

# THE ROUND TABLE

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF  
THE POLITICS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

## CONTENTS

The Politics of War	page 303
<i>After Seven Months—War Conditions and Peace Arguments—Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War—The Price of Liberty</i>	
The Dominions and the Settlement: A Plea for Conference	325
The Schism of Europe	345
<i>Germany at the Cross Roads—The Idea of Ascendancy—German Foreign Policy, 1870-1911—The Social Democratic Menace—Reform or War—The Outbreak—Absolutism or Democracy</i>	
Nietzsche and the "Culture-State"	412
Canada:	422
<i>War Measures and Politics—Increased Production in Canada—Finance and War</i>	
Australia:	447
<i>Australia and the War—Public Finance—Private Finance</i>	
South Africa:	463
<i>The Rebellion—Some Consequences</i>	
New Zealand:	487
<i>New Zealand in War—Naval Defence—The General Election</i>	

Nº 18. Price 2/6      MARCH · MCMXV  
London: MACMILLAN & CO., LTD.

## NOTE

**THE ROUND TABLE** is a co-operative enterprise conducted by people who dwell in all parts of the British Empire, and whose aim is to publish once a quarter a comprehensive review of Imperial politics, entirely free from the bias of local party issues. The affairs of **THE ROUND TABLE** in each portion of the Empire are in the hands of local residents who are responsible for all articles on the politics of their own country. It is hoped that in this way **THE ROUND TABLE** will reflect the current opinions of all parts about Imperial problems, and at the same time present a survey of them as a whole. Opinions and articles of a party character will be rigidly excluded.

**THE ROUND TABLE** can be obtained through any bookseller or through any of the following:

**UNITED KINGDOM:** Messrs Macmillan & Co., Ltd., St Martin's Street, W.C.

**CANADA:** The Macmillan Co., of Canada, 70 Bond Street, Toronto.

**AUSTRALIA:** Messrs Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 109 Russell Street, Melbourne.

**SOUTH AFRICA:** J. Tyndall, Esq., 29 Sauers Buildings, Johannesburg.

**NEW ZEALAND:** S. A. Atkinson, Esq., 162 Featherston Street, Wellington.

**INDIA:** Messrs Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 44 Hornby Road, Bombay; 294 Bow Bazaar Street, Calcutta.

**EGYPT:** Mr F. Diemer (Finck & Baylaender Suc.), Shepheard's Building, Cairo.

**CHINA, JAPAN AND STRAITS SETTLEMENTS:** Messrs Kelly & Walsh, Shanghai, Hong-Kong, Yokohama, Singapore.

**UNITED STATES:** The Macmillan Co., 64-66 Fifth Avenue, New York.



Anyone who desires any information with regard to THE ROUND TABLE and its objects or who has any difficulty in obtaining a copy at the places mentioned on the opposite page should apply to the following:

UNITED KINGDOM: The Secretary, THE ROUND TABLE,  
175 Piccadilly, London, W.

CANADA: A. J. Glazebrook, Esq., 8 Wellington Street E.,  
Toronto.

AUSTRALIA: F. W. Eggleston, Esq., Imperial Chambers,  
Bank Place, Melbourne.

SOUTH AFRICA: J. Tyndall, Esq., 29 Sauers Buildings,  
Johannesburg.

NEW ZEALAND: S. A. Atkinson, Esq., 162 Featherston  
Street, Wellington.

INDIA: A. P. Collett, Esq., I.C.S., Roorkee, U.P.

The price of THE ROUND TABLE is 2s. 6d. (65 cents, Canadian, or Rs.2) per copy. Annual subscription (including postage) 10s. (\$2.50, or Rs.7/8) per annum. Covers for binding volumes 1s. 6d. (37 cents, or Rs.1/2) can be obtained from the Publishers, Messrs Macmillan & Co., Ltd., St Martin's Street, W.C.

# CONTENTS OF NOS. 14, 15, 16, & 17.

## No. 14. MARCH, 1914.

The Irish Crisis	page 201
The South African Strike	231
Education and the Working Class	255
The New Autocracy in China	280
United Kingdom:	307
<i>The Kikuyu Controversy</i>	
Canada:	318
<i>The Session of Parliament—Naval Defence—Co-operative Credit in Saskatchewan—Oriental Immigration—The Tariff</i>	
Australia:	337
<i>The Turmoil of Politics—Finance, Development and Immigration—The Cost of Living</i>	
South Africa:	352
<i>The Indian Question before Union—The Indian Question To-day—The Real Issue</i>	
New Zealand:	366
<i>The Great Strike—The Intervention of Farmers—Seamen and Coal-Miners—The Strike in Auckland—The Government's Naval Policy</i>	

## No. 15. JUNE, 1914.

Naval Policy and the Pacific Question	page 391
<i>The Australian View—The Naval Agreement of 1909—The Anglo-Japanese Treaty and the International Balance—The Task of the next Conference</i>	
Indians and their South African Compatriots	463
South African Constitutionalism	484
United Kingdom:	501
<i>From Bradford to the Curragh—The Second Reading and its Sequel—From the Commons to the Lords—The Budget</i>	
Canada:	538
<i>Royal Governors—Grain Growers' Conventions</i>	
Australia:	550
<i>The Federal Situation—The New South Wales Elections—Land Settlement in Victoria</i>	
South Africa:	567
<i>The Indemnity Bill and Political Parties—The Railway Strike Bill—Remedial Legislation</i>	
New Zealand:	582
<i>The Session—The Naval Policy</i>	

## No. 16. SEPTEMBER, 1914.

The War in Europe: <i>Origins (1) in Austro-Hungarian Politics; (2) in the Aims of Modern Germany—The Critical Fortnight—Ultimate Issues</i>	591
Germany and the Prussian Spirit: <i>German Idealism—The Prussian Autocracy—The Strong Wine of Victory—Bismarck's Legacy—Bureaucracy and Militarism—The Religion of War—1914</i>	616
The Austro-Servian Dispute: <i>The Assassination of the Archduke—The Crises of 1908 and 1912—The Race Issue—The Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum</i>	659
Lombard Street in War	677
United Kingdom: <i>The Nationalist Volunteers—The Amending Bill and the King's Conference—An Unsolved Problem</i>	712
Canada: <i>The Provincial General Elections—The Naval Service</i>	726
Australia: <i>The Federal Situation—The Crisis in Tasmania</i>	733
South Africa: <i>The Session—The Indian Settlement</i>	739
The White Book Summarized	748
Sir Edward Grey's Speech, August 3	790
Index to Volume IV	803

## No. 17. DECEMBER, 1914.

Lord Roberts	page 1
After Four Months' War	3
Nationalism and Liberty: <i>The Two Schools—Liberalism, Nationalism and Democracy—"European Civilization" since 1815—The British Record—The Problem of a European Concert—The Peace of the World</i>	18
The Doctrine of Ascendency: <i>Alsace-Lorraine—The Prussian Poles—Racial Problems in Austria-Hungary—Balkan Nationality—Turkish Oppression</i>	70
Russia and Her Ideals: <i>The Russian Polity—The Two Russias—Reaction and Reform—Russia and other Nationalities</i>	103
War and Financial Exhaustion: <i>Cost of the War—English and German Wealth compared—England's Strength—The Position in Germany—France, Russia and Austria-Hungary—Conclusion</i>	136
United Kingdom: <i>The Irish Controversy—The Passage of the Home Rule Act—The Rupture with Turkey</i>	166
Canada: <i>The Dominion and the War—Finance—Western Legislatures and the War—Sir James Whitney's Career</i>	179
Australia: <i>Rival Policies—The Election and the War—The Result—The Government and the War</i>	201
South Africa: <i>Political Aspect of the War—Industrial and Financial Issues—Armed Rebellion</i>	219
New Zealand: <i>Sir Ian Hamilton's Visit—New Zealand and the War—Commerce and Finance in War—The Expeditionary Force</i>	237
Official Publications of Foreign Governments respecting the European Crisis: <i>Russia, Germany, Belgium</i>	258
Maps: <i>Racial and National Boundaries in Central Europe—Alsace-Lorraine and the Rhine Frontier—The Races of Austria-Hungary</i>	



## THE POLITICS OF WAR

### I. AFTER SEVEN MONTHS

THE British Empire has now been at war for seven months. During that time it has succeeded in asserting an almost complete command of the sea; it has pushed forward great preparations for a land campaign in Europe; it has held meanwhile a section amounting to rather less than a tenth of the French line in the west; and it has achieved some local successes of minor importance in different parts of the world.

There is no cause for dissatisfaction with this record, so far as it goes. The military resources of the Empire have proved far larger and more quickly available than our peace system seemed to allow. Voluntary recruiting for the new armies in Great Britain, for the expeditionary forces from the Dominions, and for all other purposes has shown a patriotic impulse running strongly and steadily through all the peoples of the British Commonwealth. That the Empire should have not less than two and a half millions of men (excluding those from India and the Dependencies) already under arms, shows a wonderful response to the stimulus of a great cause, and a very rapid expansion of military organization. It is certainly a greater achievement than most people would have thought possible seven months ago. We have, moreover, the satisfaction of knowing that our seamanship, our naval armaments, and our general naval efficiency have so far proved superior to

## The Politics of War

those of our enemies in any approximately equal test. Apart, also, from the minor actions fought, the work of the Navy upon the high seas has come up fully to the country's great hopes and traditions.

So much stands to the good. But the fact still confronts us that we are only at the beginning of our task. At sea, we have not yet defeated the main fleets of the enemy, though we have reduced them to immobility. Till they are defeated, our command of the sea will not be complete or secure. On land, we have done no more in the main European theatre than help our allies to arrest the right wing of the German advance. The German offensive has, up to the present, been stopped; and there is a general confidence that it will gain no further ground. But while we have to that extent prevented Germany from imposing her will on us, we are no nearer our main positive object, which is to impose our will on her. If hostilities were now to cease, on the terms that each side held what it possessed, she would be holding almost everything in Europe for which she has fought. History would record a signal German victory, and a decisive British defeat. For Germany is still in almost complete possession of Belgium. She is planted firmly in a formidable line of entrenchments from the Channel, through Flanders and Champagne, to the Swiss frontier in Alsace. With the help of her own ally she has, for the present, stemmed the advance of our ally in the east. In spite of the joint efforts of the British Empire, Russia and France, largely forwarded by command of the sea, to train and equip their great reserves of men, she still outnumbers, with Austria-Hungary, the forces opposed to her on both the eastern and western fronts; and all expert opinion agrees that she still has a reserve of not less than two million men to throw into the field.

There is, therefore, one question, and only one, before the Empire at the present time—how best to concentrate every available atom of its strength upon the task of defeating the Central Powers. No criterion is of any weight or value at

## War Conditions and Peace Arguments

the moment but that of efficient organization for the main purpose of the war. The worth of every measure, the key to every problem, the test of every action, whether in public or private life, lies in one consideration only—will it, or will it not, help the Empire to mass greater force at the decisive point at the earliest possible date? The question is therefore military only in the broadest sense of that term. It includes, not only the manufacture of armies and of all that armies require, but the best possible distribution of the strain which this involves, so as most effectively to carry on, in spite of it, the commercial and industrial activities essential both to military efficiency and to national staying-power, until victory is won. It also includes the concentration of the mind of the whole people upon the national task. Political and personal considerations must all yield to the central military purpose to which we are bound. Force at the decisive point must be our only thought and aim.

### II. WAR CONDITIONS AND PEACE ARGUMENTS

**T**HERE is no question whatever that the spirit of the people is equal to this task and will shrink from no sacrifice which it may demand. Throughout Great Britain, and throughout the Empire, the vast majority of men and women are banded together by a firm resolve to carry the war through to victory. The thought of failure has not entered their minds. If ever it did so, a wave of new decision and energy would sweep through the Empire from end to end.

When, however, discussion passes from this affirmation of principle to the obligations and sacrifices it may entail, a certain difference of view begins at once to make itself manifest. The dividing line is hard to trace, because the ordinary mechanism by which opinion is expressed has been largely suspended by the necessities of war. The Govern-

## The Politics of War

ment can only speak vaguely about the task which lies before it; the Opposition within certain limits inquires and suggests, but does not criticize. The measures needed to win the war can be estimated only by Ministers and their expert advisers. For the rest of the nation there is no means of judging how far the preparations already made are likely to be adequate, and how much still remains to be done. The difference of view which can be traced in public and private comment is, therefore, not so much a matter of practical opinion this way or that; it is rather a difference in the attitude of mind. And this difference arises out of the habits and traditions of peace-time, which have become ingrained in the national psychology. Consequently, though party has been effaced and our present differences of standpoint by no means coincide with party lines, these differences throw a trail of old political argument across the temporary but inexorable logic of war.

It is natural, therefore, that our attitude should constitute something of a problem for allied and neutral Powers, none of whom is as yet perhaps quite satisfied that we have put our shoulders to the wheel with all the energy and concentration required. The continuance of football matches, and other signs of the same kind, no doubt contribute to that idea; but the main reason probably lies deeper. It is a question of our mental attitude, which is not really illustrated by episodes like the football controversy so much as by the tone and spirit of a great deal of published comment on the character and exigencies of the war. This is the symptom which many of the best disposed of foreign observers find it hardest to understand.

Discussion as to what further measures we may be called upon to take is sometimes met, for instance, with a satisfied statement that we have already done all, and more than all, which we undertook in our peace relations with France, Russia and Belgium. Those who use this argument can point with great effect to certain indubitable facts—the fact that we are already preparing to put ten men in the



## War Conditions and Peace Arguments

European field where we originally promised one; that we are nevertheless conducting military operations on a large scale in Egypt, Mesopotamia and elsewhere; that our economic and industrial strength is one of the most weighty elements in the massed resources of the Empire and its allies; and that this, as well as other no less important factors, is due to the strength and efficiency of the British Fleet. All these assertions are true; but are they relevant as arguments against a further, and, indeed, the greatest possible, development of military power? Manifestly not, unless the development of further military power would weaken us unduly in other forms of power equally essential to success. Of that condition the Government alone can judge, for no persons beside the Government and its expert advisers have the necessary information. But, apart from that condition, which the public cannot assess, the fact that we are already doing at least as much as our contract enjoined is no argument against doing more, if it be required. The object of our preparations is, not merely to satisfy our consciences, but to win the war. It will be little consolation to have done as much as we bargained for, if that object be not attained. There is only one possible standard of conduct between nations allied in a struggle like this—that each should do its utmost always till the war is won.\*

Some of our public and private reasoning evinces a similar failure of understanding in regard to the factor of time. It is

\* These words had already been written when a private letter on the situation was received from France, of which the following is an extract:

“L'opinion publique en France demande à l'Angleterre de donner ‘toute’ sa force à la lutte. Le public français sent mieux—je n'ose écrire: connaît mieux—la situation internationale qu'on ne le croit, que e ne le croyais moi-même. Il se rend compte, ce qui à mon avis est très exact, que l'Angleterre joue son avenir, son existence presque, entre l'Yser et la Suisse, tout comme nous. Il s'attend donc à la voir marcher aussi à fond que nous, et avec *toute* sa puissance.—Ceci, pour répondre à certains articles anglais que j'ai vus, où l'on dit que l'Angleterre a déjà fait plus que ce qu'elle avait promis. Ce point de vue là ne sera jamais admis en France. Il ne sera jamais question de ce qu'elle a promis, mais de ce qu'elle peut faire, et dans une alliance vraiment intime, c'est la seule formule saine.”

## The Politics of War

suggested that before we prepare to exert in France or Flanders the utmost military pressure of which our resources are capable, we should wait to see whether the growing menace of invasion from the east will not weaken the western German armies to breaking-point and prove that our present armies are enough. The same argument appears very often when economic factors are discussed. It is held to be wise that we should wait and see whether the exhaustion of German finances, the inadequacy of the German food-supply, or the strangling economic effect of the commercial blockade, will not save us from the need of further military preparation. And these pretexts for delay present themselves, again, when compulsory enlistment is put forward as a possible necessity. Apart from such questions as to whether the present supply of recruits is still adequate, or whether the provision of equipment will not soon overtake the provision of men—which questions the Government alone can answer—we are told that, even if the voluntary system is now falling short of our needs, it should be given another trial in this form or that, as though, other things being equal, a delay of three or four months for experiments were a matter of indifference in war. Those who hold such opinions seem to make the assumption that, while time is strictly limited on the German side, it is unlimited on ours, and that for the sake of further experiments we are justified in facing an incalculably greater toll of loss and suffering, and in asking the same sacrifice, not only from our allies, whose hearts are in the war, but from neutrals, whose hearts are set upon the return of peace. The argument also overlooks the risk of unexpected turns of chance, in which war abounds, and makes nothing of jeopardizing by inadequate support the morale and efficiency of our armies already in the field.

Allies or neutrals who took these failures of judgment or of vision in our discussion of the war as serious indications of a weakening in our national resolve would be giving them much more importance than they deserve. Whatever

## War Conditions and Peace Arguments

measures the Government thinks necessary for victory, those measures the country will approve and accept; there is absolutely no question of that. But since such arguments produce some real confusion at home, and prejudice our case abroad, it is worth while to trace their origin and examine their strength.

One and all, they proceed from the same cause—an inability to realize that war and peace are different worlds, with standards and values which cannot possibly be transposed. The fact that we are a free people fighting for freedom does not absolve us from the hard conditions of military success. There is no way of winning the war except by driving the German armies back into Germany and defeating them there. To that purpose every consideration must be subordinated except the recognized dictates of humanity. Our task is simply to throw as much force as possible as soon as possible against the German lines. Every available man not enlisted, every minute wasted in delay, is so much taken from our prospect of victory, and so much added to the suffering of the world. There is only one standard of effort in a life-and-death struggle like this—the utmost of which time and our resources permit.

The reason that our whole people does not see these realities plain is, however, not far to seek. In European countries, even where popular government is as much a reality as in ours, compulsory military training has brought war and its necessities home to all parts of the community. When mobilization is ordered, the military supersedes the civil mind, not merely in the government, but in the people itself; and till peace returns, the whole nation becomes a conscious and determined machine with one sole object, the defeat of the enemy. We have never had the realities so brought home. Our manhood is not trained; our actual territory is not menaced; our minds, like our meadows, are entrenched behind a strip of sea. While, therefore, our men will volunteer in thousands to serve the country's need, the menace to our security is in a sense as abstract as the nature

## The Politics of War

of our cause, and there is nothing to bring home the actual terms of the struggle in which the nation is engaged. The rapine wrought on the soil of Belgium and France has stirred English feeling to its depths, but sympathy with ravaged neighbours, whose wrongs are heard of but not seen, is not the same as a national understanding of the conditions on which wars like this are won. For great numbers of our people it is hard to recognize that the present war is different, not merely in degree, but in kind, from those in which for a hundred years we have been engaged, and that its necessities are too great and pressing to be weighed in the same political scales as those of peace. War is unfamiliar, and there is nothing to help the average man or woman in realizing what it means.

In peace time all our decisions are governed by political principle or political expediency. We are accustomed to believe that arguments will determine the course of opinion, and opinion the course of events. Time is not usually an important factor; and there is no need to trouble about new expedients until old ones have demonstrably failed. Every measure is, moreover, viewed in the light of precedent, and grave consideration is given to the precedent which a new measure will itself create. The sense of continuity is strong, and every party tests the proposals of the day by their probable effect in weakening or strengthening that party's future influence. As a nation, we are by long training self-governing political beings. Many battalions in the new armies have probably felt, for instance, that various regimental questions should be settled by vote. We could not, if we would, entirely exorcize the political habit of mind. Every section amongst us has its political canons, reverently set up as lights for the future or as lessons from the past. To those canons, as political beings, we instinctively appeal, assuming—again as political beings—that every question can be settled, and should be settled, by force of argument. Our political methods and standards are second nature to us, and since the struggle with Napoleonic

## War Conditions and Peace Arguments

France a century ago they have been developed in great numbers of our people without a thought to war.

The controversy regarding conscription, which has figured to some extent in the Press and which frequently comes up in private discussions, illustrates very well the danger in war time of this political habit of mind. Those who recommend conscription, for instance, are very largely believers in compulsory military training in time of peace. They assure us that we should have been a better people had we adopted it before the war, and they indicate not obscurely that this is the Heaven-sent opportunity of securing its benefits to the English people for all time. Those who oppose it use similar arguments, but converse in effect. They declare that the refusal of the British people to accept compulsory military training in the past has been an essential element in the liberty for which they are fighting now. It is only so, they say, that Great Britain has escaped the cult of "militarism" which has besotted Germany. To accept conscription would be to lose for ever the light of English freedom and to sink to the level of the pit from which we hope to raise even our foes.

Either of these schools may be right in their views, so far as peace time is concerned; but they are equally wrong in supposing that such arguments are entitled to weight in war. Our military policy in the future will clearly depend entirely on the issue of the present struggle, and no consideration is of any weight for the time being except to secure an issue favourable to ourselves. To prejudice discussion of our present requirements by recriminations about past policy, before the war was on us, or anxieties about future policy, when the war is over, is entirely to misunderstand the terms upon which alone victory can be secured. If a measure is necessary to victory, we must adopt it, whether it suits our private politics or not. If it is unnecessary, we must forswear it, however convenient the moment may seem for carrying it through. There is one criterion, and one only, by which all measures must be

## The Politics of War

judged—will they, or will they not, help to win the war?

A reference to the experience of the great sister-democracy in the United States in its struggle for existence half a century ago may help to bring the imperative necessity of this single criterion home.

### III. ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE CIVIL WAR.

THE Civil War in the United States began with the bombardment of Fort Sumter at dawn on April 12, 1861. The garrison capitulated on April 14, and Lincoln issued his first call for volunteers on April 15. On April 20 Robert E. Lee, who had been invited unofficially to take command of the Union armies in the field, resigned his commission. The first serious action was fought at Bull Run on July 21.

Conscription was not adopted by either side during the first year; but in April, 1862, it was found necessary, in spite of their early victories, by the Confederate commanders, who had from the outset to make head against greatly superior numbers. The Act of April, 1862, called out all white men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five. Power was taken in September of the same year to call out those from thirty-five to forty-five, but was not used till the following July. In February, 1864, as the struggle reached the last stage, all between the ages of seventeen and fifty were conscribed. It is asserted in Confederate histories, apparently with good reason, that by the end the Confederacy had enlisted all men between sixteen and sixty.\* No autocratic government has imposed upon its subjects a greater sacrifice than this, imposed upon themselves of their own will by the people of the South.

The task of the Northern leaders, though less exacting

\* For a good discussion of the subject by a Northern writer see *Studies Military and Diplomatic*, by Charles Francis Adams, pp. 282-7.

## Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War

in a military sense, was politically more difficult. With their opponents the cause of principle in which the war originated became ever more closely identified with a literal struggle for hearth and home. As their need increased, their spirit was quickened by the simplest and most intimate of human loyalties, which will always be stronger in their appeal than any political idea. In the North, on the contrary, it was political principle, and that alone, which was at stake. Northern society was not menaced from top to base; very few Northern districts felt the actual touch of war. Imagination was needed to grasp the meaning of Lincoln's struggle for human freedom and the unity of the commonwealth. It is little wonder, therefore, that the unanimity of the Northern people was never so great as that of the South, and that their enthusiasm tended to grow weak as that of their opponents showed strong. To win the cause of unity and freedom they had to drive their arms into the heart of a brother-people, which believed itself to be fighting for all that is most sacred in life. A Lincoln could see the issue plain; but lesser men had shorter vision, and as the war proceeded, they dropped away or flagged.

The principle of compulsion was in consequence strongly contested in many of the Northern States. In the early stages of the war the President had appealed for a quota of volunteers in proportion to its population from each State. In many cases the response was splendid, but it was unequal; and by the beginning of 1863, when the Congressional election had shown a considerable falling off in the President's following and a series of striking successes had been won by the Confederate troops, it was plain that other measures would be needed to bring the war to a successful conclusion.

Lincoln's political creed centred on that article in the Declaration of Independence which proclaims that "all men are created equal, with an inalienable right to liberty." "I have never had a feeling, politically, that did not spring from the sentiments embodied in the Declaration of Inde-



## The Politics of War

pendence. . . . It was that which gave promise that in due time the weights would be lifted from the shoulders of all men, and that all men should have an equal chance." Such were the words used by him in an impromptu speech in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, on his way to Washington immediately after his election as President.\* He was, moreover, of Quaker ancestry, and detested the appeal to force. "Your people," he wrote to the Society of Friends, "have had and are having very great trials on principles and faith. Opposed to both war and oppression, they can only practically oppose oppression by war." It was his own predicament, the more severe that he could also win the battle of freedom only by demanding a temporary sacrifice of their own personal freedom from those who had taken up arms in its name. Add to this the fact that his training and experience, up to the time when he became President, had kept him in that region of political discussion where ordinary men most easily confuse the respective force of phrases and of facts, where compromise of principle is constantly hidden in the mists of rhetoric, and every ordinary method of thought is worlds away from the positive and rapid decisions required for successful war—add these conditions of the atmosphere in which he had had his being to the natural bent of his own mind, and Lincoln's difficulties seem too vast even for a character like his.

So far as the political problem was concerned, the impossibility of compromise between "yes" and "no" was soon fixed in his mind; it is manifest in the clear and firm accents of the First Inaugural Address. But politicians have often accepted the necessity of war without being able, in that ordeal itself, to face what it required; and Lincoln was no exception to the general rule in the first two years of his trial. Political compromises, political objects, political fears were for many months the dominant factor in the military counsels of the North; and the consequence was seen in a series of half-measures which failed entirely to cope with

\* *Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln*, Nicolay and Hay, Vol. VI, p. 157.



## Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War

the decisive military leadership of the South. At the end of two years' campaigning, during which the Northern bulletins had constantly assumed the imminent collapse of the Confederate arms, no serious progress of any kind had been made with the task of imposing the will of the Union upon the insurgent States.

By the winter of 1862-3, however, nearly two years after the outbreak of war, Lincoln faced the military problem with the same quiet firmness which from the beginning had characterized his political thinking. The system of draft quotas from States had broken down. Volunteers had not ceased to enlist (they continued to do so even when conscription was passed), but the supply was unequally distributed, inadequate and irregular. Compulsion had already been tried indirectly through the medium of the State governments, but seems to have been largely illusory. Consequently, after long discussion, Congress, on March 3, 1863, passed a Conscription Act which was to be enforced directly by the Federal Government. "The country was divided into enrolment districts, corresponding in general to the congressional districts of the different States, each of which was in charge of a provost-marshal. At the head of these officers was a provost-marshal-general, whose office at Washington formed a separate bureau of the War Department."\* The Act required that all able-bodied citizens of the United States, and all foreigners intending to become citizens, between the ages of twenty and forty-five should be enrolled. A system of exemptions was provided, and drafts were to be made proportionately from the rolls of each State as need arose. John Sherman, who claimed paternity for the main features of the law, no doubt expressed the mind of the President in a letter written to a friend on March 20. "The law," he said, "is vital to our success, and although it was adopted with fear and trembling and only after all other expedients had failed, yet I am confident it will be enforced with the general acquiescence

\* Rhodes's *History of the United States*, 1850-77, Vol. IV, p. 237.

## The Politics of War

of the people, and that through it we see the road to peace. After all, Congress cannot help us out of our difficulties. It may by its acts and omissions prolong the war, but there is no solution to it except through the military forces." Not only this, but other measures, showed that the political habit of mind which Lincoln had first brought to bear upon the conduct of war was being transformed in the hard school of experience. It was fortunate for the Union that the ultimate responsibility for its policy in the months of crisis between the autumn of 1862 and the summer of 1863 lay upon a mind and character like his.

Sherman's prediction that the people of the Union would acquiesce in the policy of compulsion was not seriously belied by the event, though there was some violent opposition. Enrolment began in March, and the first drafts were called for in July. The system adopted carried with it some of the worst hardships of conscription, for the selection of men for service from the rolls of men liable was made entirely by lot. Nevertheless no opposition was shown in Rhode Island or Massachusetts, where the drawing began. Four days later, however, riots were threatened in two strongly democratic districts of New York city, where the foreign population was large, and developed ultimately into a widespread insurrection which gave the city over to arson and street fighting for four days. In this the Irish immigrant figured prominently, and many negroes were lynched, as representatives of the race which had caused the war. The Government, however, took strong measures against the mob, and the riots were ultimately put down with an estimated loss in killed and wounded of 1,000. There were also riots in Boston and in Troy, but these were rapidly suppressed. Lincoln had throughout refused to yield anything to mob clamour or to violence.\*

After the riots strong pressure was put upon him to abandon compulsion, and doubts were cast upon the

\* This account is taken from Rhodes, Vol. iv, pp. 320-30, where the original documents are quoted.

## Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War

constitutional justification of the Conscription Act; but he remained proof against all political opposition. His position is set out in a paper entitled "Opinion on the Draft,"\* which was never made public—presumably because the opposition was not sufficiently serious.

The memorandum is addressed to those members of the public who, while "sincerely devoted to republican institutions and the territorial integrity" of the Union, are yet "opposed to what is called the draft, or conscription." It is written throughout in the style of quiet but convincing analysis, which Lincoln made his own:

At the beginning of the war, and ever since, a variety of motives, pressing some in one direction and some in the other, would be presented to the mind of each man physically fit for a soldier, upon the combined effect of which motives he would, or would not, voluntarily enter the service. Among these motives would be patriotism, political bias, ambition, personal courage, love of adventure, want of employment and convenience; or the opposites of some of these. We already have, and have had in the service, as appears, substantially all that can be obtained upon this voluntary weighing of motives. And yet we must somehow obtain more, or relinquish the original object of the contest, together with all the blood and treasure already expended in the effort to secure it. To meet this necessity the law for the draft has been enacted. You who do not wish to be soldiers do not like this law. This is natural; nor does it imply want of patriotism. Nothing can be so just and necessary as to make us like it if it is disagreeable to us. We are prone, too, to find false arguments with which to excuse ourselves for opposing such disagreeable things.†

In some detail the President then analyses the objections urged against the law. The first of these condemned it as unconstitutional. His reply is firm:

The case simply is, the Constitution provides that the Congress shall have power to raise and support armies; and by this Act the Congress has exercised the power to raise and support armies. . . . The power is given fully, completely, unconditionally. It is not a

\* *Complete Works*, Vol. ix, pp. 74-83.

† *Ibid.*, Vol. ix, pp. 74-5.

## The Politics of War

power to raise armies if State authorities consent; nor if the men to compose the armies are entirely willing; but it is a power to raise and support armies given to Congress by the Constitution, without an "if."

He then deals with other objections—such as that the law, though constitutional, was unnecessary and improper.

Such [he writes] would be a law to raise armies when no armies are needed. But this is not such. The republican institutions and territorial integrity of our country cannot be maintained without the further raising and supporting of armies. There can be no army without men. Men can be had only voluntarily, or involuntarily. We have ceased to obtain them voluntarily, and to obtain them involuntarily is the draft—the conscription. If you dispute the fact, and declare that men can still be had voluntarily in sufficient numbers, prove the assertion by yourselves volunteering in such numbers, and I shall gladly give up the draft. Or, if not sufficient numbers, but anyone of you will volunteer, he for his single self will escape all the horrors of the draft, and will thereby do only what each one of at least a million of his manly brethren have already done. Their toil and blood have been given as much for you as for themselves. Shall it be lost rather than that you, too, will bear your part? I do not say that all who would avoid serving in the war are unpatriotic; but I do think every patriot should willingly take his chance under a law made with great care, in order to secure entire fairness.\*

The memorandum goes on to discuss other objections in detail, and then returns to the principle:

The principle of the draft, which simply is involuntary or enforced service, is not new. It has been practised in all ages of the world. It was well-known to the framers of our Constitution as one of the modes of raising armies, at the time they placed in that instrument the provision that "the Congress shall have power to raise and support armies." It had been used just before in establishing our independence, and it was also used under the Constitution in 1812. Wherein is the peculiar hardship now? Shall we shrink from the necessary means to maintain our free Government, which our grandfathers employed to establish it and our own fathers have already employed once to maintain it? Are we degenerate? Has the manhood of the race run out?†

\* *Complete Works*, Vol. ix, pp. 76-7.

† *Ibid.*, Vol. ix, pp. 80-1.

## Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War

"With these views, and on these principles," Lincoln concludes, "I feel bound to tell you it is my purpose to see the draft law faithfully executed." So, on a note of characteristic resolution, the memorandum ends.

The President, though he never published this declaration, was fully equal to his word. Not only did he maintain the principle, but, realizing that time is a decisive factor in war, with which no liberties can be taken in the face of a determined foe, he also resisted all the more insidious arguments which were urged merely in favour of delay. "I do not object to abide a decision of the United States Supreme Court," he wrote to Governor Seymour of New York, "... but I cannot consent to lose the time while it is being obtained."

We are contending with an enemy who, as I understand, drives every able-bodied man he can reach into his ranks, very much as a butcher drives sheep into a slaughter-pen. No time is wasted, no argument is used. This produces an army which will soon turn upon our now victorious soldiers, already in the field, if they shall not be sustained by recruits, as they should be. It produces an army with a rapidity not to be matched on our side, if we first waste time to re-experiment with the voluntary system . . . and then more time to obtain a Court decision as to whether a law is constitutional which requires a part of those not now in the service to go to the aid of those who are already in it.\*

Telegraphing a week later to the same authority, who had renewed his argument for delay, Lincoln said: "Looking to time, as heretofore, I am unwilling to give up a drafted man now even for the certainty, much less for the mere chance, of getting a volunteer hereafter."†

This decisive grasp of the governing principle of military success—to raise the maximum of force in the minimum of time—shows a striking change of mind from the delays, indecisions and half-measures of the first two years of war; and little doubt is now possible that it turned the scale in favour

\* *Complete Works*, Vol. ix, pp. 60-1.

† *Ibid.*, Vol. ix, p. 83

## The Politics of War

of the North. The fortunes of the campaign depended in the last analysis upon the willingness of neutrals to go on suffering the loss and inconvenience occasioned by the Federal blockade of the Southern ports. France had long been hostile to it; Russia was inclined to support the French Government; and Great Britain, apart from the widespread distress produced by the stoppage of cotton imports to Lancashire, might easily have reverted to the idea, abandoned in the previous autumn, of shortening the war and all the suffering involved in it by recognizing the Confederate Government. The turn of victory in favour of the North depended therefore very largely upon the world's estimate of the Northern morale; and Lincoln's firmness established that morale amid the political weakness of his own associates and followers, refuting thereby the doubts of the Northern spirit which were almost universal among neutral Powers.

### IV. THE PRICE OF LIBERTY

THE American Civil War presents, of course, a very incomplete analogy to the vast international struggle which is raging to-day, but the conditions with which Lincoln was called upon to deal in the Northern States are in many ways similar to our own. He had to govern a democracy averse by habit and tradition to any interference with its established liberties. The case for restricting liberty for the moment, in order that the cause of liberty might thereby triumph, depended upon a proper appreciation of the unfamiliar conditions of war, at which it was hard for the people of the North to arrive. In the South those conditions were brought home rapidly by bitter experience, as in France and Belgium to-day. But in the North the struggle necessarily seemed more abstract and remote, as the present war still seems to large numbers in the British Commonwealth. Their homes were not menaced in any

## The Price of Liberty

serious degree, their daily life was not very greatly changed; and as the war proceeded, industry and commerce showed great activity, and much of the energy of all classes was absorbed in everyday routine.

Nor did Lincoln's difficulties end there. He, like Lord Kitchener, had to create a great army out of nothing—nothing, that is, in the way of organization, equipment, trained intelligence and cadres. The mind of the country had absolutely no understanding of military necessities. The struggles of the War of Independence, and of 1812, had, indeed, shown how difficult it was for such a people to address itself to war, and how necessary it was, if war was to be made, to enforce a new idea of discipline and public spirit, and to tighten government control. But those examples had been forgotten by the intervening generations which had thriven in peace, and most Americans believed—as many of us believe to-day of our struggle with Napoleon a hundred years ago—that victory was won by the sheer impulse of the people towards national liberty. Popular histories expatiate on the great declarations or treaties, and the victories or defeats, which consummate events; but they do not say so much of the continuous struggle of soldiers like Washington and Wellington, or of statesmen like Pitt and Lincoln, for adequate support from the peoples whom they saved.

Lincoln's great conflict is near enough both in time and character to our own to throw some light upon the task in which we have to succeed. It illustrates the immense responsibility resting on free governments in war, and proves how little their measures can be guided by the ordinary canons of peace. If Lincoln, the man of the people, the child of the Declaration of Independence, the tried and faithful servant of the Constitution, who strove, in his own great words, that "government of the people, for the people, by the people might not perish from the earth"—if such a man, in such a cause, resorted to temporary measures so greatly prejudicial to personal liberty as the



## The Politics of War

suspension of Habeas Corpus and conscription by lot, the lesson should teach us, too, that we cannot with reason judge the necessities of our own struggle in the same scales as of wont, or use peace arguments against the sacrifices which victory may entail.

In this respect, Lincoln's adoption of conscription is a typical example of the new standards to which he was driven, and which involved a complete, though temporary, revision of his own democratic ideas—a revision of which all history will endorse the rightness, so long as popular government endures. It does not prove that conscription is necessary in our own case. Of that the Government alone can judge. But it does prove that the ordinary arguments for and against conscription in time of peace have nothing to do with its wisdom or unwisdom in the course of a great war. In the United States it was abandoned as soon as the war was won, and the standing army of the Republic is now scarcely more than a hundred thousand strong.

The speech delivered by the Under-Secretary for War in the House of Commons on February 8, reticent though it was, makes the issue very plain; for it shows both how great the exigencies of the struggle are, and how imperfectly they are still appreciated by many sections of the country, though these are no less patriotic than the rest. Speaking of recruiting, Mr Tennant said:

I can only assure the House that recruiting has been very satisfactory. (Cheers.) Of course, it varies from week to week, and possibly at the present moment if a little more energy were to be put into recruiting it would not be out of place. But on the whole there has been no cause for discontent; still less for disquiet. But we want more men. Every man will be needed in this great life-and-death struggle in which we are engaged. The time approaches when we may have to make inroads—in fact, inroads have already been made—into important industries upon which large bodies of the population depend. Important issues must be involved in the denudation of the labour market of large numbers of men of military age and of military physique. If I might address myself to my hon. friends below the gangway, I would appeal to them to help us, the Government, to



## The Price of Liberty

organize the forces of labour. I would ask them to help us that where one man goes to join the colours his place may be taken by another man not of military age or physique. I would ask them to assist the Government also in granting—only for the period of the war; I lay stress upon that—some relaxation of their rules and regulations, especially in the armament works.

The difficulty of adjusting our system of government to the special needs of war can be read between the lines of this mixture of assurance and appeal. Necessity, in the face of an enemy, compels the Government to be oracular—Mr Tennant, indeed, insisted on the need of reticence earlier in his speech—and yet only plain speech by the Government can bring its requirements home. In such conditions, Mr Tennant's assurance that "there has been no cause for discontent" is satisfactory, and may be taken to mean that men have hitherto been coming forward as rapidly as they could be trained and equipped. But it is also clear from his words that more men, and still more, will soon be required; and his appeal well illustrates how difficult it may be, not only to regulate effectively between the needs of the new armies and those of the supplying industries which they deplete, but also to bring home to many classes of the community what a war like this involves. If, as he declares, "every man will be needed in this great life-and-death struggle in which we are engaged," those who allow peace prejudices and rules and ideas to hinder the progress of work essential to the national cause have clearly not realized either what victory may demand or what is their individual responsibility as citizens for the threatened common weal.

Our liberties are on trial in the greatest of all ordeals, and on the issue of that trial their future depends. So grave is the emergency that our whole political life has been transformed from top to base; and we have put upon our Government a responsibility which is different in kind from its responsibility in peace, for it cannot be checked or criticized. It lies, therefore, with Ministers in a special degree to throw off the politics of peace and frame their

## The Politics of War

conduct squarely by the decalogue of war. But our responsibility as citizens is not less, because theirs, as our representatives, is more. It is for every individual to seek to understand so far as he can the new conditions which war has imposed, to put aside the narrower rules or objects which legitimately governed his conduct in time of peace, and to keep one purpose only in his mind—how best to throw his weight, small though it be, into that great effort of endurance and resolve which alone will make our cause prevail.

# THE DOMINIONS AND THE SETTLEMENT

## A PLEA FOR CONFERENCE

### I

THE whole British Empire, including five self-governing Dominions, found itself suddenly at war on the morning of August 5, 1914. The decision had been taken by the British Government, which first consulted the Parliament of the United Kingdom, but could not in the circumstances consult the Dominion Governments. The latter, though autonomous national Governments in their own and in our esteem, had no more voice in the decision than the Borough Council of West Ham.

In the present constitutional conditions of the Empire this anomaly was inevitable. The diplomatic crisis preceding the war moved so rapidly that consultation was simply impracticable. And fortunately the action of Germany which brought us into the war was so flagrantly opposed to treaty faith, and so clearly menacing to British security, that public opinion supported the British Government instantly and unanimously throughout the Empire.

But the process cannot be repeated in the settlement of peace, if the unity which the war has so finely brought out is not thereafter to be jeopardized. The Dominions are spending their blood and treasure in the conflict, and they are as vitally concerned as ourselves in the result. They will be bound like ourselves by the engagements which must necessarily be formed in concluding a reasonable peace; and if Imperial co-operation is not to collapse altogether their naval and military preparations will, for many years

## The Dominions and the Settlement

to come, be governed like ours by the nature of the settlement, which will go far to define the future responsibilities of the Empire in the way of treaty guarantees to neutral States and in the matter of its own defence. They are, moreover, conquering territory by their own efforts, and will rightly demand a voice in the disposal of it at the end of the war.

It is obvious, therefore, that peace should not be concluded without some previous consultation with the Dominion Governments regarding the terms on which it should be made; and the British Government is, in fact, pledged to such consultation by the resolution unanimously passed at the Imperial Conference of 1911. In this it is expressly declared, with the full approval of Mr Asquith and his colleagues, that the Dominions shall be afforded "an opportunity of consultation" regarding British policy at the next Hague Conference, and that "a similar procedure, where time and opportunity and the subject-matter permit, shall as far as possible be used when preparing instructions for the negotiation of other International Agreements affecting the Dominions." Patently, this undertaking covers such negotiations as must take place at the end of the war.

Personal consultation, round a table, is the only effective form of consultation for the purpose in view. It differs not only in degree, but in kind, from consultation by correspondence. General Botha and Mr Fisher both laid particular stress upon it in 1911; and it is plainly necessitated by the very diverse character of the business which the peace settlement will involve. No one in his senses would suggest that, when peace comes in sight, the belligerent Governments should endeavour to agree on terms without meeting in conference; and it is hardly more reasonable to suppose that an exchange of dispatches between the Governments of the British Empire would sufficiently meet their different needs and expectations. No business firm in the world would attempt so important an exchange of views by cable or through the post; and it is only an utter lack of imagination

## The Dominions and the Settlement

that makes it possible for such cable-and-post procedure to be advocated in a crisis of the affairs of a great commonwealth.

Since, however, the argument for consultation of Ministers round a table before the peace negotiations begin does not appear to be self-evident, it may be as well to show that it is supported by a long series of events and controversies, in consequence of which the need of consultation has been more and more clearly expressed by every Dominion Government. Mr Deakin, for instance, laid great emphasis upon it at the Conference of 1907, on account of Australian dissatisfaction with the Anglo-French Agreement in regard to the New Hebrides; and it has been urged again and again in relation to every important foreign negotiation with which the Dominions have been directly concerned for many years past.

A long and painful history would, indeed, be necessary in order to bring home its full importance, as well as the unfortunate consequences which have always followed upon neglect of it. That harrowing narrative is, however, hardly necessary here. It will suffice to quote the views expressed, and the pledges given, at the last Imperial Conference in 1911, since they epitomize the teaching of about two centuries of Imperial experience.

### II

THE importance of the subject was brought out at the Conference of 1911 in three separate discussions. It figured in a general way in the debate on Sir Joseph Ward's resolution in favour of an Imperial Council, which was much criticized by all the other Prime Ministers, and ultimately withdrawn. A sentence from General Botha's speech may be taken as fairly representing the general opinion of the Conference throughout its debates.

No one can feel more than I do [he said] that, as often as the British Government has to deal with matters which may affect a

## The Dominions and the Settlement

particular part of the Empire, it is essential that the particular Dominion concerned should have an opportunity of being heard and of expressing its views.\*

This declaration gives the keynote of all subsequent references to the position of the Dominions with regard to foreign or general Imperial policy. Shortly after the discussion on Sir Joseph Ward's resolution, the Conference held a joint meeting with the Committee of Defence, at which Sir Edward Grey made a statement upon the general position of international affairs. Referring to this occasion on the last day of the Conference, Mr Asquith said:

You will all, I am sure, remember our meeting in the Committee of Defence, when Sir Edward Grey presented his survey of the foreign policy of the Empire. That is a thing which will be stamped upon all our recollections, and I do not suppose there is one of us—I speak for myself, as I am sure you will speak for yourselves—who did not feel when that exposition of our foreign relations had been concluded that we realized in a much more intimate and comprehensive sense than we had ever done before the international position and its bearings upon the problems of government in the different parts of the Empire itself.†

This tribute was cordially endorsed afterwards in public statements by General Botha and Mr Fisher, the Prime Minister of Australia. General Botha said:

I look upon the work of the Conference with the utmost satisfaction. . . . The most important and far-reaching principle which has been established is that the Governments of the Dominions should be taken into the confidence of the Imperial Government with regard to foreign policy. I do not think that the public fully realize the great importance of that step and how much it will bind us still more closely together. Next in significance is the resolution accepting the principle that the particular Dominion interested should be consulted by the Imperial Government before the latter binds itself by any foreign treaty on a matter affecting that particular part of the Empire. This principle affects South Africa more than any of the other Dominions where our territory is contiguous to that of several European Powers. Many other resolutions of great import to us all were passed, but it is not in the number of these

\* *Minutes of Proceedings of the Imperial Conference*, 1911, Cd. 5745, p. 69.

† Cd. 5745, p. 440.

## The Dominions and the Settlement

that I measure the good work that has been done. It is the knowledge that we have discussed so many problems in the friendliest manner, and in a greater spirit of solidarity than was ever displayed at previous Conferences, that will enable us to return to our homes with the conviction that we have one common ideal—to be achieved on different lines, it may be—but still all in the direction of stronger Imperial unity.\*

The other testimonies to the value of the precedent set by Sir Edward Grey were equally warm.

The Conference proceeded at a later stage to discuss the Declaration of London, the negotiation of which without consultation had produced a resolution expressing disapprobation from the Australian Government. The debate on details is of no consequence now, but the general trend of opinion on the principle of consultation is all-important. Mr Batchelor, the Australian Minister of External Affairs—whose death not long after the Conference has been a grave loss to the Commonwealth and the Empire—expressed it very fairly in his opening speech. He said:

We are to-day approaching the consideration of this Declaration of London at too late a stage to alter the course of negotiations in any way, or at too late a stage to do anything. Ought the self-governing Dominions to be in that position? The only opportunity we have of considering it is when it is too late to modify in any sense, or to suggest modification. We can, of course, urge on you that it should not be ratified, but that is taking a very extreme course, a course which nothing but the feeling that the safety of the Empire is in some way endangered by the provisions would justify us in taking. But ought we not to have had some opportunity of urging a modification possibly in some direction?†

Mr Fisher, the Prime Minister, supported his colleague very strongly in this argument.

I only wish [he said] to convey to this Conference and to the Government that we desire, as far as it is practicable to do so, not only to be consulted after things are done, but to be consulted while you have ideas in your minds and before you begin to carry them out and commit us to them.‡

\* Interview with Reuter's representative, printed in *The Times* of June 22, 1911.

† Cd. 5745, p. 99.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

## The Dominions and the Settlement

Precisely the same point was emphasized by General Botha before dealing with the details of the Declaration.

The question [he said] is how far, when the Imperial Government negotiates with foreign countries treaties or agreements which may affect particular parts of the Empire, it should consult the self-governing Dominions concerned before committing itself. I intended to discuss this question at greater length, but . . . I will content myself by stating my profound conviction that it is in the highest interest of the Empire that the Imperial Government should not definitely bind itself by any promise or agreement with a foreign country, which may affect a particular Dominion, without consulting the Dominion concerned. The debate in the House of Lords which took place on the subject of the Declaration of London was very instructive in connection with this principle. I closely followed the, if I may be allowed to say so, very excellent debate in the House of Lords on this important matter, and I believe that I am correct when I say that, with the exception of one noble lord, not a single member looked upon the question at issue from the point of view of the Dominions, and the noble lord who did refer to it from this standpoint only did so more or less casually.\*

The point of view of the Dominions was thus very clearly and reasonably stated. Sir Edward Grey acknowledged the fact cordially, and went on to give their representations a general assent. He was careful, indeed, to point out the necessary limits to consultation, of which the outbreak of war has given so striking an example; and both he and Mr Asquith naturally emphasized, in the course of the Conference, the impossibility of sharing the ultimate responsibility between different Governments. Neither of these reservations has lost any of its importance in the present situation, and they obviously must govern any measures that can now be taken to provide for consultation upon the settlement. But, subject to them, a very definite pledge was given that consultation would be provided for to the fullest degree possible. "I agree," said Sir Edward Grey, "and the Government agrees entirely, that the Dominions ought to be consulted, and that they ought to be consulted before the next Hague Conference takes place, about the whole

\* Cd. 5745, p. 125.



## The Dominions and the Settlement

programme of that Conference." Sir Edward Grey stated, moreover—in reply to an enquiry from Mr Fisher—that he intended this pledge to apply, not merely to the Hague Conference, but to all foreign negotiations which affected the Dominions. The following resolution was accordingly passed unanimously by the Conference:

That this Conference, after hearing the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, cordially welcomes the proposals of the Imperial Government, viz.: (a) that the Dominions shall be afforded an opportunity of consultation when framing the instructions to be given to the British delegates at future meetings of the Hague Conference, and that Conventions affecting the Dominions provisionally assented to at that Conference shall be circulated among the Dominion Governments for their consideration before any such Convention is signed; (b) that a similar procedure where time and opportunity and the subject-matter permit shall, as far as possible, be used when preparing instructions for the negotiation of other International Agreements affecting the Dominions.\*

The scope of this resolution was clearly broad enough to cover any negotiation affecting the general interests and responsibilities of the Empire, and the Conference in adopting it showed some anxiety lest it should handicap British diplomacy. The point was raised finally just before the resolution was passed:

*General Botha:* Do I understand you think this will not handicap in any way the British Government?

*Mr Asquith:* In order to prevent the possibility of that—and Mr Fisher very fairly acknowledged yesterday that we must be careful in these matters, and Sir Wilfrid Laurier pointed out many important considerations—in the second branch here the words used are rather carefully chosen: "a similar procedure where time and opportunity and the subject-matter permit."

*General Botha:* I want it clear. I do not want to handicap the British Government. I want them to undertake the full responsibility.

*Mr Asquith:* The British Government do not want to shovel it on to the Dominions.

*Mr Fisher:* I do not want to handicap you, either. We want to be associated as far as possible.

\* Cd. 5745, p. 15 and pp. 130-2.

## The Dominions and the Settlement

*Mr Asquith:* I really think that this gives effect to both views in the resolution. Speaking on behalf of the Government, I think it does.\*

Finally, on the last day of the Conference, Mr Asquith, in his recapitulation of its work, drew attention to "the important resolution, unanimously affirmed, that the Dominions should be afforded an opportunity of consultation, as far as possible, when instructions are being prepared for the negotiation of international agreements which affect them." This decision, was, he said, "a very important matter in what I call the international sphere."

It is, then, beyond question that by the resolution of the last Imperial Conference and by the undertaking then given by the British Government the Dominions are entitled to consultation upon the issues raised by the war "so far as time and opportunity and the subject-matter permit." The necessary reservation contained in that qualifying parenthesis entirely covers the failure of the British Government to consult them before the declaration of war. But the settlement after the war is different. With regard to that "time and opportunity" do, with some obvious limitations, unquestionably permit; and "the subject-matter" not only permits, but necessitates. Australia and New Zealand, for instance, have captured some German possessions in the Pacific; Japan has captured others. It is obvious that in the final negotiations British policy must show a proper regard for the views both of Australia and New Zealand, and of Japan, its valued Ally. The Union of South Africa, on the other hand, is closely interested in any international negotiations affecting foreign possessions in the East and West of the African Continent; and it is now proceeding, like Australia and New Zealand, to the conquest of German territory. Nor must it be supposed that the conduct of the war itself has failed to bring to light many questions on which consultation between this country and the Dominions would be very valuable. The British

\* Cd. 5745, pp. 131-2.

## The Dominions and the Settlement

Government has had to take many steps relating to trading with the enemy and restricting his supplies, which have very closely and deeply affected the Dominions and the Dependencies. The export of many articles of commerce, for instance, has had to be either restricted or prohibited. And there are many other questions—such as those relating to finance, new issues of capital, shipping, questions of prize law, of contraband and so forth—on which consultation could not fail to be valuable.

These are definite special interests, on which a full exchange of views is eminently desirable. But there is also the general effect of the settlement upon the Empire: the extent of security which it may furnish, the new responsibilities which it may impose, the fresh treaty engagements which it may entail. In regard to all these things the Dominion Governments are entitled to know, well in advance, the mind of the British Government. The next Hague Conference, on which Sir Edward Grey laid stress in 1911, pales by comparison with the international negotiations which will have to be undertaken when the war has run its course; and by these negotiations the liabilities and responsibilities of the Dominions, no less than of the United Kingdom, will be measured for many years to come. If the general review of British foreign policy, given in confidence by Sir Edward Grey to the Conference of 1911, did much to consolidate opinion and deepen mutual confidence, as all the members of that Conference testified, how much more valuable would be a similar review in the far more searching conditions of 1915?

### III

THE practical question remains—how, within the limits of the present system, to make consultation upon the settlement as full and effective as possible.

One condition imposes itself at the outset. In present circumstances the final authority and responsibility of the

## The Dominions and the Settlement

British Government in making the British terms of peace cannot be alienated to any other representative body created for the purpose of the settlement. Mr Asquith dealt plainly with this aspect of our present constitutional relations in his speech on Sir Joseph Ward's resolution in favour of an Imperial Council at the Conference of 1911. Of Sir Joseph Ward's proposal he then said:

I might describe the effect of it without going into details in a couple of sentences. It would impair if not altogether destroy the authority of the Government of the United Kingdom in such grave matters as the conduct of foreign policy, the conclusion of treaties, the declaration and maintenance of peace, or the declaration of war, and indeed all those relations with foreign Powers, necessarily of the most delicate character, which are now in the hands of the Imperial Government, subject to its responsibility to the Imperial Parliament. That authority cannot be shared, and the coexistence side by side with the Cabinet of the United Kingdom of this proposed body—it does not matter by what name you call it for the moment—clothed with the functions and the jurisdiction which Sir Joseph Ward proposed to invest it with, would, in our judgment, be absolutely fatal to our present system of responsible government.\*

This declaration has been widely misinterpreted, for it has been understood to convey an intimation that the control of Imperial and foreign policy can never be shared by the people of the Dominions. In fact, it suggests nothing of the kind; for it is solely concerned with the patent constitutional truth that control and responsibility in these matters cannot be separated without destroying constitutional government. Foreign policy cannot be conducted jointly by several governments, as the circumstances of last August have clearly demonstrated. If, then, it is to be subject to democratic control throughout the self-governing Empire, a new government must be created to deal with it, constitutionally representative of all the democracies under the Crown. Till that is done, some one of the existing local governments of the Empire must wield the necessary authority alone; and none can do it but the Government of the United Kingdom, which is still, in fact as well as theory,

\* Cd. 5745, p. 71.

## The Dominions and the Settlement

the supreme Imperial Government, though responsible only to the democracy of the British Isles. Mr Asquith's declaration that the supreme authority "cannot be shared" was therefore no veto upon the democratic development of Imperial relations. It was merely a plain and practical statement of the constitutional position which now exists.

If control by a single government was shown to be necessary by the diplomatic crisis before the war, it will be no less necessary in the diplomatic process of negotiating a settlement. While the circumstances of the settlement may be better anticipated than those of the outbreak of war, they will inevitably demand rapid adjustment and decision in important particulars. The actual conduct of negotiations in any international convention always produces a great variety of questions and situations which cannot be accurately foreseen. Plenipotentiaries require a large discretion if they are not to be fatally handicapped, since the favourable moment for settlement may often come suddenly and be as suddenly gone. It is, moreover, the habit of diplomats to profit by any confusion or division of counsel in the ranks of their rivals, and to sow it in the process of negotiation if it is not already there. It has long been held in Germany that the British Empire, with its vast range, its apparently loose cohesion and very diverse interests, presents a favourable field for diplomacy on these lines. The activity of German Consuls in seeking diplomatic *status* in Dominion capitals is a good example of efforts already made to use the democratic instinct of self-government against the unity and welfare of the British democracies.

The moral—so far as concerns the coming settlement—is twofold.

In the first place, the Dominions can no more be separately represented in a European Conference than their own different provinces and states can be separately represented in an Imperial Conference. If the British Empire is to remain a single State, it cannot speak in an international

## The Dominions and the Settlement

assembly with the voice of several different governments. The result may best be imagined if the German and Austrian Empires were likewise to be represented by separate delegates from Prussia, Bavaria, Austria, Hungary, Saxony, Bohemia, and so on through the list of their chief kingdoms and principalities. The German Empire will commit no such follies. If the British Empire were to show any signs of committing them, it would suffer incalculably both in the settlement and afterwards.

It is equally plain, in the second place, that the British plenipotentiaries cannot be responsible to several different governments. They may be aided by advisers from the Dominions; it is probably essential that they should. But their supreme instructions must come from the British Government, whose servants they will be, if the common cause is not to suffer as much as it would from the appointment of separate representatives.

The practical means of bringing the settlement into accord with the feeling of all the British democracies resolve themselves accordingly into two expedients—adequate consultation beforehand, and a proper provision of advisers from the Dominions to help the British plenipotentiaries when negotiation begins. Of these expedients the former is the more important; for, if the advisers are to be broadly in accord, the Governments instructing them must have a common understanding at least on matters of principle. Consultation beforehand must therefore be provided for, and it cannot well be carried on through the medium of correspondence, which is not only slow but largely ineffectual. What is needed, to begin with, is just such a review of the British position as was given to the Conference of 1911, when Sir Edward Grey is understood to have covered broadly the whole range of essential British interests. After such a review, there would naturally follow an exchange of opinions on many points of detail. Australia and New Zealand would, for instance, be able to state their views upon the disposal of the captured German possessions

## The Dominions and the Settlement

in the Pacific; South Africa would state hers upon the African aspect of the settlement. But opinions on detail could not be profitably exchanged until all the Governments were in possession of the general information which the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would make it his business to provide.

This process of conference would, in point of fact, resemble very closely the method suggested by Sir Edward Grey in 1911 for giving the Dominion Governments a voice in British policy at the next Hague Conference. He pointed out then that the usual method of the British Government had been to hold an inter-departmental conference to consider what instructions should be given to the British delegates "as to the line they should take on the different points"; and he suggested accordingly that the Dominions should appoint representatives to the inter-departmental conference. The Dominions, he went on to say, would thus be parties to the British instructions; but—and this warning is worth recalling—they would have to leave great latitude to the delegates at the Hague Conference itself.

*Sir Edward Grey* (continuing): No doubt from time to time while the Conference is proceeding points will arise, which have to be answered by telegraph sometimes, and I think then it would be impossible to have consultation on every point that arises, because there is no time, owing to the necessities of the case. As a matter of fact, during the last Hague Conference, theoretically the whole Cabinet ought to have been consulted here on points as they arose, but there was no time. Parliament is not always sitting, the Cabinet is separated, and some individual Minister here, unfortunately the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs generally, has to take the responsibility of dealing with points which arise from moment to moment.

*Mr Fisher*: And then blame the Prime Minister.

*Mr Asquith*: As a matter of fact, the Prime Minister can generally be communicated with, but you cannot assemble the Cabinet.

*Sir Edward Grey*: Just in the same way as one individual Minister sometimes has to act and take responsibility without consulting the Cabinet, and the Prime Minister has to act without consulting the Cabinet on some things from the nature of the case when there is not time, so the Home Government when the Conference is going



## The Dominions and the Settlement

on would have to deal with the points without being able to consult the Dominions, simply because it is not physically possible to do so.\*

The procedure proposed for the next Hague Conference may be taken, *a fortiori*, to be applicable to the settlement after the war, which will have a much more important bearing than any past meeting at The Hague on the future of international politics; and Sir Edward Grey's observations about it illustrate very well the conditions of diplomacy by showing that, while consultation may be very valuable both before and during the negotiations, supreme responsibility must remain in the hands, not merely of one Government, but of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in that Government, or at any rate of the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister. For if the British Cabinet itself cannot always be consulted, much less can five other Cabinets be consulted, which are thousands of miles apart from each other and from the Cabinet here.

These things being so, it is clear that consultation must have taken place well before the time for actual negotiation arrives, if it is to be more than a mere form. Nor can any method of consultation be really effectual except the meeting in London of representatives of the Dominions adequately qualified to speak for their respective peoples and Governments.

### IV

THE Imperial Conference comes due again in May or June this year according to its regular quadrennial term. Its meetings were made quadrennial by the following resolution, passed by the Conference of 1907:

That it will be to the advantage of the Empire if a Conference, to be called the Imperial Conference, is held every four years, at which questions of common interest may be discussed and considered as

\* Cd. 5745, pp. 114-15.



## The Dominions and the Settlement

between His Majesty's Government and his Governments of the self-governing Dominions Beyond the Seas. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom will be *ex officio* President, and the Prime Ministers of the self-governing Dominions *ex officio* members of the Conference. The Secretary of State for the Colonies will be an *ex officio* member of the Conference and will take the chair in the absence of the President. He will arrange for such Imperial Conferences after communicating with the Prime Ministers of the respective Dominions.\*

It will be observed that this Resolution takes the form of an instruction to the Colonial Secretary as a member of the Conference. Having been carried unanimously on April 20, 1907, it was duly acted upon four years later, and the Imperial Conference assembled for the first time under that title on May 23, 1911. The Colonial Secretary is therefore called upon in the ordinary course of his duty to the Conference to arrange for its reassembling this year or to obtain the consent of a majority of the constituent Governments to its postponement.

From Mr Harcourt's reply to a question in the House of Commons on February 5, it is clear that the latter course has been pursued.

In consultation with all the Dominions [Mr Harcourt said] it has been decided that it is undesirable to hold the normal meeting of the Imperial Conference this year.

This decision was natural and indeed inevitable. The "normal" business of the Imperial Conference is to discuss a hundred and one resolutions on matters of domestic concern. Some of these are important, some are not; but they practically all belong to the ordinary routine of administration, and all alike sink into temporary insignificance in the presence of the urgent business imposed upon the Governments of the Empire by the war. It would be absurd to suppose that Ministers should leave their present imperative duties upon one side for a period of days or

\* *Proceedings of the Colonial Conference, 1907* (Cd. 3523), p. v. The Resolution goes on to deal with other points connected with the Conference.

## The Dominions and the Settlement

weeks in order to confer upon uniformity in patents, double income tax, cable rates, and the various other questions which occupy the Imperial Conference for the greater part of its sittings in time of peace.

It would be equally absurd to suggest that in this time of abnormal strain the Imperial Conference should meet to discuss any of the larger problems of Imperial partnership, such as naval co-operation or the control of foreign affairs, or a change in constitutional relations or machinery. It is quite true that the circumstances of the war have thrown new light upon the Imperial system as it stands; and probably the consciousness of this fact is responsible for the idea, put forward here and there, that the Imperial Conference should make haste to take the experience of the war to heart. Well meant as the suggestion may be, it is clearly a most mistaken one. Whether our machinery be perfect or not, it is at present set at racing speed. It will be time enough to overhaul it when the strain is relaxed and peace is attained.

But the Imperial Conference is the natural medium for direct consultation between Governments upon the larger questions raised by the war and the settlement; and this duty of consultation is as imperative as any of those imposed upon Ministers by the greatly increased business of administration in present circumstances. It is not to be expected, indeed, that the normal ceremonies connected with the Conference should be persevered in any more than the normal programme of business; but Dominion Ministers have found the combination of work and ceremony almost too exacting in the past, and they would assuredly not complain if the hospitalities of the occasion were much abbreviated. The Conference would naturally discard all ceremony, postpone all but urgent business, and confine itself to the single matter of the war and the coming settlement. It would thus make possible, with the maximum of effect and in the minimum of time, just such an exchange of views as took place between the Foreign Secretary and Dominion

## The Dominions and the Settlement

Ministers in 1911, at a moment when a close understanding between the Governments of the Empire is more important than ever before. Dominion Ministers, who testified so warmly to the value of the new departure four years ago, have even stronger reason now for desiring to share the mind of the British Government and for enabling it to share their own. Less than ever before can the British Government afford to be without the fullest possible understanding of Dominion views. Nothing else will ensure the unity of the British world, not merely in the struggle—there is no fear in regard to that—but in the far more critical period when diplomacy at last begins to supersede the clash of arms. It is then that our future responsibilities for an unknown period of years will be suddenly defined; it is then that our position in the world, individually and collectively, will be made clear; it is then that our future relations with each other will be marred or confirmed.

The public can easily understand that Ministers, both here and in the Dominions, may be too busy to attend the Conference in the ordinary course in May or June. But the preoccupations of the moment will not exonerate them for having failed to meet in consultation, when the public is confronted with the problem of settlement and is anxious as to results. The oceanic cables may then be strained to their utmost capacity, and the tables of those responsible may sink beneath the weight of dispatches sent and received; but a true understanding is not secured by such means, and the public which judges will hold with reason that, however exacting may have been the actual problems of the war, the problems of the settlement should also have been foreseen.

What is essential, therefore, is that direct personal consultation should be provided for some time this year, before peace negotiations are entered upon. If this be done, it matters little in what particular month Ministers meet, or whether their meeting be regarded as a formal meeting of the Imperial Conference. The Imperial Conference

## The Dominions and the Settlement

is now the established method of inter-Imperial deliberation, and it is usually better to use the established routine than to depart from it; but the principle of direct consultation is the vital thing, and the name is of no consequence provided that it stands for a personal exchange of views before peace is negotiated. The Dominions must understand the difficulties of the British Government if they are to judge fairly of the results; the British Government must understand the standpoint of the Dominions if it is to show due regard to their interests and desires. Only direct conference, round a table, will secure this. Misunderstanding will follow inevitably, if a conference is not provided for in time.

It is, moreover, our desire that the instrument in which the coming peace is signed shall regulate the course of international affairs for many years to come. We hope to find in it an opportunity equalling or excelling that which European statesmen so grievously misused at Vienna a century ago, and we trust to make it a new departure in history, from which the world will derive a better understanding both of national right and of international law. The five self-governing nations of the Empire are fighting with absolute unanimity for that end; and when the British signatures are given to the peace, they will pledge the faith of all five nations as though they were one. The conditions of peace will therefore not only define our purpose and responsibility as an Empire towards other Powers; they will also very largely regulate the terms of our own partnership as nations beneath one Crown. Whenever in future we discuss our joint defence, our common liabilities, our policy as an Empire amid the changing currents of international affairs, these conditions of peace will be the hinge on which all discussion will turn. How can our partnership endure if they are not accepted and endorsed as fully as possible by all?

Every treaty of peace yet devised by human wisdom has held within it the seed of some future war. We are fighting to-

## The Dominions and the Settlement

day upon the strength of arrangements made or mis-made by the Congress of Vienna in 1815, by the treaty guaranteeing Belgian neutrality in 1839, by the Treaty of Paris of 1871 and the Berlin Treaty of 1878; and we cannot assume that the undertakings which our honour and interest will demand of us at the end of this war will never be prejudiced or challenged by some new configuration of European power. The future of Belgium alone presents incalculable possibilities. Her independence is a vital British interest, and neutrality is clearly no sufficient guarantee. If honour and interest alike have sent us to her rescue to-day, they will equally compel us to guarantee hereafter, as fully as we can, the independence which we mean to restore. In some form or other that guarantee will make part of the coming settlement.

Thirty years ago a great Englishman, whose public life has only just closed, expressed a frank opinion on the attitude of the Dominions towards such responsibilities "at the other end of the globe." His opinion dealt, not merely with the time at which he spoke, but with a future so remote that he conceived in it, for purposes of analysis, the existence of a common representative body to discuss Imperial affairs.

Supposing [he wrote] for the sake of argument that Australia were represented in the body that decided on war . . . nobody believes that the presence of Australian representatives in the Imperial assembly that voted the funds would reconcile their constituents at the other end of the globe to paying money for a war, say, for the defence of Afghanistan, or for the defence of Belgian neutrality. \*

It is worth while comparing this hardy confession of unfaith with the article from Australia on a later page, which describes the feeling of Australia, and the sacrifices she is making, to-day. Australia is doing now, of her own

\* Lord Morley in a review of Seeley's *Expansion of England*, reprinted in *Miscellanies*, vol. iii, p. 315.

## The Dominions and the Settlement

free will, what Lord Morley predicted she would never do. She is spending men and money in a war over the neutrality of Belgium; and spending it, as the article shows, with a growing comprehension of the great issues involved.

Those who think that Pacific islands and other minor Colonial acquisitions will constitute the sole interest of the Dominions in the coming settlement are making Lord Morley's mistake of thirty years ago—with much less excuse. Canada has no acquisitions in view, but she has entered the struggle as wholeheartedly as ourselves, and will be as deeply concerned in the result. If Belgian independence—to repeat that single illustration—is of vital moment to the Empire now, it will continue to be of vital moment so long as the Empire is united and rests upon sea-power. The blood and treasure which the Dominions are spending for it to-day, they may be called upon to spend again; and it must always be a main consideration of British policy both in diplomacy and in defence.

The same considerations apply to every important feature in the settlement. The principles which we hope to see applied in it will commit the Dominions as completely as Great Britain, and commit them for all time, unless our partnership breaks down. What we fight for as a united people, we must remain a united people to defend. Whenever an Imperial Conference meets in future to discuss our joint responsibilities in defence or diplomacy, the terms of the coming settlement will lie before it as the basis of debate. Is it possible, then, to maintain that the future of our partnership, and of that unity which the last seven months have so splendidly brought home, will not sooner or later be prejudiced or even jeopardized, if the obligations which we contract in the settlement after the war are not fully understood and agreed to in advance by the representatives of all?

## THE SCHISM OF EUROPE

### I. GERMANY AT THE CROSS ROADS

MANY thousands of books and pamphlets have been written about the great war, describing its origins and the ideals which underlie it. But few of them have arrived at the fundamental truth. This war is the result of the rejection of democracy by Germany and Austria in the years 1848-70, and its bitterness is due to the fact that two irreconcilable principles, autocracy and democracy, are struggling for supremacy in Europe to-day. It is the purpose of this article to show how autocracy triumphed in those years, how it has steadily corrupted the political sense of the German nation ever since, and how under its baneful influence the rulers and people of Germany have been driven to attempt to establish its predominance over a free Europe by force of arms.

It is not possible to trace in detail the history of those tragic years from 1848 to 1870, when reaction triumphed and democracy failed. It will suffice to recall that in 1848 a national assembly of Germany, elected by popular vote, with one member elected for each 500,000 of the population, drew up a Grundrecht for a German union. This fundamental law was conceived on noble lines. Germany was to become a true federation. The thirty-six separate States were to retain local self-government, but there was to be a federal government, superior to them all, to which every German citizen was to owe primary allegiance. The individual citizen was to be guaranteed those rights which the British citizen had won long before in the struggles



## The Schism of Europe

over Magna Charta, the Habeas Corpus Act, and during the Great Rebellion, and which were eventually embodied in the Bill of Rights of 1688. These elementary constitutional rights no German then possessed or now possesses. The Grundrecht went on to provide, that though the citizen was bound to serve his country in arms, he was also to have freedom of speech, freedom of public meeting, freedom of the Press, and his person was to be secure from arrest except under legal warrant. Finally it declared that every State was to be governed according to the principles of popular representation, and that ministers were to be responsible to Parliament and not to the King. Germany was to become a true democratic federation of the German peoples.

This plan, nobly conceived, was rejected by the "princes and statesmen with golden stars upon their callous breasts." Twelve years later, Germany was united in another way. Trampling the Prussian Constitution of 1847 underfoot, Bismarck for four years governed Prussia in the teeth of violent popular opposition, until he had forged an army of strength sufficient for his purpose. Then in three wars he seized Schleswig-Holstein, cast Austria out of Germany, conquered France and was able to impose union on Germany on his own terms. Bismarck's constitution was very different from the liberal and democratic Grundrecht of 1848. It was based on the two chief articles of Bismarck's faith, the prerogative of the monarch and the ascendancy of Prussia. The constitution was drafted by no elected assembly. It contained no references to liberty of speech or person. It was promulgated on the authority of the Emperor, after consultation with his fellow monarchs, and was granted not as a right but as an act of grace. Power in united Germany was vested in the hereditary rulers by the grace of God, and not in Parliaments representing the will of the people. The true executive authority under the constitution was the Bundesrath, a secret council of Empire composed of the nominated ministers of the German Princes and Kings, and possessing



## Germany at the Cross Roads

legislative and executive functions. The Chancellor and his subordinates were responsible not to the Reichstag but to the Emperor, and when they appeared in the Reichstag, they came there simply as spokesmen of the Bundesrath, incapable of changing the policy of the Government on their own authority. The Reichstag itself could only criticize, amend or veto bills, and refuse its assent to new taxes. It was, however, to be elected by universal suffrage of all males over twenty-five. This concession to democratic principles and to non-Prussian Germany Bismarck justified as follows:

"Direct election and universal suffrage I consider to be greater guarantees of conservative action than any artificial electoral law. . . . Universal suffrage, doing away as it does with the influence of the Liberal bourgeoisie, leads to monarchical elections."

The real power in the new Empire resided in Prussia. The King of Prussia was the German Emperor and had control of the army. In his capacity as Emperor, he nominated the Chancellor, who was also Prussia's chief representative on the Bundesrath; and the Chancellor was the executive officer of the Empire. Prussia and its King had thus entire control of the federal machinery of government, the princes and the people of the rest of Germany having little opportunity for more than criticism and influence. Moreover, the constitution was so contrived that it was almost unassailable. Only by a complete revision of the whole fabric of the German Empire, from top to bottom, including the relations of the States to one another and the system of government in Prussia itself, could the Government be made responsible to the people instead of to the King.

In this manner was the problem of German unity solved. But in failing to unite themselves the German people paid the inevitable price. They did not obtain self-government and to this day they have remained subject to an autocratic

## The Schism of Europe

government which they can influence, but not control. And they were all brought—South Germans and North Germans alike—within the influence of the Prussian system of government with its belief in force as the mainspring both of internal and external policy, and its doctrine that the duty of the citizens is to obey and not to control the government. From the triumph of the Prussian autocracy all subsequent trouble has come. It is well, therefore, before going on to trace the course of German policy since 1870, to examine briefly what the Prussian system was.

Prussia was the typical monarchical military State—at the opposite pole from the modern democratic State. All power centred in the Government, and the Government was the king and the nobles backed by the army. The people were regarded, not as ends in themselves but as beings to be drilled, disciplined and manœuvred into obedience to the will of the governing class. They were taught to obey the laws, not because they had a share in framing them, and because the laws then represented the general will, but because the laws were the commands of a power divinely authorized, and because disobedience would meet with condign and instant punishment inflicted by irresistible power. The virtues of the citizen of the democratic State were anathema in Prussia. Independence, self-reliance, private judgment in politics, a sense of responsibility for the national policy, and criticism of the authorities, which are the very life's breath of popular government, were frowned on and repressed. The Prussian virtues were obedience, loyalty and self-sacrifice to the command of the king and the higher powers, without question or hesitation, and these virtues it was the studied purpose of the State to instil into the people from their earliest years. It was Frederick the Great who inaugurated the system of universal compulsory military service and of universal compulsory attendance at school, largely with this end in view. It has always been a leading feature of military and school discipline in Prussia to cultivate the instinctive habit of unquestioning obedience to

## Germany at the Cross Roads

authority in children and recruits. This system, while it produced great virtues, a simple loyalty to the Crown, and a wonderful courage and self-sacrifice in war, inevitably tended also to undermine initiative and self-reliance in the people.

Bismarck derived his political ideas from Prussia. Hence the system of government he imposed on Germany was marred by two inseparable evils. It gave almost absolute power—under the specious form of a democratic constitution—to a small aristocratic group, and in order to ensure the ascendancy of that group it deliberately discouraged political independence and self-reliance in the people, so that they should neither reject the policy of their rulers, nor take the control of the national affairs into their own hands. And this system is still in force to-day. The constitution is unchanged. Despite all the debates in the Reichstag the same classes hold power in Germany now as held it in 1871. And the docility of the people on which their ascendancy depends is maintained still by the four great engines which Bismarck contrived. Firstly, by the educational system, which is state controlled from top to bottom. It is lavishly fostered by the Government, but always on condition that it steadily inculcates the duties of political obedience and patriotism. Appointments are subject to government control, and criticism of the Government or open sympathy with democratic aims involves dismissal or the loss of all chance of promotion or preferment. "No one can make a successful career in the public service, and education is a public service, unless he is considered politically orthodox (*gesinnungstuchtig*), and orthodoxy does not simply mean abstention from damaging criticism or dangerous opinions; it means in practice deference to the opinions of those who 'know better,' that is, to the clique of Prussian generals and bureaucrats, who, together with the Kaiser, control the policy of the country."\* Secondly, it has been maintained by the army, which drills the majority of the male population into habits of

\* *War and Democracy*, p. 94.

## The Schism of Europe

discipline and of implicit and instinctive obedience to authority. Thirdly, there is the Press Bureau—a highly organized and powerful department, for moulding public opinion in the direction required. It has a large clientele of newspapers, which know that they will not get their share of official information if they carry criticism of the Government too far. One of its members once said: "It is as scientifically equipped and as highly organized a machine as the army itself, and it has over the army the advantage of being able to operate in time of peace." Finally, by means of the tariff, subsidies to shipping companies, preferential railway rates, and the vast system of insurance against sickness and unemployment, large sections of the community are made directly dependent upon the favour of the great bureaucratic machine. It cannot be too clearly realized that the Prussian system of government because it is autocratic in character, and based on the ascendancy of a particular class, distrusts the people and depends for its permanence on cajoling and coercing them. German policy since 1871 has aimed primarily at producing, not only the conscript soldier compelled to obey orders, but the conscript mind predisposed to acquiesce in the existing order, and taught to accept the authority of the Government as final and to regard criticism of it as unpatriotic.

### II. THE IDEA OF ASCENDENCY

**I**N consequence, modern Germany is something different from both the older Germany of the Rhine and the South, which men still remember affectionately—the Germany of strenuous thought and great music, with its spectacled professors and pigtailed maidens, its mediaeval courts and castles—and the hard, unimaginative, puritanical Prussia, with its disciplined and orderly government and its simple unquestioning faith in the divine authority of the monarchical State. Modern Germany does not emerge for twenty years after the creation of the Empire. By that time

## The Idea of Ascendency

Germany's rich heritage of thought, literature and music, and the political principles of the Prussian State had been fused into a complete national philosophy taught assiduously in every university and school, and ardently believed in by the mass of the German people.

The most conspicuous aspect of the new school of thought was a blind and uncritical belief in the superiority of the German race, and in the destiny of the autocratic Germanic State eventually to dominate the world by force of arms. The State, according to Treitschke and the dominant Prussian School, is an end in itself. "States," he says, "do not arise out of the peoples' sovereignty, but they are created against the will of the people." The State is something beyond the people. It "protects and embraces the life of the people, regulating it externally in all directions . . . It demands obedience." Hence the State stands superior to the laws of morality. "It will always," says Treitschke, "redound to the glory of Machiavelli that he has placed the State on a solid foundation, and that he has freed the State and its morality from the moral precepts taught by the Church, but especially because he has been the first to teach that the State is power." Thus to modern official Germany the State is a non-moral predatory organism, whose primary function is the acquisition of power in order that it may prevail in the struggle for existence with other States. The law of its being is not the law of truth, justice and honour, but the law that might is right. Hence the noblest duty of the subject is dedication and sacrifice to the will of the State, without criticism and without question, and the noblest function of the State is to express its power by domination, repression, conquest and war. This doctrine, so subversive of political morality and the true welfare of the community, is the inevitable outcome of the autocratic system. It is certain to arise where the government is a body of men distant from the people and always in power, for they invariably come to regard their own power as the essence of the State and

## The Schism of Europe

they attempt by every possible means to preserve their own privileged position and to persuade their subjects that it is unpatriotic, disloyal, and even impious to dispute their will.

The doctrine of winning ascendancy by force was also the traditional policy of Prussia. From its inception the Prussian State has been based on force. It was Christianized, not by the slower and more stable method of voluntary conversion, but by force. It was given unity by the forcible overthrow of the semi-independent knights and cities. It was by force that its boundaries were steadily and deliberately extended; by force that the German ascendancy over the Slavs was preserved; by force that internal order and unity were maintained—force applied through the army or the police at the sole discretion of the king. And war, the final triumph of the policy of force, had always been a familiar idea with Prussia. As Mirabeau said, "War is Prussia's national industry."

It is this doctrine of national ascendancy—a doctrine naturally attractive to the autocratic rulers of Germany and gradually accepted by a people politically demoralized by having no responsibility for public policy—which is the primary cause of the war. It permeates every act of official policy. It blinds Germany to the claims of justice and liberty when the rights and independence of other races or nations are involved. And it has driven her headlong into a policy which was bound to bring her into collision with those of her neighbours who valued their freedom and were strong enough to resist her will.

In domestic policy it became a government axiom that everything non-German was dangerous to the German State and had to be overcome, not by conciliation and compromise, but by force. This was the traditional policy of Prussia, and how far Prussian doctrines have corrupted the liberal Germany of the South is seen in the following lines about Poland, by a friendly biographer of Bismarck:

"Nothing shows the change which he [Bismarck] has been able to bring about in German thought better

## The Idea of Ascendency

than the attitude of the nation towards Poland. In the old days the Germans recollected only that the partition of Poland had been a great crime, and it was their hope and determination that they might be able to make amends for it. In those days the Poles were to be found in every country in Europe, foremost in fighting on the barricades; they helped the Germans to fight for liberty, and the Germans were to help them to recover independence. In 1848 Mieroslawski had been carried like a triumphant hero through the streets of Berlin . . . At a time when poets still were political leaders, and the memory and influence of Byron had not been effaced, there was scarcely a German poet—Platen, Uhland, Heine, who had not stirred up enthusiasm for Poland. It was against this attitude of mind that Bismarck had to struggle, and he has done so successfully. He has taught that it is the duty of Germany to use all the power of the State for crushing and destroying the Polish language and nationality.”\*

It is now the policy of official Germany not only to destroy the Polish language and nationality, but to drive the Poles from their country. In 1906 the children in the schools of Poland went on strike because compelled to have their religious instruction in German. Many of them were kept back at school and flogged. Parents were fined and imprisoned for withdrawing children during the hours of religious instruction. Children were also sent to reformatories on the ground that their parents in resisting the decrees of the State had shown themselves incapable of taking proper care of them. In 1908 an Act was passed by the Prussian Diet, “as imperatively necessary in the highest interest of the State,” providing for the compulsory expropriation of Polish landlords, since the system of the voluntary colonization of Prussian Poland by State-assisted German settlers had failed. The Poles were forbidden to build houses on expropriated land and when they lived on it in gipsy carts they were heavily fined. The Reichstag protested against

\* Headlam, *Life of Bismarck*, p. 175.



## The Schism of Europe

this procedure in 1909, but was unable to affect the policy of the Government, whose final justification of its policy was the plea that "in political matters might goes before right." Bonuses were then given to postal officials who refused to deliver letters addressed in Polish, and Government officials who showed any sympathy for Polish grievances were dismissed. The Reichstag again protested, and again but two years ago, proved that it had no power, for the Government pursued its policy of forcible Germanization unmoved.

The same policy was pursued in Alsace and Lorraine, where more conciliatory methods might have been expected. For though these provinces had been taken from France by force, the people were mostly of German descent and had for long been part of the Holy Roman Empire. Instead, the only method which Prussia understands, that of Germanizing by force, was immediately inaugurated. The French language was proscribed, children could only be registered under German names, the public performance of the classical French drama was forbidden, and even the use of French words such as "coiffeur" and "nouveau-té," universal in trade and in common use in the rest of Germany, were forbidden in parts of Alsace-Lorraine under pain of police-court penalties. Finally the Government attempted to take the heart out of the people by the constant parade of overwhelming military strength, thereby demonstrating the folly of resisting the German will and the wisdom of meekly submitting to superior force and becoming docile servants of the German State. The Zabern incident shows how the Prussian doctrine of forcible ascendancy has grown and not diminished in the last forty years. It is the same in the Danish parts of Schleswig-Holstein. In 1913 the Norwegian explorer, Ronald Amundsen, was prohibited from giving a lecture on his voyages in his own language, on the ground that Norwegian was so like Danish as to be dangerous. This prohibition was subsequently withdrawn by Berlin, but it shows the attitude of the administration towards its Danish subjects.

In foreign affairs the same doctrine of ascendancy



## German Foreign Policy, 1870-1899

gradually made itself felt. It was not that Germany coveted any particular possession of her neighbours. She had a bigger soul than that. It was that she wanted the first place. She was determined that sooner or later her word was to be the final word in all great questions of international policy, which none could gainsay because none could resist the German sword. Being no free State herself, she was, in fact bent on destroying the freedom of her neighbours and making them also subordinate to the tyrannical will of her own rulers. For this ideal—the allurements of supreme power—the German people, taught and disciplined by their rulers, have been induced to make any sacrifices, and no demand for men, money or ships has ever been refused. It is this megalomania, originating in the belief in force and the will to power, encouraged by the political enslavement of the people and the absence of self-criticism which that involves, and fostered in every way by the Chauvinist military and bureaucratic classes, which has been the main force behind German foreign policy for the last twenty years.

### III. GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1870-1899

**B**Y 1871 Bismarck had won for the German Empire an undisputed position of predominance in the councils of Europe. Skilfully isolating his enemies one by one, and then falling upon them at his own chosen moment, he had succeeded in uniting the Empire, and after 1871 he maintained his ascendancy by the same means. Throughout his chancellorship France was kept at the mercy of the German sword. In 1872 he formed the Drei-Kaiser-bund for the mutual protection of the three autocratic monarchies of Russia, Austria and Germany. Seven years later—when as the outcome of the Russo-Turkish war and the Berlin Conference of 1878, Austria-Hungary obtained the right of administering Bosnia-Herzegovina and Russia went back empty handed—he was able to reunite Austria-Hungary to Germany in the Dual Alliance. Three years later,

## The Schism of Europe

again, by urging France in 1881 to occupy Tunis, which Italy had regarded as her own preserve, he succeeded in inducing Italy to join it too. Not content with the Triple Alliance, which was the only diplomatic combination in Europe at that time and immensely strong, Bismarck in 1884 entered into the famous secret reinsurance treaty with Russia, whereby the two powers guaranteed to remain neutral in the event of an attack by any other power.

Germany was thus absolutely predominant in Europe. But Bismarck, towards the end of his life, was a confirmed believer in peace and was able to convince his neighbours that Germany, strong though she was, had no overweening ambitions. She had therefore no enemies save France. Moreover, during the 'eighties, when, after the appalling revelations of the slave trade by Livingstone and Stanley, the process of partitioning Africa among the Great Powers was being carried through, Germany, though late in the field, obtained considerable dominions. She acquired German East Africa, German South-West Africa, Togoland and Cameroon. This provoked no opposition in England. Gladstone said:

"If Germany is to become a colonizing power, all I can say is, 'God speed her.' She becomes our ally and partner in the execution of the great purposes of Providence for the advantage of mankind. I hail her in entering upon that course, and glad will I be to find her associating with us in carrying the light of civilization and the blessings that depend upon it to the more backward and less significant regions of the world."

In 1884 a conference was held in Berlin which regularized the partition of Africa among the Great Powers, defined boundaries, promulgated rules about effective occupation and originated phrases like "spheres of influence," with a view to obviating the possibility of conflict or misunderstanding.

With the accession of William II, however, a complete change came over the scene. Bismarck had, perhaps, grown

## German Foreign Policy, 1870-1899

too old to respond to the leaping pulse of new Germany. William II was determined to head a new movement whereby Germany should acquire the same position in world-politics, which Bismarck had won for her in Europe. His action was decisive and dramatic. He came to the throne unexpectedly in 1888, a young man of 30, untried and almost unknown. He seized at once on the fundamental principles of the constitution and determined to profit by them. His first proclamation was to his army—the support of the royal power, and the foundation of autocratic Germany. He did not address his people till three days later. In the following year, despite the opposition of Bismarck, he went on his famous visit to the Sultan Abdul Hamid, which was the beginning of that connection between the ruling classes in Berlin and Constantinople which has borne fruit in the Bagdad Railway, and in the Austrian policy of establishing her ascendancy in the Balkan Peninsula. No sooner did he return to Germany than William II made up his mind to get rid of Bismarck. Bismarck in his old age was the almost undisputed autocrat of Germany. The Kaiser was no less bent on being the autocrat of Germany himself. The breach came on the question of power. Bismarck contended that he was the responsible Chancellor of the German Empire, and that so long as he retained the confidence of the Emperor, the views of other Ministers of State could only be conveyed to the monarch through the Chancellor himself. The Kaiser replied that he was German Emperor and as such could invite any of his subjects for advice. Neither side would give way and Bismarck finally tendered his resignation, which was instantly accepted. In the same month of March, 1890, the Kaiser declared "One only is master within the Empire and I will tolerate no other." "Those who are willing to help me in my endeavours are cordially welcome. Those who oppose me I will smash."

Ever since then the Kaiser has been the real ruler of Germany, making and discarding his ministers, as their

## The Schism of Europe

policy diverged from his or became too unpopular, but ever remaining in office himself. At every crisis it is his will which decides. And that he believes himself to be the ruler of Germany and that the duty of his subjects is to obey he is at no pains to disguise. "The King," he said, "is King by God's grace, therefore he is responsible only to the Lord." "I call to mind the moment when my grandfather, as King by the grace of God, took the crown in one hand and the Imperial sword in the other and gave honour to God alone and from Him took the crown." (Frankfurt, 1896.) This was no youthful outburst of dynastic enthusiasm, for less than five years ago, in 1910, he declared in a speech which raised much discussion in Germany, that his grandfather had

"placed by his own right the crown of the Kings of Prussia upon his head, once again laying stress upon the fact that it was conferred upon him by the grace of God alone, and not by Parliaments, meetings of the people, or popular decisions, and that he considered himself the chosen instrument of Heaven, and as such performed his duties as regent and as ruler."

The duty of obedience he insisted on, especially in his speeches to his army. Thus to recruits he said:

"Your duty is not easy: it demands of you self-control and self-denial—the two highest qualities of the Christian, also unlimited obedience, and submission to the will of your superiors. As I, Emperor and ruler, devote the whole of my action and ambitions to the Fatherland, so you must devote your whole life to me."

On another occasion he said to them: "There is but one law and that is my will."

The new Emperor at once announced that he was going to abandon the Bismarckian tradition and inaugurate a world policy instead of a European policy. "My course," he said, "is the right one and I shall follow it."

## German Foreign Policy, 1870-1899

He declared that Providence intended Germany to lead the world, and that Germany must assert her power and influence in every part. "We are the salt of the earth," and "I lead you to glorious times." The character of the new German policy was described by a German writer in the *Neue Rundschau* in 1913 as follows:

"We have tried to carry out a world-policy, we have hustled about in every direction, we have dreamed dreams of boundless colonial expansion, and cherished deep in our hearts the belief that rivalry with England is the divinely ordained objective of our world political and commercial ambitions. Our foreign policy began to think in continents. . . . Our sea power grew fabulously and with it the claim—trumpeted thrice a day to all the winds—that henceforth no decision, whatever or whensoever it might be, should be taken without Germany's directing and determining voice."

These last words represent exactly the underlying principle of German foreign policy since 1890. It was expressed by the Emperor himself as follows: "Nothing must henceforth be settled in the world without the intervention of Germany and the German Emperor." This attitude, the traditional attitude of Prussia, is the exact opposite of the attitude of modern democracies. It sees the world not as a great family of peoples struggling blindly yet with good will towards a better mutual understanding and ever engaged in perfecting the instruments for maintaining international peace. It views it as a terrible arena in which war is a "biological necessity" and in which the strongest power will eventually by superior force compel the rest to acknowledge that they are no longer free, but must, in the last resort, subordinate their wills to its will.

It did not take very long for the Emperor to realize that for foreign policy on Prussian lines to be successful in "welt politik" it needed the same instrument of force behind it which had made it so successful in European politics. Moreover, that force had in the nature of things to be naval

## The Schism of Europe

and not military. At that time Germany had practically no navy, and therefore the Emperor and the apostles of the "new course" set to work to work up public opinion to support the idea. At first criticism was rife. Prussia—master of the land—distrusted the sea. The rest of Germany had as yet little enthusiasm for expansion. But the great engines for moulding public opinion were set in motion, and the political docility induced by the Bismarckian system made the rest easy. Small beginnings were made, but in 1897 came the famous avowal which paved the way for the great Navy Bill of 1898. "I shall not," he said, "rest until I have brought my fleet to the same standard as my army." "The trident ought to be in our fist."

The decision to commence building a fleet, to number twenty battleships, twelve large and twenty-eight small cruisers within six years, was caused by certain occurrences in the Far East and South Africa. In 1894-5 war had broken out between China and Japan, in which Japan had been an immediate victor. Immediately afterwards Germany joined with Russia and France—it is said by the Japanese, on German initiative—to compel Japan to revise the treaty of Shimonoseki and surrender Port Arthur, which was subsequently leased under compulsion to Russia, while Germany occupied Kiao Chao (1897). This was a successful bluff, but it was not likely to be successful again unless Germany had some naval strength to bring to bear. Similarly with South Africa. The rulers of Germany saw in the growing difficulties between the Transvaal and British South Africa a chance of profit. Hopes of expansion in South Africa were in those days high. *Die Grenzboten*, one of the most influential German weeklies, wrote in 1897: "The possession of South Africa offers greater advantages in every respect than that of Brazil." Hence the independence of the Transvaal was declared to be a German interest, and President Kruger was encouraged in every way to resist those measures of internal reform which alone would pave the way to a peaceful settlement. It is not too much to say that but for

## German Foreign Policy, 1870-1899

German intrigues the constitutional and racial problems of South Africa, now so happily solved, might never have been decided on the field of battle. How great a part German promises played in President Kruger's mind may be seen from the following speech he made to Germans in Pretoria, "As a child grows up, it requires bigger clothes, the old ones will burst; and that is our position to-day. We are growing up, and although we are young, we feel that, if one nation tries to kick us, the other will try to stop it. . . . I feel sure that, when the time comes for the Republic to wear still larger clothes, you will have done much to bring it about." When the opportunity, however, came after the deplorable Jameson raid, Germany, having no fleet, could do nothing save send a telegram congratulating the President on having repelled the raid "without invoking the aid of the friendly powers." Hence the Navy Act of 1908.

In the same year the Emperor struck out again towards the Near East. In the autumn he again paid a second visit to Constantinople, where he manifested the greatest cordiality towards the Sultan Abdul Hamid, though the whole world had recently been horrified by the Armenian atrocities. The Emperor then went on to Jerusalem, and at Damascus on November 7 proclaimed himself the protector not only of Turkey but of the whole Mohammedan world—a curious indication of the general trend of his ideas when it is remembered that he had not a single Moslem subject and that the immense majority of the Mohammedan peoples were citizens of the British and French Empires. The German ascendancy in Constantinople dates from this time, and its first fruits were seen in the Bagdad railway concession, finally signed in 1902 and known in Berlin as B.B.B., or Berlin Byzantium Bagdad.

Bismarck had watched the "new course" with dismay. His sagacious, if unscrupulous, mind saw the inevitable outcome of the reckless policy of interfering in other peoples' affairs. He began, too, to realize the danger of the system he had created. In rejecting every proposal for



## The Schism of Europe

enabling the people to share in the direction of public policy, he had omitted to consider what might happen when his old master died and he himself was dead or discarded. And now he realized that while he had created a machine of terrific power which could be absolutely controlled by a single man, the levers had fallen into the hands of an impulsive and ambitious ruler, more noted for his indiscretions than his wisdom. And he realized, also, that there was no method of removing the danger save a wholesale revolution in that constitution which gave the power to the Emperor, the leaders of the army, the bureaucrats and the junkers. He grew more and more depressed as time went on, when he saw how absolute was the power of the Emperor to change his ministers as he liked, how the military party which he had always distrusted and kept at a distance, because of its blind Chauvinism, was steadily increasing its hold on royal favour, how the position of diplomatic security he had won for Germany in Europe had already been undermined, while there were no compensating gains abroad, and how the policy of Germany, by tending towards Turkey and Asia Minor, was gradually being drawn into the endless racial struggles of the Balkan Peninsula. Bismarck was too old to change his fundamental beliefs, but, seeing whither systematized autocracy was leading, he made the remarkable avowal in his later years, "If I were not a Christian, I would be a Republican."

### IV. THE ANGLO-FRENCH ENTENTE, 1900-5

THE end foreseen by Bismarck was soon reached. The first result of his fall from power was the dropping of the reinsurance treaty with Russia. The Emperor and his minister, von Caprivi, regarded it as too "complicated." Their eyes, too, were set on world policy, not on Europe; and the Triple Alliance afforded Germany ample security at home. The next step was that France and Russia,



## The Anglo-French Entente, 1900-5

alarmed by the new policy of Germany and recognizing their powerlessness against the Triple Alliance, began to negotiate for mutual security. By 1896 the Dual Alliance was an accomplished fact. France was no longer in defenceless isolation as against the Triple Alliance, and Russia was secured against aggression on her western flank, while she pursued colonization and expansion in Siberia. Ten years later England had deserted her traditional policy of "splendid isolation" from the complications of Europe, and had entered into an Entente with France. The steps by which the Anglo-French Entente came into being must be considered in detail, for on them depends the answer whether or not England has selfishly and deliberately hemmed Germany in.

The antagonism between England and Germany did not outwardly appear until the Boer war. The German Navy Bill of 1898 did not cause much comment in England, as Germany obviously needed a fleet to protect her interests overseas. The wave of Anglophobia, however, which swept over Germany during the Boer war, struck England with a shock of surprise. It was far more than the sympathy which most foreign nations—understanding little of the real issues—felt for the small republics gallantly standing up to an overwhelming foe. It was a feeling prompted at bottom by the sense of impotence. The effect of long teaching by Treitschke and other apostles of the "governmental" school had been to disparage the British Empire in German eyes. Having had no experience themselves of political liberty, they could not understand the impalpable influence which knit the British Commonwealth into a willing unity; they could not understand how the principle of liberty which animates the whole British Imperial system guaranteed peace, personal freedom, the reign of law, and an orderly progress towards self-government to every class of its members, civilized and uncivilized, coloured or white. To German eyes Britain had created the British Empire by the same means as Frederick the Great had created

## The Schism of Europe

Prussia, and Prussia under Bismarck's hand had created the German Empire, by ruthless use of war, waged for selfish ends whenever favourable opportunities occurred. To the Germans the foundation of all empire and dominion was force and nothing but force. According to this view Britain was the Colossus with the feet of clay, the most gigantic fraud of history. For the British seemed to expect to be allowed to preserve their great position, trusting to their past prestige and to their fortunate position as an island, while refusing to make even the sacrifice of universal compulsory service, which every European power had made for its own defence. They were manifestly an effete people, whose empire would collapse at the first touch of reality, and would tumble into the hands of the new dynamic race which was destined, by reason of its prowess in arms and its dedication to the national cause, to be master in the new century.

The Boer war raised all these feelings to fever heat. The war itself was but another example of British land-grabbing, and the long resistance of the Boer was final proof of British degeneration. Yet in this crisis, when the greatest and least worthy of the new empire's rivals was at death-grips far away, Germany was powerless. The war broke out on October 11, 1899. On the 18th the Kaiser, in a public speech, expressed public sentiment exactly when he said, "We are in bitter need of a strong German navy." The universal feeling was that such a thing must never happen again and that Germany must hurry on the creation of her navy as rapidly as possible. In 1900-1 the number of Navy League societies rose from 286 to 1,010, and the membership from 246,000 to 566,000. £50,000 was spent in propaganda, and in 1900, only two years after the first great Navy Law, a second was passed, providing for the creation of a fleet of thirty-eight battleships, fourteen large cruisers, thirty-eight small cruisers, and ninety-seven destroyers, all to be ready by 1917. The first law had merely authorized a fleet such as a great power like Germany certainly needed. The pur-

## The Anglo-French Entente, 1900-5

pose of the second was clearly indicated in the preamble, which set forth that "Germany must have a fleet of such strength that a war against the mightiest power would involve risks threatening the supremacy of that power." Germany had definitely entered the lists with a view of gaining the same position of ascendancy by sea that she already enjoyed on land.

The next years were a confused time in diplomacy. England, though perturbed by the Navy Laws, was extremely reluctant to abandon the policy of isolation. She was somewhat exhausted by the Boer war, and being entirely preoccupied with the manifold internal problems of her own empire, she entertained no projects of expansion. On the other hand, France and Russia were by long tradition hostile to England: Russia, because of a number of unsolved frontier questions in Tibet, Afghanistan and Persia; France, because of similar questions in Northern Africa—especially in Egypt. The Anglo-French quarrel had culminated in the Fashoda incident of 1898, when Colonel Marchand, by forced marches, tried to annex for France the upper waters of the Nile, directly after Lord Kitchener had overthrown the Khalifa at Omdurman in the Sudan. Accordingly, the proposal was originated—it is generally believed by Germany—that Russia, France and Germany should repeat the success they had won against Japan in 1895, by combining against England during the winter of 1899-1900. The combination, however, had not enough power by sea and the idea came to nothing. Then, in October, 1901, Germany, alarmed at the effect of her own action on English opinion, suggested tentatively an alliance with England, on the basis that each side should guarantee the possessions of the other in all parts of the world except Asia. The fact that such an alliance would commit England to guaranteeing the German occupation of Alsace-Lorraine, Posen and the Danish provinces, and might lead to obvious difficulties with the United States if Germany contemplated aggression in Brazil, would have foredoomed the proposal

## The Schism of Europe

to failure. In any case the determination of the British Government to avoid definite commitments on the Continent of Europe caused it to be dropped almost at once. It was indeed doubtful if it was intended seriously by Germany at all.

At any rate, Germany turned back to France, and an attempt was made to arrive at an understanding on the basis of a partition of all the north coast of Africa, directed against England and concluded behind the back of England. But there was in France a strong party, headed by M. Delcassé, which distrusted the designs of Germany. As a Frenchman, quoted by Sir Valentine Chirol, remarked: "William II always offers to be your friend *against* somebody else. Otherwise your friendship has no value for him." M. Delcassé was in favour of an understanding with England, based upon a general settlement of all outstanding quarrels, which would pave the way for cordial relations and might eventually mature into an entente or an alliance if German foreign policy became, as it promised to become, even more menacing and aggressive.

This party prevailed, and on July 7, 1903, an interview took place between Lord Lansdowne, the British Foreign Secretary, and M. Delcassé which led to the conclusion of the Anglo-French Agreement of April 4, 1904. That agreement did no more than recognize the then existing facts of the situation in Africa. In the whole of that continent only three independent States remained—Abyssinia, Liberia and Morocco. All the rest of the continent was under the political tutelage of some European power. Morocco was surrounded on all sides by French territory, and English and French commerce were predominant there, while Spain had some political claims in the country. The agreement specified that while France recognized the predominant position of the British in Egypt and the Sudan, the British recognized the predominant position of the French in Morocco. France declared that she had "no intention of altering the political status of Morocco;" England made the same declaration

## The Anglo-French Entente, 1900-5

with regard to Egypt, and further agreed that it "appertained" to France to "preserve order" in Morocco and "to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial and military reforms which it may require." She also undertook "not to obstruct the action taken by France for this purpose." At the same time, as it appeared later, France entered into secret arrangements with Italy and Spain, guaranteeing to one a Spanish sphere in Morocco and to the other a free hand in Tripoli.

The news of the Anglo-French Agreement produced little comment in Germany. Prince Bülow, the Chancellor, speaking in the Reichstag on April 12, 1904, said that on the whole Germany welcomed the Anglo-French understanding and that Germany's interests in Morocco were solely economic. But there was much chagrin in the German Foreign Office itself, which had hoped, by playing on French antipathy to England, to make an agreement favourable to Germany behind the back of England. It now found that France had obtained what she wanted without paying "compensation" to Germany, and, what was infinitely more disquieting, had made up her quarrel with England and paved the way for an entente which might eventually threaten Germany's domination over Europe by creating an equipoise to the Triple Alliance.

True to the Prussian tradition, the German Government made up its mind that there was only one method of dealing with the situation, to frighten France from her intentions by the threat of war. Accordingly, on March 31, 1905—a couple of weeks after the final defeat of Russia at Mukden had removed all danger on their Eastern frontier—the Kaiser suddenly landed at Tangier and declared that he visited the Sultan as an independent sovereign in whose lands all powers were to hold the same footing and enjoy the same rights. The protection of Morocco was the ostensible reason of the move. The true reason was exactly expressed by the German historian, Rachfahl: "Because under the surface of the Morocco affair lurked the deepest and most difficult problems of power (*macht-probleme*), it was to be

## The Schism of Europe

foreseen that its course would prove to be a trial of strength of the first order." During the controversy which followed the Emperor's visit, Germany delivered a peremptory ultimatum to France. A special envoy, Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck, was sent to Paris. It was, he said, clear to the Imperial Government of Germany that the Anglo-French Entente had been framed to isolate and humiliate Germany. Was that the policy of France, or of her Minister? The policy of the Minister was aimed at Germany, who would not wait till it was completed. Let France think better of it, give up her Minister, and adopt towards Germany an open and loyal policy such as would guarantee peace—in other words, break off relations with England. France was not strong enough to resist Germany in arms, and M. Delcassé resigned.

This was the first instance of mailed-fist diplomacy in Europe for many years. It crystallized the growing fears about the domineering tendencies of German policy. For Germany, herself protected by the Triple Alliance, had threatened France with war at a time when France's ally, Russia, was powerless, unless by some dramatic act of humiliation she proved that she meant to change her policy and acknowledge that she would not pursue a foreign policy disapproved of by Germany. But so far from weakening the understanding between France and England, this incident immensely strengthened it. The Entente began to be a reality, and its foundation became a common determination to resist mailed-fist humiliation or military aggression by the central Powers. As to Morocco itself, it was agreed that the whole question should be submitted to an international conference, which met at Algeciras in 1906. The conference ended in an apparent victory, but a tacit defeat, for Germany. All the members, except the Austrian, including the representative of the United States, decided against the claims put forward by Germany. Finally the conference drew up an act providing for the future of Morocco "on the three-fold principles of the sovereignty and independence of H.M. the Sultan, the integrity of his dominions, and economic

## Anglo-German Negotiations, 1906-9

liberty without any inequality for the trade and commerce of all nations." At the same time, however, it was recognized that France and Spain had the right to supervise the police in the eight treaty ports, and to enforce the ordinances about Customs and against the illicit importation of arms, which meant that in the event of internal disorder they would be the powers to intervene and restore order.

### V. ANGLO-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS, 1906-9

THE Morocco crisis was followed by a general election and the advent of the Liberal Party to power in England. A most determined effort was now made by the new Government to enter into friendly relations with Germany, stop the growing expenditure on armaments, and inaugurate an era of peace. The central idea of their policy was defined later on by Sir Edward Grey, when he said (November, 1911), "It is difficult to find a half-way house between constant liability to friction and cordial friendship. It is cordial friendship alone which provides sufficient mutual tolerance and good will to prevent difficulties and friction which would otherwise arise." The Liberal Government, in fact, put forward as the future basis of international relations in Europe the principle that nations should mutually respect one another's rights and territories, and that in order to maintain peace, they should endeavour to cultivate good relations all round, rather than range themselves in hostile military groups protected not by friendliness and good will, but by a common fear of the terrible consequences of war. This principle was advanced as the alternative to the traditional Prussian and Bismarckian idea that States were necessarily in eternal competition with one another and used diplomacy and alliances simply as means of profit or aggrandizement at the expense of their neighbours.



## The Schism of Europe

In two quarters the policy was successful. In 1907 an Agreement was signed with Russia whereby the old difficulties concerning the buffer States of Tibet, Afghanistan and Persia were roughly settled. Each side disclaimed aggressive intentions against these areas, and spheres of influence were delimited in Persia, which, so long as any form of stable government could be propped up in Teheran, would obviate trouble for the future. This agreement with Russia, unlike the spirit of the Entente with France, carried with it no suggestion of the possibility of common action in the event of German aggression, though it was facilitated by common apprehension of German designs. As Sir Edward Grey explained, its purpose was simply to remove causes of friction in frontier questions and so permit relations of friendliness instead of suspicion between the Governments of London and Petrograd. A similarly successful arrangement was also arrived at a few years later with the United States, whereby various ancient controversies about the Newfoundland Fisheries and boundary waters were amicably composed.

Negotiations were also opened with Germany; but as there were no minor matters at issue, they centred on the question of naval rivalry and the possibility of a diminution of expenditure on armaments. The second Hague Conference was due in 1907, and the Liberal Government thought that some simultaneous movement might be made towards disarmament and better international arrangements all round. Accordingly, in order to show that they were serious, and were not manœuvring to steal an advantage, and in order to prove to Germany that Great Britain had no intention of aggression against her or of hemming her in by an unbreakable wall of steel by land or sea, the Government announced that the British programme of new construction—known as the Cawdor programme—for the year 1907 would be reduced from 4 to 3 Dreadnoughts. Certain reductions were made at the same time in the army. The British overtures did not meet with much success, for, in 1906, the German

## Anglo-German Negotiations, 1906-9

naval programme, so far from being reduced, was increased by six fast cruisers, the general opinion in official circles being reflected by Count Reventlow, the well-known publicist, when he said: "The most that Germany could do would be to propose that England should so reduce her rate of construction as to allow the German navy to overtake the British. Once the two navies were equal, Germany would pledge herself not to increase her fleet further."

But the Liberal Government still persisted. On March 2, 1908, the Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman, wrote an open letter to the world urging the need of some measure of disarmament in the interests of peace and civilization. And in order to prove the sincerity of their intentions the Government reduced the programme of naval construction for 1908 still further from the Cawdor standard by only laying down two Dreadnoughts instead of four. The answer of Germany was decisive. Germany made her attendance at the Hague Conference conditional on no motion being brought forward on the subject of disarmament, and in the following year (1908), after a successful "patriotic" general election, passed yet another new Navy Law adding four more Dreadnoughts to her programme and laying down no less than four in the current year. As the *Novoe Vremya* at Petrograd said: "This mania for armaments really aims at the domination of the universe."

It was obvious that mere security could not be Germany's object, for nobody thought of attacking her or any of her possessions. Nor was colonial expansion the motive, for she had not made much use yet of her own colonies, and she had signed an agreement with England which gave her the major share of the Portuguese colonies, should Portugal collapse. Nor was it commercial reasons, for her prosperity and trade were increasing by giant strides. The real reason was the boundless ambition of the rulers of Germany, and their belief that Germany could eventually drive her neighbours to relinquish any claims to equality, and so dominate the policy of Europe by the superiority of her

## The Schism of Europe

armaments and will to power. Their attitude was exactly expressed by the German Chancellor, Dr von Bethmann-Hollweg, in March, 1911, when, in rejecting President Taft's proposals for arbitration, he said:

"When a people will not or cannot continue to spend enough on its armaments to be able to make its way in the world, then it falls back into the second rank and sinks down to the rôle of a 'super' on the world's stage. There will always be another and a stronger there who is ready to take the place in the world which it has vacated."

Early in 1909 the British Government, in face of vigorous attacks by the Opposition, abandoned the attempts to reach an understanding over armaments with Germany as hopeless. They admitted that there had been an unprecedented increase in the general warlike preparations of Germany as well as in her building programme. Krupp's works had recently taken on 36,000 new hands, an increase of 60 per cent. Recognizing the danger in which Great Britain had placed herself, they proposed, in order to make up lee-way and secure the safety of the country, to lay down no less than eight Dreadnoughts in 1909. New Zealand and Australia were no less alarmed and spontaneously decided to build a Dreadnought cruiser each, and Canada announced her intention of commencing a navy of her own.

On March 29, 1909, Sir Edward Grey summed up the whole position in a speech delivered to the House of Commons. He began with a reference to the naval negotiations:

"The House and the country," he said, "are perfectly right in the view that the situation is grave. A new situation in this country is created by the German programme . . . When that programme is completed, Germany, a great country close to our own shores, will have a fleet of thirty-three Dreadnoughts.

## Anglo-German Negotiations, 1906-9

... That fleet would be the most powerful fleet that the world has ever yet seen . . . That imposes on us the necessity of which we are now at the beginning—except in so far as we have Dreadnoughts already—of rebuilding the whole of our fleet. That is what the situation is. What we do not know is the time in which we shall have to do it.”

Then Sir Edward Grey went on to set forth with not less precision the only conditions on which the peace of Europe would be maintained:

“As regards our future diplomatic relations with Germany, I see a wide space in which both of us may walk in peace and amity. Two things, in my opinion two extreme things, would produce conflict. One is an attempt by us to isolate Germany. No nation of her standing and her position would stand a policy of isolation assumed by neighbouring Powers. I should like to observe that in recent debates nothing has been more unfounded and nothing more malign in its influence than the statement that any difference of opinion we have had with regard to the question of Austria has been due to the fact that Austria was Germany’s friend. On the contrary, we have carefully avoided in all our relations anything which was likely to make difficulty or mischief, directly or indirectly, between those two Powers. Another thing which would certainly produce a conflict would be the isolation of England, the isolation of England attempted by any great Continental Power so as to dominate and dictate the policy of the Continent. That always has been so in history. The same reasons which have caused it in history would cause it again. But between these two extremes of isolation and domination there is a wide space in which the two nations can walk together in a perfectly friendly way.”\*

After that he made a further plea for some restriction of expenditure or armaments in the interests of peace:

\* Sir Edward Grey—House of Commons, March 29, 1909.

## The Schism of Europe

“ If I were asked to name the one thing which would mostly reassure the world—or reassure Europe—with regard to the prospects of peace, I think it would be that the naval expenditure in Germany would be diminished, and that ours was following suit, and being diminished also. Were there a cessation of competition in naval expenditure public opinion everywhere would take it as a guarantee of the good intentions of the two nations, and the effect would be incalculable.”\*

Finally, he discussed the basis of a possible understanding with Germany about armaments, pointing out how superior naval power was a matter of life and death to the British Empire, with its vital parts scattered in every continent of the globe, while it was in no sense essential to the safety of Germany:

“ On what basis would any arrangement have to be proposed? Not the basis of equality. It must be the basis of a superiority of the British Navy. No German, so far as I know, disputes that that is a natural point of view for us. But it is another thing to ask the German Government to expose itself before its own public opinion to a charge of having co-operated to make the attainment of our views easier. That is the difficulty which it is only fair to state. As against that there is no comparison between the importance of the German Navy to Germany, and the importance of our Navy to us. Our Navy to us is what their Army is to them. To have a strong Navy would increase their prestige, their diplomatic influence, their power of protecting their commerce; but as regards us—it is not a matter of life and death to them that it is to us. No superiority of the British Navy over the German Navy could ever put us in a position to affect the independence or integrity of Germany, because our Army is not maintained on a scale, which, unaided, could do anything on German territory. But if the German Navy were superior to

\* Sir Edward Grey—House of Commons, March 29, 1909.

## The Bosnian Crisis

ours, they, maintaining the Army which they do, for us it would but be a question of defeat. Our independence, our very existence, would be at stake.”\*

The growth of armaments, he concluded, had become “a satire and reflection upon civilization, which, if it goes on at the rate at which it has recently increased, sooner or later, I believe, will submerge that civilization.” But no nation could stop it alone; action must be mutual and simultaneous. We could not afford to fall into a position of inferiority. If we did, “we should cease to count for anything among the nations of Europe, and we should be fortunate if our liberty was left and we did not become the conscript appendage of some stronger power.”

### VI. THE BOSNIAN CRISIS

AS if to give final proof of her intention to “dominate and dictate the policy of the continent,” Germany, in the spring of the same year, 1909, intervened in the dispute over Bosnia-Herzegovina, exactly as she had done over Morocco, with a threat of war as the alternative to submission. The Bosnian question was but one aspect of the great racial problem which has kept the Balkans and Austria-Hungary in a ferment for centuries. After the defeat of Austria by Prussia in 1866 the Hungarians had asserted their independence and the Habsburg Monarchy was reconstituted as a Dual monarchy, controlling autocratically foreign affairs and the army, and basing its power on a political system which gave ascendancy over all Slavs in Austria to the Germans, and over all Slavs in Hungary to the Hungarians. In the ensuing years a policy of conciliation to the other races, Czechs, Poles and Slovenes, gradually prevailed in Austria, and a large measure of liberty and self-government was enjoyed by all races. In Hungary, however, the Magyar aristocracy fought desperately against any concessions to their subject

\* Sir Edward Grey—House of Commons, March 29, 1909.

## The Schism of Europe

peoples. The Slovaks and the Southern Slavs—the Serbs and Croats—were repressed in every conceivable way. They had no voice in their own government. Their language was put under grave disabilities, their newspapers were suppressed, their universities and schools were starved of funds and hindered in other ways, and any exhibition of nationalist sympathies was fiercely punished.

These measures of force fanned the passion for liberty among the Southern Slavs and stimulated to fever heat their love of their language and nationality. After the liberation of Serbia from Turkish rule their hopes centred in Belgrade, and they looked forward to a day when the Southern Slavs would be a free and united people, either outside the Austrian Empire or as a third element, counter-balancing the Magyars and the Germans, within it. In July, 1908, the Young Turk Revolution took place in Constantinople and, on October 9, Austria-Hungary announced the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which she had been administering under the terms of the Treaty of Berlin. This act was a blow to the more extreme hopes of the Southern Slavs, but was especially galling to Serbia, which saw her final hope of access to the sea disappear and with it the chance of freeing herself from economic dependence upon Austria. She bitterly demanded compensation; and when Austria absolutely refused to consider her requests, she appealed to Russia—the patron of the Slavs—to intervene, and even made preparations for war. Russia, which had great sympathy with her oppressed Slav fellow subjects, made strong representations to Vienna, but without avail.

At the same time England protested against the abrogation of a European treaty without any reference to the parties to it. She urged that the prospect of international peace depended largely on the recognition by civilized powers of the sanctity of treaties which they had signed, and that the only hope of avoiding the constant appeal to force in diplomacy or war was by mutually recognizing the reign of law in international affairs in so far as it was defined in treaties



## The Bosnian Crisis

and conventions. She had no objection to the actual sovereignty of Austria-Hungary in Bosnia-Herzegovina becoming a formal reality, but she demanded that the revision of the treaty of 1878 should be effected by a conference of all the signatory powers.

Austria-Hungary, however, refused to admit that a conference had any jurisdiction over her *fait accompli*, even though it did involve a change in a fundamental European treaty. She refused also to make any concessions to Serbia or to allow her any access to the sea. In this attitude she was supported by Germany. The dispute dragged on for some months, but was dramatically ended by Germany early in 1909. The German ambassador suddenly presented an ultimatum in St Petersburg, informing the Russian Government that Germany would mobilize against Russia unless she at once desisted from her support of Serbia and accepted the *status quo*. Russia, disorganized by the Japanese war and by internal revolution, had no option but to agree. The ultimatum also necessarily disposed of the demand for a European conference.

The motive for this act is explained by Prince Bülow, who was then Chancellor, in his book on Imperial Germany. "The German sword," he says, "had been thrown into the scale of the European decision directly in support of our Austro-Hungarian ally, indirectly for the preservation of European peace, and above all for the sake of German credit and the maintenance of our position in the world. . . . The group of Powers whose influence had been so much overestimated at Algeciras fell to pieces when faced with the tough problems of continental policy . . . The Triple Alliance is a force against which no country would let itself be thrust forward for the sake of remote interests, even if clever diplomacy were used in the attempt. Hence the course of the Bosnian crisis in point of fact made an end to the policy of isolation."\*

The policy of isolation to which the Chancellor refers was

\* *Imperial Germany*, pp. 51-2.

## The Schism of Europe

the policy of building up an equipoise to the Triple Alliance, so that Germany should not be able to force her neighbours to accept her will under threat of immediate and irresistible attack in war. And the Bosnian *coup* was designed to prove that no such combination existed and that Germany still possessed military and diplomatic predominance over the rest of Europe. To anyone trained, as Prince Bülow was, in the Prussian autocratic school, to pursue a policy of equilibrium, whereby nations are secured in their freedom and independence, was to isolate Germany. What the rulers of Germany never have been able to understand is that other nations value their liberty, and rather than acquiesce in a diplomatic tyranny of Europe by a great militarist State would fight to the last horse and the last man.

### VII. THE AGADIR CRISIS

WITHIN little more than two years Germany again adopted the method of the mailed fist and again brought Europe to the verge of war. Prince Bülow writes: "This was the great lesson of the Bosnian crisis, that our international policy, when all is said and done, is based upon our continental policy." So, having vindicated the military supremacy of the Triple Alliance in Europe in 1909, Germany attempted to profit by it once more in the outside world.

The inevitable process of internal disintegration in Morocco, foreseen at the Algeciras conference, soon began to take place. Accordingly, after minor diplomatic trouble, an agreement was come to in 1909 between France and Germany "to facilitate the execution of the Algeciras Act," which would, as Prince Bülow said in the Reichstag, "put co-operation in the opening up of the country in place of mutual hostility." France declared herself "wholly attached to the integrity and independence of the Shereefian

## The Agadir Crisis

Empire," and pledged herself "not to impede German commercial and industrial interests in Morocco." Germany, on the other hand, "pursuing only economic interests," recognized that France possessed "special political interests in Morocco, which were closely bound up with the consolidation of order and internal peace." This was taken to be a tacit acknowledgment that Germany accepted the understanding, long arrived at by the other Great Powers, that France and Spain were to intervene in Morocco should misgovernment make European control necessary, provided they guaranteed equality of trade to all nations in the country they occupied. By the early summer of 1911, partly owing to internal disorder, partly owing to the intrigues, financial and otherwise, of French and Spanish adventurers, things had come to such a pass in Morocco that one-third of the country was occupied by these two powers, and a French army had entered Fez. Suddenly, on July 1, the German Government announced that they had sent the gunboat "Panther" to the open port of Agadir, ostensibly "to help and protect German subjects and clients in those regions" who might be affected by the growing internal disorder. In reality, as all the diplomatic world knew, it was a rattling of the sabre to intimate to France that Germany must receive "compensation" before she could acquiesce in the annexation of Morocco by France and Spain. It was also suspected that the occasion would be used to make another attempt to isolate France, and so put her out of the race, by compelling her to abandon the entente under the threat of instant war. This suspicion proved to be well founded.

The actual course of the crisis was as follows. On the same day that the "Panther" was sent to Agadir—July 1—the German Ambassador in London informed the British Government that Germany "regarded a return to the *status quo* in Morocco as doubtful, if not impossible, and that what they contemplated was a definite solution of the Moroccan question between France, Spain, and

## The Schism of Europe

Germany." Three days later Sir Edward Grey informed the German Ambassador that England had treaty obligations with France about Morocco and interests of her own there, so that she could not be indifferent to the course of the negotiations. Meanwhile direct negotiations were proceeding between France and Germany in which England took no part, as neither her own interests nor her treaty obligations seemed to be involved. But eventually, as Sir Edward Grey said:

"It appeared in the Press that the German Government, and indeed it was the case, that the German Government had made demands with regard to the French Congo of an extent to which it was obvious to everybody who thought of it that neither the French Government nor the French Chamber could agree. That at once made me anxious as to the development of the situation. If Germany was going to negotiate with France an arrangement by which Germany received from France something in the French Congo and left France in Morocco as she is under our agreement of 1904, then of course we were prepared to stand aside and not to intrude, but if Germany, starting negotiations on that basis with France, made demands not for a portion, but for the greater part of the French Congo or anything of that kind, it was quite clear that France must refuse those demands and negotiations would be thrown back on some other basis and the question of the possible partition would arise again."\*

Germany in fact was doing exactly what Sir Edward Grey in his speech of March, 1909, had made clear must endanger the peace of Europe. Though protected herself by the Triple Alliance, which nobody had ever attempted to undermine, she was trying to break up the Triple Entente, a combination which had no aggressive or exclusive objects, and which had only been brought into being by the dominating and threatening diplomacy of Germany herself. The method of doing this which she had selected was that of

\* Speech in House of Commons, November 29, 1911.

## The Agadir Crisis

making extortionate demands from France under threat of instant war if she refused, at the same time declaring that the Morocco negotiations were the concern of Germany, France and Spain alone, with which England, which was concerned in them by self-interest, the Algeciras Act and other treaties, had nothing to do. By July 21 the situation had reached the breaking-point. Germany persisted in her demands and persisted in her attitude of military menace. The real question was no longer Morocco, but whether France would be compelled once more to accept the terms imposed upon her by the German sword, or whether the Entente was sufficiently firm and united to resist the attempted blackmail even at the risk of war. On July 21 England accepted the challenge. Sir Edward Grey informed the German Ambassador that England had no wish to intervene in friendly negotiations between France and Germany, but that if Germany—as appeared to be and indeed was the case—made “demands which were in effect not a rectification of the frontier but a cession of the French Congo, which it was obviously impossible for the French Government to concede,” and especially if they proposed to take Agadir as a naval base, England could not stand aside. On the same evening Mr Lloyd George made a speech at the Mansion House, in which he said that England had made great sacrifices to preserve peace, but that if a situation were to be forced upon her,

“in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be treated, where her interests are vitally affected, as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be humiliation intolerable for a great country like ourselves to endure.”

This step of supplementing a diplomatic communication by a platform utterance, mild in actual purport, but

## The Schism of Europe

rhetorical in tone, made negotiations very difficult for a day or two. The German Government protested vigorously against the speech, but nothing could hide the real position. Great Britain had made it clear that, if Germany intended to force impossible concessions from France at the point of the sword, she would stand by France in resisting them, even at the cost of war. After a war council at Potsdam, at which it was decided that Germany was not ready for war, Germany gave way. She made an "exceedingly friendly" reply, and all danger was past. The French and German Governments proceeded to negotiate an agreement (signed November 4) whereby Germany acquiesced in the occupation of Morocco by Spain and France, and obtained a slice of the French Congo by way of compensation.

It is impossible for the outsider to estimate the precise merits of the details of the long Morocco controversy between France and Germany. They are not yet all public. What is clear is that Germany by starting every negotiation with the threat of war prejudiced hopelessly her own case. Instead of confining herself to the question of whether France was entitled to absorb Morocco, or whether Germany was entitled to compensation from France, and if so what and where, she began on every occasion by attempting to intimidate France into submission and to isolate her from her friends. Directly the factor of power was introduced, overriding the rights and wrongs of the case, the other Entente Powers, in self-defence and in the interest of national freedom in Europe, had no option but to range themselves with France against her tyrannous neighbour. To the honest German, preoccupied with his own destiny, and misinformed by the official Press Bureau, this seemed a piece of deliberate and selfish hemming in. He has never understood that the bludgeoning methods of the Prussian autocracy which he so much detests in Germany, but acquiesces in because he has to, are bound, when applied in external affairs, to unite outsiders, not in selfish and greedy hostility to his country, but in common self-defence.

## The Agadir Crisis

The Agadir crisis produced an immense impression in Germany. It was not only that the German Government, after issuing a challenge to France and England, had retired directly it had been accepted, though that was an intolerable humiliation to a military caste trained to a code of honour in which slights and provocation still have to be wiped out by the duel. It was that the whole theory which underlay the Prussian domination of Germany, and the confident hope that Germany was eventually to reach the first place in the world by her tremendous expenditure on armaments, had been called in question. That theory depended upon the belief that if Germany only spent enough on armaments, she would eventually beat her neighbours into subservience, either by exhaustion or, in the last resort, by war. To this end she had steadily increased her navy. With this object she had fostered in every possible way the trade and prosperity of the people, for they provided the sinews out of which power is made. And with the same purpose she had discouraged emigration and colonization. Though the acquisition of colonies has played its part in the Press campaign of the Navy League, it has never been an important aim of Government policy. Colonies in any case were a doubtful benefit. They exhausted the manhood of the home land. They were turbulent and disobedient. Emigrants went to foreign countries like the United States or South America, where wages were high, not to the barren and undeveloped colonies of Germany. It was a better policy in every way to "keep our people happy and prosperous at home," strengthening the army, adding to German wealth, and so available for the day when in a supreme struggle all the best possessions of her rivals would fall into the lap of a victorious Germany.

In accordance with this general policy the rulers of Germany had confidently expected that France, divided by religious and social quarrels, would not keep up the struggle for full national liberty much longer. This seemed inevitable from the figures of population alone.



## The Schism of Europe

1861. Prussia . . .	19,000,000	France	37,000,000
1868. North German Confederacy . . .	30,000,000	„	38,000,000
1871. German Empire . .	41,000,000	„	36,000,000
1910. „ . . .	65,000,000	„	39,000,000

If France could only be made to suffer a few more rebuffs like that of 1905, she would reluctantly sink to the level of a second-rate power and concern herself no more with the high affairs of world politics, and one more of Germany's rivals would disappear. But Agadir made Germany suddenly realize that none of her dreams was coming true. Her restless world policy, the great Navy Laws of 1898, 1900, 1906 and 1908, the successes won under threat of war against France in 1905, and against Russia in 1909, had roused the fears of her neighbours to the point that they had composed their own quarrels and had united in a tacit understanding to resist in common the tyrannous domination of Germany. 1911, so far from proving that the Triple Entente was a powerless fiction, and that France was an effete power, had proved that German foreign policy had succeeded in uniting all Europe in self-defence and that Germany herself, for the first time in her history, had had to beat a retreat.

### VIII. THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC MENACE

**I**T is not to be supposed that the whole German people, which had shown such liberal tendencies in 1848, had meekly acquiesced in the autocratic regime and in its aggressive foreign policy all these years. For the first six years after the formation of the union Bismarck leaned upon the support of the National Liberals. They hailed him as the man who had achieved one of their great ideals, and looked forward to the gradual accomplishment of the other under his guiding hand. But Bismarck had no intention of making any concessions either to Germany or to democracy,

## The Social Democratic Menace

and gradually became estranged from the Liberals. Starting his career as Chancellor with the famous Kulturkampf, an attack on the Roman Catholic party of the centre, which was particularist and suspicious of his unifying policy, he rapidly changed round in 1877. He realized that no compromise was possible between himself and any true Liberal or Democratic party. He therefore set himself to win the support of all who shared his belief in monarchical autocracy and in the ascendancy of Prussia. He turned to the Prussian junker agrarians, ultra-conservative and monarchical and contemptuous of the rest of Germany, and to the Roman Catholics, who welcomed the emphasis he laid on authority and the duty of obedience and who numbered among them many of the South German rulers. From 1877 until 1907 the Government secured a docile majority in the Reichstag from these two parties—the Conservatives and the Centre. As time went on the Liberals—more and more entranced by the amazing diplomatic, financial and commercial success of Germany—forgot their principles, and came nearer to terms with the Government. One party alone was irreconcilable, the Social Democrats.

Social Democracy, in its essence, was opposition to the whole theory and system of government inaugurated by Bismarck. It repudiated monarchical autocracy. It demanded popular government, liberty and equality. It hated militarism, and the doctrine that any section of the community should be protected in an ascendancy over the rest. It was bitterly opposed to an aggressive foreign policy. Social democracy collected under its banner all the elements of discontent, from the idealists, who demanded the sovereignty of the people to the individuals who were exasperated by the tyranny of bureaucratic officialdom and police. Bismarck attempted to destroy Social Democracy by force. He prohibited its organization, its newspapers and its societies. He forbade meetings of its members. He even proposed that anyone legally convicted of holding Socialist opinions should be deprived of the franchise and excluded from the

## The Schism of Europe

Reichstag, but his colleagues would not support him in this extreme measure. Social Democrats were abused by the authorities in the most unmeasured terms. The Kaiser said: "For me every Social Democrat is an enemy of the Empire and the Fatherland." They were described as traitors, as men without a country, as the enemies of the State. This they were not. They were often revolutionary and extreme. They had little understanding of the practical difficulties and problems of government. But they were the class in which alone the passion for liberty and self-government still flowered and which alone refused to bow before the great machine of autocratic efficiency which was gradually crushing all real independence out of the German people. And between them and the system of autocratic government, according to the Prussian tradition, no compromise was possible. They were the enemies not of Germany, but of the Prussian conception of the State. As Prince Bülow says: "The Social Democratic movement is the antithesis of the Prussian State," "for decades [it] has been combating the monarchical and military foundations of the Prussian State."\*

Their power and influence in Germany steadily grew. It is shown in the following table of the number of votes polled by them at the Reichstag elections:

1884	.	.	.	.	550,000
1887	.	.	.	.	763,000
1890	.	.	.	.	1,427,000
1893	.	.	.	.	1,787,000
1898	.	.	.	.	2,107,000
1903	.	.	.	.	3,011,000
1907	.	.	.	.	3,539,000
1912	.	.	.	.	4,250,000

By 1907 the position was becoming serious. In the preceding elections they had won 80 seats out of 397. The Government was determined to cripple them. As Prince

\* *Imperial Germany*, pp. 186, 189.

## The Social Democratic Menace

Bülow, who had charge of the elections, said, "It is the duty of every German Ministry to combat this movement until it is defeated or materially changed. There can be no doubt about the task itself, but there may be hesitation as to the choice of means."\* It shows how abysmal is the gulf which separates Germany from popular government that a Chancellor should speak in such terms of by far the largest body of voters in the Empire. Prince Bülow, after rejecting the idea of using force as being ineffective, says that the true remedy against Social Democracy is a vigorous national policy. If every other means fails, an appeal to the deeply ingrained and carefully fostered patriotic sentiment will succeed. Such an appeal to national sentiment must be sounded in thrilling notes. "Nothing," he says, "has a more discouraging, paralysing and depressing effect on a clever, enterprising and highly developed nation such as the Germans than a monotonous, dull policy which, for fear of an ensuing fight, avoids rousing passions by strong action."†

This policy, pursued in 1906-7, was a striking success. The whole country was dissatisfied. High hopes had been entertained of triumphs in Morocco and these had been shattered by the Algeiras conference. The Bagdad railway, another project which had raised great expectations, was evidently not going to bring prestige and prosperity rapidly in its track. The war against the Hereros in German South-West Africa had been a somewhat gloomy fiasco. The excitement over expansion in China had died away when it was realized that it was mainly a matter of humdrum trade. The hoax perpetrated by the famous Captain of Koepenick reflected the prevailing temper of disgust at the management of Imperial affairs. The question of ministerial responsibility was openly discussed. Prince Bülow, however, announced in the Reichstag on November 14 that this was impossible. "In Germany the ministers

\* *Imperial Germany*, p. 171.

† *Ibid.*, p. 199.

## The Schism of Europe

were not the organs of Parliament and its temporary majority. They were the men who possessed the confidence of the Crown, and the legislative ordinances were the ordinances of the Government and the Monarch."

Immediately afterwards the Reichstag was dissolved with a tremendous appeal to national sentiment. The main issue is seen in the pronouncements of the chief parties. The Social Democrats condemned wild naval schemes and an ambitious world-policy, and reiterated their demands for democratic government. The Centre—which was out of favour with the Government—said that the issue was "whether the representatives of the people are to be bound to vote what the chief military authorities and colonial governors demand." The *North German Gazette*—the official Government organ—said the true question was "whether Germany is at all capable of developing from a European power into a world power." By a deft arrangement with the National Liberals and the Radicals, who accepted the cry of "the State in danger," Prince Bülow was able, on the second ballots, to secure the defeat of the Social Democrats. Though their poll rose from 3,011,000 to 3,539,000, their seats fell from 81 to 43. The policy of becoming a world power had prevailed. As Prince Bülow said after the election: "The whole world will recognize that the German nation sits firmly in the saddle, and that it will ride down everything which places itself in the way of its well being and its greatness." The Government reaped its reward in the fourth great Navy Law of 1908.

But though the elections of 1907 and still more the successful "shining armour" ultimatum to Russia in 1909 restored the prestige and authority of the Government, the pressure for reform did not diminish. There was great agitation from 1908 to 1910 over the reform of the Prussian constitution. The three-class system of voting and the distribution of seats had remained unchanged for nearly sixty years and was grotesquely unfair. Thus 314,000 Social Democratic voters were entirely unrepresented in the

## The Social Democratic Menace

Landtag, while 324,000 Conservatives returned 143 members, The propertied and agrarian classes returned over 300 members, the remainder, including the vast industrial districts of the Rhine, 130. Some of the constituencies contained 40,000 voters, others 500,000 or even 700,000. A bill to remedy some of the most glaring grievances was introduced in 1908. But it did nothing to change the fundamental fact that by the Prussian constitution the whole power rested with the Junker class, and that this class, from which were mainly recruited the higher military and bureaucratic officials, shared with the Court the control of the destinies of the German Empire. Hence when amendments were introduced in favour of a fair and equal franchise system they were rejected by Prince Bülow as incompatible with the welfare of the State, or in other words with the predominance of the Prussian ruling caste. In 1910 the franchise reform bill was withdrawn, for the democratic party would not accept the meaningless concessions of the Government and so prejudice their chances in the future, and the Government would offer no more. The new Chancellor, Dr von Bethmann-Hollweg, who had succeeded Prince Bülow in the preceding year, said in the Reichstag that "Prussia could not allow herself to be towed into the waters of Parliamentary government while the power of the Monarchy remained unbroken. That power of the Monarchy, which had always made it its proud tradition to be a kingdom for all, would not be tampered with."\* And later in the same year, in defending the Emperor against attacks about his speech on divine right at Königsberg, he said that the Emperor's declaration as to the rights and duties of Prussian sovereigns was in no way incompatible with the Prussian constitution, which did not recognize the sovereignty of the people.

The failure at Agadir immensely increased the discontent with the Government. The Social Democrats pointed out that they had always foretold disaster from the official

\* *Annual Register*, 1910.

## The Schism of Europe

policy. The rest of the country declared that the Government was incompetent and was going to fail in winning for Germany the position of ascendancy in the world which they had always promised, if the people would do as they were told. The Reichstag elections took place immediately after the crisis, in December, 1911. The spirit of discontent was clearly indicated. Despite all the efforts of the Government the number of Social Democratic members rose from 43 to 110. As the Chancellor said in his opening speech to the new Reichstag, the oldest Parliamentary hand among them had never stood face to face with a political situation so uncertain.

### IX. REFORM OR WAR

**H**OW deeply the ruling classes felt the humiliation of Agadir is seen in the steps they took to make sure that it should never happen again. They immediately had recourse to the time-honoured Prussian expedient—the building up of more power, so that when the next crisis came, whether it was internal or external, they might count on overthrowing their enemies and demonstrating the folly of every attempt on their privileged position. In 1912 a new Army Law raising the peace strength of the army from 515,000 to 544,000 was passed as a first instalment. In the same year a fifth Navy Law was passed, adding three new battleships to the programme and 15,150 officers and men to the personnel, and what was far more important, providing that four-fifths of the fleet should be kept permanently in commission ready to strike at a moment's notice. In the next year another, and this time a truly terrific, Army Law was introduced and passed. It provided for many new formations, 4,000 officers and 15,000 N.C.O.'s, and the annual contingent of recruits was increased so that the peace strength of the Army should rise to 870,000. At the same time a special levy on property was announced



## Reform or War

amounting to £50,000,000, to be all paid by July 1, 1914, and to be spent on fortifications, equipment, and other capital preparation for war. This Bill was justified by the Chancellor because it was "according to the unanimous judgment of the military authorities necessary in order to secure the future of Germany."

These measures were passed without serious difficulty, for, as Dr von Bethmann-Hollweg said, they were "according to the unanimous judgment of the military authorities necessary in order to secure the future of Germany." The Agadir crisis was adduced as proof of a plot on the part of the Entente powers against the liberties and future of Germany, which it was necessary for every patriotic German to shatter by demonstrating finally and for ever the spirit of self-sacrifice which animated him, and the immense and irresistible power of Germany if anyone stood in her way. At the same time a vigorous campaign was instituted by the Press Bureau against France and Russia. The moral of the Agadir crisis for Germany was that France was no longer afraid of Germany and had become warlike once more. A report to the French Government, dated July 30, 1913, summarizes a large number of German opinions from all parts and classes as follows:

"The treaty of November 4 is a diplomatic defeat, a proof of the incapacity of German diplomacy and the carelessness of the Government (so often denounced), a proof that the future of the Empire is not safe without a new Bismarck; it is a national humiliation, a lowering in the eyes of Europe, a blow to German prestige, all the more serious because up to 1911 the military supremacy of Germany was unchallenged, and French anarchy and the powerlessness of the Republic were a sort of German dogma."

In the case of Russia the Press campaign made much of the growing Slav peril. The presence on her Eastern frontier of the great Russian State, even more backward politically

## The Schism of Europe

than is Germany herself, must always be a grave preoccupation for Germany. It imposes on her, and will impose on her, the need for a large national army. But the "Slav peril" of the last few years is largely an artificial product. It is not Russian aggressiveness, but the doctrine of racial ascendancy, with its forcible denationalization of the Slavs by the Germans and Magyars, and its outcome the assertion of Teutonic predominance over the Slav States of the Balkans, which has caused the estrangement between Teuton and Slav. Even so, for the last ten years there has been no true Slav menace. Russia has been paralysed by the defeat in Manchuria, and the revolution which followed it. There has been no question of her being able to attack the Triple Alliance with the faintest chance of success, even when the organization of her army was complete (1916), and she had built a navy. The real Slav menace has been that a regenerated Russia, in alliance with a regenerated France, would finally deprive Germany of diplomatic and military hegemony over Europe and force her to admit that she could no longer dictate to her neighbours under threat of war.

Hence the tremendous expansion of naval and military armaments of the years 1912 and 1913, and the intense disappointment when it was found that France was not going to be forced out of the race. For by a supreme effort in the year 1913 France passed a Bill providing that every soldier should spend three years instead of two with the colours. This did not increase the war strength of the Army, as the whole available population was already conscribed, but it strengthened its peace footing, and kept such a number of men in the Army that the enlarged peace force of Germany would not be so superior as to be able certainly to overwhelm it before mobilization was complete.

Despite the ominous signs the Liberal Government in Great Britain persisted in its efforts to come to an understanding with Germany, and the German Government, only too anxious to keep England from becoming too intimate with France and Russia, gladly welcomed the advances. There was

## Reform or War

great friendliness during the London Conferences over the Balkan wars, and an agreement was reached, shortly before the outbreak of war, about the access of the Bagdad railway to the Persian Gulf. But on the main issue—the expansion of armaments—Germany refused to make the slightest concession. England explained that the British Empire with its vital parts, the British Isles, Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand and India, distributed all over the world, could not possibly afford to allow Germany, which already had the most powerful army in the world, to build a fleet equal to her own. But she was content with a 60 per cent superiority over Germany, and would gladly agree to a simultaneous reduction of programme on the basis that these proportions were maintained. On the other hand, if Germany persisted in her policy of expansion, it would do her no good, for England was resolved that for every Dreadnought added to the German programme, she would build two. In this way it was hoped that at any rate further expansion would be prevented. But the ruling classes in Germany were wedded to their policy of armaments, and their reply was yet another new Navy Law in 1912. In July, therefore, Mr Churchill introduced supplementary Navy estimates amounting to £990,000, stating that these were the direct result of the new German Navy Law, the fifth large increase of the German programme in fourteen years, which provided for four-fifths of the German fleet being kept in instant readiness for war.

In the same year Mr Haldane went on a special mission to Berlin to try to arrive at some understanding with Germany on behalf of the British Government. He was authorized to give this assurance: "Britain declares that she will neither make nor join in any unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggression upon Germany is not the subject and forms no part of any treaty, understanding or combination to which Britain is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object." The German Government replied that the basis of any understanding must be

## The Schism of Europe

an absolute pledge from England that she would remain neutral in all circumstances in the event of Germany being engaged in war. But as Sir Edward Grey said in November, 1911, "One does not make new friendships worth having by deserting old ones. New friendships by all means let us make, but not at the expense of the ones we have." The German proposal would have meant the desertion of France in her struggle for national freedom. Moreover, the new German Army and Navy Laws were an obvious menace to the liberty of Europe. No free country could guarantee to stand as a spectator aside, while they were being used to tyrannize over weaker powers. So the negotiations fell through. Despite this demonstration of Germany's attitude towards her neighbours the Liberal Government in the next year made yet another advance to Germany. Speaking on October 18, Mr Churchill said that according to their respective programmes for 1914, England would lay down four Dreadnoughts and Germany two. He promised on behalf of the British Government that if Germany would put off laying down her two Dreadnoughts for twelve months, England would put off laying down her four for the same length of time. By this "naval holiday" the relative position of the two Powers would remain unchanged, while each would have saved several million pounds which could be more usefully directed to other purposes. The proposal was rejected by Grand Admiral von Tirpitz in a firm yet friendly reply.

Thus the attempt to wear down the staying powers of France and England by a tremendous new effort by land and sea failed. The only effect was to increase the alarm and unity of the Entente powers, and to swell immensely discontent in Germany. Every class felt that the burden was growing insupportable. Even the Junkers protested against taxation, which had begun to fall heavily upon themselves. There was a growing feeling that the situation was intolerable and must relieve itself—if need be, by war. The military party, of course, were set on this solution, as they believed

## Reform or War

that success was certain; and it was said that the Emperor, hitherto favourable to peace, was going over to their view. Moreover the effect of their teaching of the last forty years had begun to tell decisively upon the masses of the nation and there was strong popular approval for the doctrine that if her neighbours would not admit the paramountcy of Germany in Europe peaceably, they must be made to do so by force. How much the Chauvinist doctrine has spread of late years appears from the following quotation from Professor Otfried Nippold:

“Hand in hand,” he says, “with this outspoken hostility to foreign countries are enjoined a one-sided exaltation of war and a war mania such as would have been regarded as impossible a few years ago. One can only confess with regret the fact that to-day there is so much irresponsible agitation against other States and nations and so much frivolous incitement to war. It cannot be doubted that this agitation is part of a deliberate scheme, the object of which is gradually to win the population, and if possible the Government, by any means whatever—even by the distortion of fact and malicious slander—for the programme of the Chauvinists. These people not only incite the nation to war, but systematically stimulate the desire for war. War is pictured not as a possibility that may occur, but as a necessity that must come, and the sooner the better. The quintessence of the teachings of the organizations of Chauvinism . . . is always the same; a European war is not merely an eventuality for which we must be prepared, but a necessity for which we should in the interest of the German nation rejoice. From this dogma it is only a small step to the next maxim of the Chauvinist which is so dear to the heart of the belligerent political generals—the maxim of the ‘war of attack,’ or the so-called preventive war. If war has to come, then let it come at the moment most favourable to us. In other words do not let us wait until a formal cause for war occurs, but let us strike when it best suits us, and above all let us strike soon.”

## The Schism of Europe

How powerful these Chauvinist organizations were may be inferred from the fact that the German Navy League in 1907 had a subscribing membership of over a million, while its monthly newspaper, *Die Flotte*, had a circulation of 375,000 copies. During the last few years the flood of literature on the inevitability and "duty" of war has steadily increased.

The character of the propaganda is exactly expressed by the leaders of the "Young Germany" movement. One of them wrote in its official organ for 1913:

"War is the noblest and holiest expression of human activity. For us, too, the glad great hour of battle will strike. Still and deep in the German heart must live the joy of battle and the longing for it. Let us ridicule to the utmost the old women in breeches who fear war and deplore it as cruel and revolting. No, war is beautiful, its august sublimity elevates the human heart beyond the earthly and the common. In the cloud palace above sit the heroes, Frederick the Great and Blucher, and all the men of action—the Great Emperor, Moltke, Roon and Bismarck—are there as well, but not the old women who would take away our joy in war. When here on earth a battle is won by German arms and the faithful dead ascend to heaven, a Potsdam Lance-corporal will call the guard to the door, and old 'Fritz,' springing from his golden throne, will give the command to present arms. That is the heaven of young Germany."\*

Moreover, the standard of political morality in international affairs had steadily fallen under the influence of the Prussian teaching about the State. For this degeneration Bismarck himself is in great measure to blame. In his retirement he delighted to talk about his own diplomatic skill and cunning.

"The conclusions drawn from these disclosures and others which followed were exaggerated, but the naïve,

\* Quoted by Mr W. H. Dawson. *What is Wrong with Germany*.

## Reform or War

simple belief of the people was irretrievably destroyed. Where they had been taught to see the will of God they found only the machinations of the minister. In a country where patriotism had already taken the place of religion, the last illusion had been dispelled; almost the last barrier had been broken down which stood between the nation and moral scepticism.”\*

Meanwhile war began to darken Europe for the first time for many years. In 1911 war had broken out between Italy and Turkey over Tripoli, and by the spring of the next year Tripoli had been annexed to the Italian kingdom. Though the Triple Alliance was solemnly renewed in the autumn of 1912, one half of its foundation had thus been knocked away. Bismarck had succeeded in inducing Italy to join the Triple Alliance in 1882 by secretly urging France to annex Tunis, which Italy coveted, in the preceding year. By the acquisition of Tripoli, which France encouraged, Italy was now appeased and the two countries were reconciled. There was only the other foundation for the Triple Alliance left, the necessity of avoiding constant quarrels and warlike gestures between the ancient enemies, Italy and Austria, which for twenty years had been prevented, by uniting them in an alliance. But an alliance was only possible so long as the general policies of the two countries did not conflict, and events in the Balkan Peninsula and the general trend of Austro-German policy began to drive the two countries further and further apart. In 1912 the first Balkan War broke out and led to the rapid overthrow of the Turkish Empire in Europe. This was a severe blow to Austro-German policy, which aimed at establishing a permanent hegemony of the Balkan Peninsula, based upon the overwhelming military strength of the central European Powers to the north and the military regeneration of Turkey by German officers to the south. The first Balkan War not only weakened Turkey but placed a barrier of Slav and Greek States across the road. This was especially objectionable to Aus-

\* Headlam, *Life of Bismarck*, p. 460.



## The Schism of Europe

tria-Hungary, as the success of Serbia immensely complicated her own internal problems, by increasing the prestige of the Serbian people and raising the hopes of the Serbo-Croat subjects of the monarchy for their eventual liberation from the Magyar yoke, and union inside or outside the monarchy. Accordingly, under Magyar influence the Austro-Hungarian Government, which had already put an absolute embargo on Serbia's obtaining access to the Adriatic, incited Bulgaria to attack her former allies. But so far from improving the position it made it a thousandfold worse, for Serbia and Greece, assisted by Rumania, were immediately victorious and came out stronger than before. It was during this time that Austria-Hungary proposed to Italy that they should join in overwhelming Serbia before she could recover from two wars, and so settle the business once and for all in favour of the monarchy. But Italy had no desire to see Austria predominant in the Balkans. Russia also emphatically declared that any military attack on Serbia would mean war with Russia. And Germany, who was still in the middle of her military preparations, supported loyally Sir Edward Grey's efforts for peace by making it clear at Vienna that if Austria-Hungary became embroiled with Russia through military aggression on Serbia she would not have German support, and by making it equally clear in Petrograd that if Russia quarrelled with Austria-Hungary so long as the latter did not attack Serbia, Germany would fight with her ally. Hence the crisis passed by. But it was not over, as was shown by the fact that in the same year Austria-Hungary voted £28,000,000 for extraordinary military expenditure.

### X. THE OUTBREAK

EUROPE was in this dangerous condition when a Bosnian assassin murdered the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne—the Archduke Francis Ferdinand—in Serajevo on June 28, 1914. The tragedy had a double effect.

## The Outbreak

It removed the one man who might have solved the Slav problem in Austria-Hungary by peaceful statesmanship, and it threw absolute power into the hands of the Magyar party of racial ascendancy and expansion by force of arms. This party at once determined, come what might, to make an end of Serbian independence and Southern Slav aspirations.

In Germany also it was felt that a crisis in the national history had come. Now if ever was the time to prove that, despite Agadir, Germany and her allies were the predominant power in Europe, and to rehabilitate the prestige of the ruling classes. The method chosen was exactly that of 1905, 1909 and 1911. The two Governments presented the powers of the Entente with a choice between surrender and war. Only this time there was to be no parley or delay. The alternatives were to be inexorable. Either the Entente powers had to give way and allow Austria-Hungary to destroy the liberties of Serbia, or they had to take up the gauntlet and fight Germany and Austria-Hungary at a time chosen by themselves. In either event Germany felt sure of victory. If the Entente powers, when faced with war, retreated and allowed Austria-Hungary to work her will on Serbia unmolested, Germany would have asserted her military predominance in the most decisive and unmistakable fashion to the whole world. The Triple Entente, too, by admitting its uselessness in a real crisis, would almost certainly break up and the diplomatic ascendancy of Germany in Europe would then be undisputed. If the Entente powers accepted the challenge, the prospects were even better. The great German General Staff had long promised a short and successful war, like those of 1866 and 1870. The most perfect of all the products of the German genius for organization, and trained in the wonderful school of Moltke, it had thought out every detail of the great campaign for the mastery of Europe. Provided it could choose its own moment for war, it was ready to guarantee to smash the French army and occupy Paris in three weeks and then turn

## The Schism of Europe

back and, in conjunction with the Austrian armies, prove to Russia that she could make no sort of impression on her Teuton foes. France might fight on, but she would never be able to eject the German armies from Paris and North France, and as the indemnities extracted from both gradually bled her to death she would be compelled reluctantly to make peace. England would probably not come in. In any case she would intervene too late, and her army was too small to affect the issue in the decisive military theatre, and if France and Russia were defeated it was only a question of time for England to make peace too.

This plan involved, it is true, the violation of the neutrality of Belgium, and strategic railways to the Belgian frontier had accordingly been commenced as long before as 1906, but Belgium could not be allowed to stand in the path of the German destiny. Moreover, the Belgian route made the rapid conquest of France almost certain, and it had the additional advantage, if Belgium resisted, that Germany would be able to keep some portion of that country at the end of the war, thus bringing her frontiers within 120 miles of Paris and making it finally impossible for France to think of resisting her will by force of arms after the war. To the German General Staff victory was as certain as human foresight could make it. The omens at the moment were propitious. Italy, it was known, would not join in such a war. But she could be counted on to be neutral. Russia would not have completed the reorganization of her army till 1916, and was troubled at the moment with strikes. In France the railways were supposed to be disorganized and revelations had recently been made showing a great shortage of equipment and supplies. England was manifestly pacific, and was so divided internally as to be on the verge of civil war in Ireland. On the other hand, the German army had just been increased. Enormous sums had been spent both in Germany and Austria-Hungary on arms, equipment and stores. And Turkey was almost in German hands. Such a favourable opportunity might never return

## The Outbreak

Moreover, the murder of the Archduke was an excellent pretext. Austria-Hungary certainly had a case against Serbia. It would be quite easy to persuade the whole German people, already alarmed by the press campaign of 1913 over the designs of France and the Slav peril, that Germany had been wantonly attacked and that it was the duty of every citizen to support the Government without criticism or question, in defence of the safety and liberty of the Fatherland.

Hence the character of the ultimatum. It was so framed as to make acceptance impossible and to be a deliberate challenge to Russia. An answer was required within forty-eight hours, which gave no time for negotiation or mediation or for any of the ordinary expedients for averting war. Directly it expired, military movements against Serbia were begun. To every representation Germany replied that the question was a purely Austro-Serbian one in which the rest of the world had no concern. She passed on the suggestions of Sir Edward Grey and others, but she backed her ally in refusing to discuss them. In a matter which had for many years been the common subject of diplomatic intercourse, and which had been under consideration during 1912 and 1913 at the London Conference of Ambassadors, and which manifestly affected the rights of other nations and the peace of the world, Europe was told that it had no concern. Germany and Austria-Hungary were determined to settle the question in their own way and would fight rather than allow anyone else to interfere. Germany, in fact, which had claimed for years the right to interfere in every problem throughout the world and had claimed that nothing should be done anywhere without her consent, now insisted on settling a European question in her own way, and declared that nobody else, even those vitally interested, was to be allowed a voice.

The correct proceeding would have been for Austria-Hungary to declare to Europe that she was convinced of Serbian complicity in the Serajevo crime, that the situation

## The Schism of Europe

was growing intolerable, and that unless by the pressure of the Powers Serbia could be induced within reasonable time to give security that she was not attempting to dismember the Habsburg monarchy, she would be forced to take drastic action. This would have given reason and diplomacy a chance, and a general European war would probably have been averted. But the crushing of Serbia was to Austria an act of policy prompted by the Magyar determination to maintain their ascendancy over the Southern Slavs, and had been decided on long before the assassination. And to Germany the Serbian affair was only the pretext for another diplomatic *coup* with the mailed fist, and her approval to the method of the ultimatum was given with an eye to the humiliation of the Entente rather than to the punishment of Serbia.

It is quite impossible at present to say whether the Emperor and the Chancellor contemplated war from the beginning. Probably they calculated that, if their action was sudden and decisive enough, their opponents, divided and distracted by internal difficulties, would hesitate and then give way, and that after their humiliation had been established, an agreement would be patched up. But they must have known that after 1911 it was impossible for them to make concessions themselves, and that after the rebuffs of 1905 and 1909 it was very difficult for France and Russia to retreat in the face of threats, and that the policy of an ultimatum with a time limit was as likely to bring Europe to war as any policy could do. In determining, therefore, to challenge Europe in this way they must have been prepared for war as a likely, if not a certain, outcome. It is evident that there was a moment's hesitation on the part of the Emperor and the Chancellor on July 29, when it had become clear that the powers of the Entente were not going to submit to the fourth threat of war in nine years, and that war was inevitable unless Germany and Austria were willing to treat the question as a European question and to discuss a settlement based upon the concessions promised in the

## The Outbreak

almost abject Serbian reply. But at this crucial time the final defect of the Bismarckian system inclined the balance. Though the Chancellor is, under the Emperor, the ruler of Germany, he has nothing to do with the Army. The Emperor himself is sole head of the Army. During the preceding ten years, under the pressure of the great German military engine and under its constant threats of war, the whole of Europe had been lined up into two great military camps. As their military preparations were perfected, the factor of time became increasingly important. The Power which could strike first and before its opponent was mobilized and in position could make victory almost certain. And so now, directly the military machine had been set in motion by the Austrian ultimatum, the German General Staff swept the Foreign Office aside and took charge. The mobilization of the Austro-Hungarian army against Serbia and its attack on Serbia were followed by the mobilization of the Southern Russian army, for in no other way could Russia show that she meant to save Serbia from annihilation. This precipitated preliminary preparations in Germany, which in turn led to general mobilization in Russia, and this prompted the final ultimatum to Russia that the only alternative to war was the abject surrender of Russia, signified by the total demobilization of her whole army. War, indeed, was almost certain from the time Austria began to move. It was absolutely inevitable from the time that Russia, responding to preparations in Austria and Germany, mobilized in her northern districts, for that brought into operation the terrible time-table which the German General Staff had prepared to ensure certain victory for the German arms.

There was only one question in doubt—whether England would fight. So little attention had been paid in England of late years to foreign affairs that there was but the vaguest understanding in the country at large of what the German menace really was. But there was a general feeling that if France was to be attacked England had no option but to

## The Schism of Europe

stand by her, in view of the tacit but none the less real obligations of the Entente. But it was the violation of Belgian neutrality that brought home to the whole population what it was that Germany was aiming at, and crystallized feeling into immediate action. From that moment there was no hesitation. History will probably record that it was the failure of the German General Staff to appreciate how powerful the spirit of liberty could be in countries which had enjoyed political freedom, that was the primary cause of the failure of their original plan. It was the wonderful courage of the Belgian people in refusing a free passage to the heart of a friend, at terrible cost to themselves, that gave the respite which enabled the French to complete their mobilization, and which brought the British into the war before the German plan had been carried through and all resistance in Western Europe had been crushed to the ground.

### XI. ABSOLUTISM OR DEMOCRACY

**A**FTER this examination of history, it is possible to distinguish between the occasion and the cause of the war. The murder of the Archduke, the ultimatum and its time limit, the mobilization of Austria-Hungary or Russia, all these were but the immediate occasions. The true cause was the tragic parting of the ways during 1848-70, when France and Italy chose the road of popular government, and Germany and Austria-Hungary were driven by force into accepting autocratic rule. The question at issue during those years, says the biographer of Bismarck, had been whether the Crown or Parliament should rule, and "the Crown had won not only a physical but a moral victory."

"From that time the confidence of the German people in Parliamentary government was broken. Moreover it was the first time in the history of Europe



## Absolutism or Democracy

in which one of these struggles had conclusively ended in the defeat of Parliament. The result of it was to be shown in the history of every country in Europe during the next twenty years. It is the most serious blow that the principle of representative government has yet received.”\*

Prince Bülów gives the same verdict. “Liberalism,” he writes, “in spite of its change of attitude in national questions, has to this day not recovered from the catastrophic defeat which Prince Bismarck inflicted nearly half a century ago on the party of progress which still clung to the ideals and principles of 1848.”†

How fatal the triumph of autocracy has been all subsequent history has shown. During the last fifty years the great German people, which had led the world for so long in thought and music, and which still leads it in its capacity for accurate and fearless research and for organized enterprise, has been steadily corrupted. Instead of being made to understand that they were free citizens, and that as free men they were responsible for their country's actions, and that by no jugglery of argument about patriotism could they absolve themselves of that responsibility, Germans were taught that it was the highest citizenship to obey without question the direction of an hereditary caste. Character, the habit of acting under a sense of responsibility for one's actions, is the special, as it is the noblest, product of freedom. The national character of Germany has been steadily undermined by the political system inaugurated by Bismarck. And so Prince Bülów, after ten years as Chancellor, despairs of the political capacity of his own countrymen. “Despite the abundance of merits,” he says, “and the great qualities with which the German nation is endowed, political talent has been denied it.” And Mommsen, the historian of Rome, writing in 1903, says of Germany, “There are no longer free citizens.”

\* Headlam, *Life of Bismarck*.

† *Imperial Germany*, p. 120.

## The Schism of Europe

Autocracy has corrupted German "kultur" no less than it has corrupted the German people. "Kultur" embodies much that is priceless and noble in the sphere of art and intellect. But it contains also that element of slave morality which Nietzsche's free spirit discerned in his countrymen and denounced with such passionate rhetoric. "Kultur" is no longer the pursuit of beauty and truth wherever they may lead, but the acceptance of German standards of beauty and truth. If they do not prevail by their own virtue, then they must be enforced by the State. That is why, to a modern German, German "kultur" must be spread by the sword, and why "a place in the sun" means an extension of the German State. "Kultur," in fact, does not fully exist until the State has robbed the individual of his liberty and in return has organized, educated, blue-booked and inspected him into an obedient and useful cog in the great national machine.

Finally, the triumph of autocracy in 1871 has led to the fatal doctrine of ascendancy which is the proximate cause of the war. It is inevitable that an autocratic caste should wish to extend its dominion. The only check on the ambition of rulers is the power of the people, who, if left to judge for themselves, care little for such things. But the people of Germany, misled by the exceptional features of their own history from 1864 to 1870, corrupted by the malignant teachings of the great governmental machine, and deprived of all chance of developing that political character and self-reliance which is the security for honesty and fair play in public policy, accepted blindly the gospel that it was their destiny, under the direction of the State, to dominate the world by force of arms. They failed to realize that their western neighbours were resisting not Germany but the fatal principle by which the Germans were enslaved. Deserting liberty themselves, they soon began to forget or ignore the rights of others and to believe that their State could do no wrong. The worship of the State became almost a new religion, claiming

## Absolutism or Democracy

implicit self-sacrifice and implicit obedience from its devotees. Yet in Germany the State is not even the people. It is the Emperor, the Prussian aristocracy, the army and the bureaucracy. It is in their interests, not the interests of the German people, that the gospel of "frightfulness," ascendancy and war has been invoked and that countless thousands of lives, German and non-German, have been destroyed. That is the terrible truth which emerges from a study of the history of Europe during the last hundred years.

Thus the great war, in its essence, is the time-honoured struggle between the principles of liberty and tyranny, democracy and autocracy. Its first manifestation in history was when the Persian king, determining to allow no peoples to refuse his overlordship and to govern themselves, encountered a spirit such as was unknown in his own enslaved dominions at Thermopylæ, Marathon and Salamis. It was not so much that the great King wanted to rule the Greeks. It was that he could not bear that any people should claim absolute independence of himself and refuse to acknowledge that in the last resort his will was their law. This is exactly what modern Germany, under the impulse of her rulers, has been contending for in Europe.

We must put aside [says General von Bernhardi] all such notions of equilibrium. In its present distorted form it is opposed to our weightiest interests. The idea of a state system which has common interests in civilization must not of course be abandoned, but it must be expanded on a new and more just basis. It is not now a question of a European state system, but of one embracing all the states of the world, in which the equilibrium is established on real factors of power. We must endeavour to obtain in this system our merited position at the head of a federation of Central European States, and thus reduce the imaginary European equilibrium in one way or another to its true value, and correspondingly to increase our own power.

According to this teaching, Germany can tolerate no equal. It is a case of world-dominion or downfall. And Dr von Bethmann-Hollweg admitted the dominance of this idea

## The Schism of Europe

when he said in 1911 after the set-back at Agadir, "The dominant chord of the passionate feeling which prevails in wide circles is the will of Germany to assert herself in the world with all her strength and capacity."

Such a claim no other nation could admit and still pretend to be a free people. As against the German policy of ascendancy, known as the doctrine of the unity of Europe, the democratic nations, such as England and France, set the doctrine of the balance of power. The doctrine of the balance of power is founded on the principle that nations are free and equal, and are entitled to go their own way and develop along their own lines, so long as they do not aim at enslaving or robbing their neighbours. And it has for a primary object the recognition of law, as expressed in treaties, as the foundation of international relations. The doctrine of the balance of power, indeed, is the doctrine of liberty, equality and fraternity between nations. The doctrine of the unity of Europe, as taught by Prussia, is the doctrine of the ascendancy of one power and the subservience of the rest. The one is the natural outcome of government by the people, the other is the inexorable result of government by an autocratic caste. And it is the question of whether the nations of the Continent shall retain their full freedom, or whether autocratic Germany shall, by defeating them, make it impossible for them to resist her will again, an issue fraught with incalculable results for the world and the progress of mankind, which is being fought out on the grim battlefields of Europe to-day.

But though the dynamic cause of the war has been the instinctive desire of autocratic Germany to destroy liberty in Europe by tolerating no equal to itself, let us not think that no measure of responsibility rests upon the democratic nations of the world and especially ourselves. Just as an autocracy by the law of its own being tends to militarism and the gospel of force, so a democracy tends towards folly and blindness in its external relations. Power

## Absolutism or Democracy

rests with the people, and they are so preoccupied with their internal problems, with social reform, the abolition of privilege and the equalization of opportunity, that they wilfully blind themselves to the hard and difficult problems of the outside world. By talking peace they think they can escape the necessity for that resolute and farsighted foreign policy by which, in a world divided into independent sovereign States, peace can alone be maintained. It is a painful truth that, since democracy became a reality in England, the Government has tended to shelter itself behind a kind of Monroe doctrine for the British Empire. This doctrine is called the policy of "avoiding foreign entanglements." Such a policy, if blindly followed, can only lead to disaster, just as our failure fully to face our foreign responsibilities has led to disaster now. The world is one whole, and what goes on in one part is bound sooner or later to react on every other part. We realized this dimly during the early years of this century, as the gospel of military aggression gained greater and greater hold on Germany. But we never faced the full consequences of the situation. Even after the revelation of Germany's true policy in the years 1906-1909, even after Germany at Agadir and by the great Army and Navy Laws of 1912 and 1913 had made it demonstrably clear that she refused to accept Sir Edward Grey's diagnosis, that peace in Europe could be maintained only by nations respecting one another's liberties, we deluded ourselves with false hopes. The charge which history will level against England is not that she has hemmed Germany in and been selfish and grasping. It will rather be that in the face of a manifest plot against democracy and liberty, after overtures of friendliness, supplemented by acts, not promises, of disarmament had been scornfully rejected, she did not face the facts, make good her preparations, establish definite and avowed relations with other threatened powers, and so make it clear to Germany that she could not make herself the tyrant of Europe by force of arms.

## The Schism of Europe

On us the chief responsibility for blindness chiefly rests, for we condemned as alarmists and fools the farsighted prophets who sought to bring home to us what our responsibilities were. But it rests also in some measure on other peoples who are dedicated to the cause of liberty. It rests with Canada, which was not less blind. It rests with Italy, which remained in alliance with an autocratic and reactionary State. And it rests also with the great Republic which most claims to be the home of liberty and which for nearly a hundred years has believed that it could think only of its own affairs and had no responsibility for the maintenance of liberty and justice beyond its own shores. The practical lesson of the war is that the whole trend of democratic policy has been one-sided and blind. In future no nation can afford to ignore the outside world. Every nation that has self-respect must direct its policy consciously towards the improvement of international relations and must assume the liabilities and obligations which such a policy involves. The consideration, however, of the manner in which this lesson will affect international relations in the future must be reserved for an article in the next number of this review.

When wrong is being done, or free men are being enslaved, it is the duty of the strong and honourable man to step in and prevent it, if he can, and if need be by force. Any other course only leads to the triumph of evil. The inevitable tragedy of the victory of force is nowhere more strikingly exemplified than in Germany itself, where, in acquiescing in the forcible establishment of a tyrannical Government in their own case, the German people have gradually lost the sense of liberty themselves, and so have been led to make the supremest sacrifices in order to extend that tyranny over their neighbours. So now our only duty is to spare no effort to defeat the attempt of autocratic Germany to establish the reign of might in place of the reign of liberty throughout Europe. And it is doubly important because on the issue to the conflict will depend not only the liberties of France, Belgium and the minor Powers, and the

## Absolutism or Democracy

future peace of the world, but the future of Germany also. As late as 1914, Professor Delbruck, the successor of Treitschke in the chair of history in Berlin University, wrote:

“Anyone who has any familiarity at all with our officers and generals knows that it will take another Sedan, inflicted on us instead of by us, before they will acquiesce in the control of the Army by the German Parliament.”

When once the German autocracy has met its Sedan, the German people, abandoning false dreams of conquest and dominion, may learn the true lesson of the war and take the direction of their own destinies into their own hands. And when that happens, the mainspring of militarism and the Prussian cult of power will be destroyed. For in a democratic State, the State is the people, not a class covetous of dominion and power. And the policy of a people tends to concern itself not with the glory of the State, but with the welfare of the community, and to be guided, not by the immoral principle that power is law, but by the same standards of justice, equality and freedom which it follows in its own internal affairs.



## NIETZSCHE AND THE "CULTURE-STATE"

THE name of Nietzsche is at present so closely associated with the aggressive national faith of Germany that a prominent bookseller in London advertises a list of works and pamphlets upon "The Euro-Nietzschean War." The prophet of the superman doubtless lends himself to misinterpretation of this crude and sweeping kind. But Nietzsche's countrymen have in truth had no keener or more unsparing critic than the wild seer who is supposed, even by many of themselves, to have preached and justified their present ideals. His own preoccupation was not with physical but with spiritual wars; and, so far from esteeming the culture of modern Germany, he denounced it as the arch-enemy of that new aristocracy of character and intellect which he foreshadowed in visions of the superman. He was wont to call himself, above all things, a "good European," for his ideal of culture transcended national boundaries and looked only to the production of the highest human type. He must turn in his grave at the claims which German culture is parading with such fierce and unanimous conviction to-day.

Nietzsche's true creed, or glimpses of a creed, need not detain us here; but his criticism of modern Germany will illustrate better than anything else the fundamental wrongness of the national ideals against which England has drawn the sword. There is no hatred of Germany in England comparable to the hatred of England in Germany. On the contrary, most Englishmen are conscious of some affinity

## Nietzsche and the "Culture-State"

to the German race, and they trace their present antagonism only to the fact that the modern ideals of Germany are contrary to the true spirit of Germany in the past. Kin to the English stock, and devotees of self-government in their earliest time, the German people are now the protagonists of reaction towards the twin doctrines of subordination and ascendancy—subordinate themselves to an all-righteous and omnipotent State, and vowed to win ascendancy for that State over all other peoples. Their culture is, in fact, a form of enslavement to the State—not only menacing, as it seems to Englishmen, the cause of freedom everywhere, but contrary to the German genius itself. It is vain for foreigners to press an indictment of this kind, but the German people may read it, clause by clause, in Nietzsche's penetrating criticism of the "Culture-State." He was teaching in a German university when his ideas began to take shape; he had served in the German army; he had been raised in German schools. Englishmen may, therefore, take his testimony as good foundation for their belief that a momentous conflict of ideals is the true reason of this war *à outrance* between the two great branches of the Teutonic race.

Nietzsche's first criticism of his country's ideals was delivered at Bâle in a series of lectures on the future of its educational institutions. The date was 1873, only two years after the creation of the German Empire; but even then he put his finger unerringly upon the main issue at stake. Was education, the great civilizing force, to be the servant of humanity or merely a German instrument? In principle, he declared, it should be the former; but it was the latter in fact, because the German system compelled it "to renounce its highest and most independent claims in order to subordinate itself to the service of the State." In a striking picture, he compared the dissemination of culture under the German State to a reeling, torch-lit and self-absorbed procession of worshippers, intoxicated by the mysteries of some pagan cult:

## Nietzsche and the "Culture-State"

The State assumes the attitude of a mystagogue of culture, and, whilst it promotes its own ends, it obliges every one of its servants not to appear in its presence without the torch of universal State education in his hands, by the flickering light of which he may recognize the State as the highest goal, as the reward of all his strivings after education.\*

The origin of this subjugation of culture by the State may no doubt be traced, as Nietzsche himself points out, to the period of the War of Liberation, when Prussia called upon all her great intellectual resources to build the State anew and deliver it from the dominance of French arms. Hegel's panegyric of the State as "an absolutely complete ethical organism, the be-all and end-all of every one's education,"† has certainly drawn much of its power over German thought from the experience and wonderful achievement of that period of national regeneration. But throughout the first half of the nineteenth century a more liberal view of the State might easily have overcome the Prussian cult. Such a view struggled hard for mastery during the critical twenty years which preceded Bismarck's entry into office as Prussian Minister-President, and the great reaction dates definitely from the dazzling successes of the German people under his iron leadership in 1866 and 1870. When the present Emperor ascended the throne, the last hope of a peaceful Germany faded into air. The only question that remained open was whether the Prussian system would force the latent spirit of liberalism into revolt within the Empire itself before it embroiled the Empire with the outer world.

Unhappily, as Nietzsche so clearly saw, the State was able to control the very well-springs of education and to use them solely for its own ends. The "militarism" which England denounces in Germany is not the existence of a great army of conscript soldiers, animated with a splendid

\* *The Future of our Educational Institutions* (Vol. III, Complete English Edition), p. 86.

† *Ibid.*, p. 90.

## Nietzsche and the " Culture-State "

spirit of patriotism and self-sacrifice. All the great European Powers, except England, possess such armies. France, among the great nations, Switzerland, among the smaller ones, call a larger proportion of their subjects to the colours every year than Germany; yet neither France nor Switzerland is a " militarist " State. The danger of " militarism " arises only when the animating purpose and spirit of the army becomes also the animating purpose and spirit of the State; and this is only possible when every department of government and of national life, including higher education itself, lies under the dominance of governors with whom the army comes first and the nation afterwards. It is significant that, when the Emperor William ascended the throne, his proclamation to his people followed three days after his proclamation to the army. The people, it seemed, existed for the army; the army and himself were the State.

One recent episode, the affair at Zabern in 1913, will illustrate the result. Zabern, the old French Savergne, is a little garrison-town in Alsace. It seems that in December, 1913, the local Alsations—Alsations are nowhere patient of German government—had shown what was regarded as some lack of respect for the garrison troops. A young Prussian lieutenant thereupon offered a reward of ten marks to any soldier who, if insulted by a native of the town, struck the offender and brought him into barracks. In this harangue he used an insulting term to denote Alsations; and it is worth observing, in view of what followed, that the definition of what constituted an insult was left entirely to the troops. The nature and language of Lieutenant von Forstner's address becoming known, there was an unfriendly demonstration outside the officers' mess, which was dispersed by soldiers with loaded rifles. The lieutenant then went out shopping, escorted by four soldiers with fixed bayonets. In the evening the popular excitement increased; whereupon the Colonel of the Regiment proclaimed martial law and placed machine-guns in the streets. The scene

## Nietzsche and the "Culture-State"

which followed is thus described in the calm pages of the *Annual Register*:

A fireman who left his supper when he heard the drums of the regiment was arrested at his door; the Judge and Counsel of the Civil Court, which had just risen, were also arrested as they were leaving the Court. The Judge was allowed to go home, but all the others (twenty-seven in number) spent the night in the cellars of the barracks, and were only liberated the next day when they were brought before the Judge for trial. . . . A further aggravation of the scandal was the arrest of a man and his wife at Metz, because the wife laughed at a passing patrol, and the wounding by Lieutenant Forstner of a lame cobbler, who with other workmen was alleged to have insulted him by "contemptuous cries," though the Burgomaster asserted it was only some children who had jeered.\*

Judicial proceedings followed, in which it was proved that "when warned that his unprovoked incitement of the population was likely to lead to bloodshed," Colonel von Reuter, who commanded von Forstner's regiment, had said that "bloodshed would be a good thing," and that civilians had been arrested for "intending to laugh."† The Colonel was finally acquitted on the ground that "he did not know that he had acted illegally." He himself based his action on a Prussian Cabinet Order of the year 1820.

It must not be supposed that this example of military zeal was universally approved in Germany. It aroused a storm of controversy, and the Reichstag actually passed a resolution by 293 votes to 54 declaring that it was dissatisfied with the Chancellor's rather half-hearted defence of the conduct of the garrison. But the protest of the Reichstag and the more independent sections of the public was entirely ineffectual. The Crown Prince had telegraphed to Colonel von Reuter during his trial, exhorting him ("immer feste darauf") to "stick to it"; and General von Falkenhayn, the Prussian Minister of War, had declared in the Reichstag that "what they had to deal with was not the

\* *The Annual Register*, 1913, p. 319.

† See a good account of the episode in *What is Wrong with Germany*, by the careful author of *The Evolution of Modern Germany*.

## Nietzsche and the "Culture-State"

degree of a lieutenant's offence, but *a determined attempt by Press agitation and abuse to exercise an unlawful influence upon the decision of the authorities.*" Dr Jagow, the Police President at Berlin, afterwards supported these views of the matter by explaining in the *Kreuz Zeitung* that "*military exercises are acts of sovereignty, and, if obstacles are placed in the way of their performance, the obstacles must be removed in the execution of this act of sovereignty.*" Dr Jagow may be supposed, in virtue of the office he holds, not to express public opinions upon matters of State without some idea whether or not those opinions are agreeable to the Government. When the pother had died down, his theory that "military exercises"—such as running lame cobblers through the body and shopping with fixed bayonets—"are acts of sovereignty" apparently held the field, so far as official Germany was concerned. The very mild sentence of forty-three days' detention passed on Lieutenant von Forstner was quashed by a higher military Court, and Colonel von Reuter was decorated with a Prussian Order at the beginning of the new year. It would hardly have been possible to demonstrate more clearly that in the eyes of the German Government there is one law for the army and another for civilians, and that civil must yield to military rights whenever they conflict.

It has become common to denounce the German military system for all this sinister and reactionary tendency in the German "Culture-State"; but the root of the evil is not really to be found in the mess-room or the barracks, however greatly they may seem to encroach upon the elementary liberties of civil life. The root of the evil, rightly traced, is in the schools and universities, which have been degraded by the State into an instrument for so diffusing military ideals and standards throughout the atmosphere of German life, that they now dominate all the normal processes of German thought. Professor Mommsen, the great historian, once bade the nation take heed "lest in this State, which has been at once a power in arms and a power in intelligence,

## Nietzsche and the "Culture-State"

the intelligence should vanish and nothing but the pure military State remain."\*

There has always been in Germany a liberal and ideal strain which has struggled steadfastly against the repression and degradation of culture by the narrow materialism of the Prussian autocracy. It showed itself in the outburst of criticism upon the Zabern incident; and it has been expressed with growing courage by a section of the literary world, which seemed until the outbreak of war to be increasing its influence. But the State has wielded so tremendous a power over national life that this reforming school has fought against impossible odds. Employment and promotion, not merely in the Government services, which absorb a very large proportion of the educated class, but in the world of education itself, even to the professorial chairs, have been made to depend entirely upon official favour; and official favour has naturally been reserved for those who further official purposes. Education and culture have, in consequence, been poisoned at the springs, and only very courageous and independent minds have escaped the contagion of the doctrine that the State is "the be-all and end-all of every one's education," the arbiter of conscience no less than of thought. For forty years, moreover, the State has been an autocratic and military tyranny; its supreme and all-sufficient expression is the Emperor with his Army and his Fleet. The national habit of mind has thus been depressed to the moral and intellectual standards of the Zabern garrison. Preferment and encouragement, in the world of higher thought as elsewhere, has depended upon subservience to this cult. The very citadel of German thought has been invaded by the soul-destroying ways of Court sycophancy and Byzantinism, and men of independent mind have been steadily prevented from exercising their proper influence on State policy and the direction of national ideas. Almost the last words which Nietzsche wrote were, like his first, devoted to this theme:

\* Quoted in *What is Wrong with Germany*, p. 116.



## Nietzsche and the "Culture-State"

Not only have the Germans entirely lost the *breadth of vision* which enables one to grasp the course of culture and the values of culture; not only are they one and all political (or Church) puppets; but they have actually *put a ban upon* this very breadth of vision. A man must first and foremost be "German," he must belong to "the race"; then only can he pass judgment upon all values and lack of values in history, then only can he establish them. To be German is in itself an argument; *Deutschland, Deutschland über alles* is a principle; the Germans stand for "the moral order of the universe" in history. Compared with the Roman Empire, they are the upholders of freedom; compared with the eighteenth century, they are the restorers of morality, of the Categorical Imperative. There is such a thing as the writing of history according to the lights of Imperial Germany. There is, I fear, anti-Semitic history. There is also history written with an eye to the Court, and Herr von Treitschke is not ashamed of himself.\*

Does not this hit off the keynote of every defence of German policy in the present war?

The part played by every country in world politics is determined, not only by its interests, but by the spirit of its institutions. The much belauded culture which Germany is striving to impose upon the world is the product of a military State which has not merely conscribed its subjects' bodies—as every State must claim the right to do—but has also conscribed their minds. The German State has exalted its interest as the only law; and to this law it appeals, not only over the individual conscience and liberty of its own subjects, but over the moral conventions and ideas by which all civilized States are striving to regulate the crude arbitrament of force. It has standardized German culture as a State product for its own material ends, and German culture has become its body-slave. "The State—what is that?" cries Zarathustra in Nietzsche's favourite work:

The State is called the coldest of cold monsters. And coldly it lieth. And this lie creepeth out of its mouth: "I, the State, am the people." . . .

"On earth there is nothing greater than I: God's regulating finger am I," thus the monster howleth. And not only those with long ears and short sight fall upon their knees. . . .

\* *Ecce Homo*. (Vol. xvii, Complete English Edition), pp. 123-4.

## Nietzsche and the "Culture-State"

The new idol would fain surround itself with heroes and honest men. It liketh to sun itself in the sunshine of good consciences—the cold monster!

It will give you anything if you adore it, the new idol: thus it buyeth for itself the splendour of your virtue and the glance of your proud eyes....

What I call the State is where all are poison-drinkers, the good and the evil alike.

This is the poison which has twisted the features of German culture and clouded its eyes, and made of it a by-word among all peoples of free mind. *It will give you anything if you adore it, the new idol; thus it buyeth for itself the splendour of your virtue and the glance of your proud eyes.* What is that but the old curse of Byzantinism, infecting the thought and conscience of the noblest with the taint of slavery, the more insidious because disguised as personal sacrifice to a lofty and transfiguring idea? The Prussian system of State worship, which exalts the monarch as a hierarch mediating between God and the people of his choice, is nothing but the secular cult of absolutism and theocracy in a new and more subtle guise; and the struggle against it is England's historic struggle against the principle of blind obedience to authority in human affairs—the struggle between free life and slave life, between all that goes with representative government and all that goes with the divine right of kings. It is strange to reflect, now that the issue is so plain, how clearly it was stated many years ago by the German philosopher most generally acclaimed as the prophet of modern German ideas.

The victory of England and France will end the menace of this reaction from the Western world, but in Germany itself the transformation can only come from within. To speak of "crushing German militarism" by force of arms is to adopt the very fallacy against which we are fighting, that culture can be imposed by war. The hope of freedom in Germany rests not on any such insubstantial ground, but on the reasonable assurance that, if the successes of the

## Nietzsche and the "Culture-State"

Prussian system are once reversed, the truer mind of Germany, which is not dead but overlaid, will recover its proper influence upon the German State. Nietzsche himself—to quote him for the last time—declared again and again that the true German spirit was at variance with the modern claim of the German State to arrogate all culture to its own use:

Hiddenly or openly [he wrote in 1873] this purpose of the State is at war with the real German spirit and the education derived therefrom; . . . with that spirit which speaks to us so wondrously from the inner heart of the German Reformation, German music and German philosophy, and which, like a noble exile, is regarded with such indifference and scorn by the luxurious education afforded by the State.\*

Solitary though the spirit of idealist Germany be, and though, as Nietzsche says: "the censor of pseudo-culture be swung far away from it," amid the acclamation of a drugged and deluded host of teachers, historians and seers, there is still alive in Germany the strain which made the greatness of her people in the past. There will be no hatred between the British and the German Empires when once that freedom of spirit comes again to its own in German life, "like a wind out of fair places, with healing in its wings."

\* *The Future of Our Educational Institutions*, p. 89.

## CANADA

### I. WAR MEASURES AND POLITICS

**T**HERE will be sober rejoicing in Canada when we know that the Canadian forces at Salisbury have completed training and gone to the front. It was not thought that so much time would be required to fit the troops for active service. It is hard to feel that we are assisting in the actual defence of the common Empire while they remain in England. Vagrant reports come back to us of imperfect discipline and defects in organization. But we have faith in the essential quality of the Canadian contingent, and a settled conviction that in the field they will not dishonour Canada or the Empire.

It must be remembered that we have no warlike traditions, no permanent military organization, no equipment adequate to the service we desire to render. For years appropriations for the militia have been grudgingly yielded by Parliament. Many rural regiments have gone to camp in successive seasons with a percentage of "volunteers" under contract for the period of training. Even in the centres of population service with the militia has been regarded by a considerable element of the people as a social pastime, rather than as the discharge of patriotic duty, or as serious preparation for actual warfare. We were enfeebled by academic pacificism, and sunk in happy and easy torpor. We were persuaded that on land and sea we were secure and hardly conscious that we were protected by the

## War Measures and Politics

British Navy, the defensive resources and the diplomatic alliances of a powerful Empire. But at least we did not sleep on when the test came, and the slumber in the future will never be so profound.

It was inevitable that the first Canadian expeditionary army should contain much raw material. It is perhaps surprising that the organization was not more faulty and the equipment more imperfect. But it is impossible to believe that the Canadians will not readily submit to discipline, and display in any crisis endurance, courage and high moral temper. At least there has been no manifestation of arrogance in Canada nor any Chauvinistic boasting. We have a solemn pride in what British soldiers already have accomplished and desire nothing better than that the Canadian regiments shall show equal valour and endurance. Of this we have indeed a quiet but confident expectation, and it is certain that any toll we must pay in blood and sacrifice will be paid with fortitude and dignity. If the detention at Salisbury Camp has been trying, there has been no general disposition to censure the British authorities, nor any serious doubt that the long course of training was required to ensure efficiency and prepare the Canadian regiments for the desperate ordeal to which they will be subjected.

There have been various changes in the methods of organization and training adopted by the Canadian Government. The first contingent was assembled at Valcartier and officers were appointed and equipment provided under the immediate direction of the Minister of Militia. But with the approach of winter the open camp at Valcartier had to be abandoned. Recruiting camps were established at Winnipeg, St John's, Que., Toronto and other centres. At Toronto and Winnipeg the troops were housed in the buildings maintained by the permanent Exhibition Associations, and elsewhere other permanent structures were secured. In Toronto more ideal conditions for training could hardly be obtained. At Winnipeg and St John's the

## Canada

accommodation is also excellent. In order to release the Minister of Militia for the active administration of the Department, the training, selection of officers and general organization of the second contingent were entrusted to divisional commanders. Major-General Lessard was in command at Toronto, Major-General Steele at Winnipeg, and other permanent officers at minor recruiting centres. It is admitted that the second contingent has received a more thorough training than the first, and possibly the material is also better. The test of physical qualification was more severe. There has been, perhaps, a more careful selection of officers. A far longer period has been devoted to training than was practicable with the first contingent. For the third contingent again a different method of organization has been adopted. The men will be recruited at the headquarters of local regiments throughout the country, where they will undergo preliminary training, and later will be assembled at central camps and fitted for dispatch to England. These various changes of method are the result of experience and do not represent a merely shifting policy in the Militia Department or weak concession to local feeling. In addition to the army at Salisbury, we have 6,000 men on garrison and outpost duty and 50,000 under training. A second contingent of 17,000 will go forward when they are accepted by the War Office. Our forces under arms and abroad now exceed 100,000, and as Sir Robert Borden said at Toronto, "Two hundred or three hundred thousand men, if that many are needed, will be Canada's contribution to the defence of the Empire."

It may be added that it is not difficult to obtain recruits. In the east and in the west more volunteers offer than can be accepted. The universities of Toronto, McGill and Queen's have been active centres of recruiting and of national and Imperial inspiration. In this connection Dr Falconer, President of the University of Toronto, and Principal Peterson of McGill have been especially influential. In Convocation Hall, at Toronto, the professors have delivered

## War Measures and Politics

many addresses in explanation of the origin and significance of the war, and they have spoken also before many Canadian clubs and at many public meetings. Contributions to patriotic, Red Cross and relief funds have been generous and continuous. To these funds rich and poor alike have contributed. In gifts of food and even of money the farmers have been foremost. The women of the townships have been as active as those of the cities. For the stricken Belgians there has been a passion of concern throughout the whole country, and for this movement Nova Scotia has afforded splendid leadership. As it is in the east, so it is in the western provinces. Quebec has manifested special interest in France and Belgium. The Legislature of the French province has voted an annual appropriation of \$40,000 for relief of distress in France. The Grain Growers of Manitoba individually have resolved to give the proceeds of an acre of wheat for war purposes. The federal Government is making an organized appeal to the farmers of the Dominion to increase production, and as a result there will be an increase of at least thirty-five per cent in the wheat acreage. It may be that we in Canada cannot fully realize the gravity of the struggle in which the Empire is engaged. We will have a clearer and more poignant understanding when our troops go into the trenches and the bitter meaning of war strikes into many households. But our ears are not stopped that we cannot hear, nor our eyes blinded that we cannot see, and perhaps we will so meet the utmost test as not to be shamed before the nations.

There still is general abstention from partisan controversy. This is peculiarly true of the political leaders. The Press also is restrained and judicious. There are intemperate utterances alike from Press and platform, but these are not numerous and seldom impugn the loyalty to the Empire of any element of the population. There is criticism of the American protest against British treatment of American shipping, but perhaps less severe than is expressed by many American newspapers and wholly without the note of anger.



## Canada

Indeed the general feeling in Canada for the United States is friendly and grateful. The attitude towards Great Britain of Americans within the Dominion is hardly distinguishable from that of the British and Canadian elements. This is as true of the newer American settlements in the west as of the masses of Americans in the older provinces. Sentiment is less satisfactory among the German and Austrian communities in the west, but the Mounted Police are vigilant and no active treason is manifested. In all there are 521,000 Germans and Austrians in Canada, and 248,000 of these are established in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta.

During the last few weeks Sir Robert Borden has addressed public meetings in Toronto, Montreal, Halifax, Winnipeg and Fort William. He has devoted himself chiefly to details of the organization, equipment and composition of the contingents, to the issues of the conflict and to the obligation of Canada to assist in defence of the common Empire. None of his addresses have had the flavour of controversy. None have considered questions between the parties in Canada. He has argued for moderation in dealing with aliens and has suggested, in spirit if not in language, the unwisdom of making divisions in the Canadian population that will be baneful legacies when the war is over. Sober, responsible, sympathetic and ardent in devotion to the Empire, his speeches have not contained a provocative sentence. His vision of the future may not command universal assent, but for the time dissent and criticism are withheld.

It was inevitable that he should suggest direct and responsible representation of the Dominions in Imperial councils, and the concession of proportionate authority to the Dominions over peace and war and in the general direction of foreign policy, and as inevitable that from this position extreme autonomists should dissent. Indeed, Mr Bourassa has protested, but for the time his voice is only a whisper in Canada. In this connection it is significant

## War Measures and Politics

that Mr J. S. Brierley, for many years editor of the *Montreal Herald*, which under his direction gave a firm and continuous support to the Liberal party, deprecated in a speech at Montreal any further assertion of the extreme principle of autonomy and urged frank and full acceptance of the theory and fact of Empire. In his address at Toronto the Prime Minister declared that the war had demonstrated the essential unity of the British communities. At Montreal he pointed out that Canada had not yet attained its full share of self-government in the Empire and that "with regard to foreign relations and in the decision of those questions of alliance and understandings which in the end must determine the issues of peace and war" actual authority must be conceded to the Dominions. "You young men," he said to the students of McGill University, "will certainly see it, when the men of Canada, of Australia, of South Africa and of the other Dominions will have the same voice in these questions as those who live in the British Isles." He added, "Any man who doubts that that will come doubts that the Empire will hold together." He said at Winnipeg:

"It is within the bounds of probability that the four free nations of the oversea Dominions will have put into the fighting line 250,000 men if the war should continue another year. That result, or even the results which have already been obtained, must mark a great epoch in the history of inter-Imperial relations. There are those within sound of my voice who will see the oversea Dominions surpass in wealth and population the British Isles. There are children playing in your streets who may see Canada alone attain that eminence. Thus it is impossible to believe that the existing status, so far as it concerns the control of foreign policy and extra-Imperial relations, can remain as it is to-day. All are conscious of the complexity of the problem thus presented, but no one need despair of a satisfactory solution, and no one can doubt the profound influence which the tremendous events of the past few months

## Canada

and those in the immediate future must exercise upon one of the most interesting and far-reaching questions ever presented for the consideration of statesmen."

The argument of Sir Robert Borden was strongly supported by the Hon. C. J. Doherty, Minister of Justice, in an address at Toronto.

"Our recognition of this war as ours, our participation in it, spontaneous and voluntary as it is, determines absolutely once for all that we have passed from the status of the protected colony to that of the participating nation. The protected colony was rightly voiceless; the participating nation cannot continue so. The hand that wields the sword of the Empire justly holds the sceptre of the Empire; while the Mother Country alone wielded the one, to her alone belonged the other. When as to-day the nations of the Empire join in wielding that sword, then must they jointly sway that sceptre."

No more eloquent and inspiring speeches have been delivered in Canada since the war began than those of the Hon. Arthur Meighen, Solicitor-General in the federal Cabinet. Avoiding the suspicion of partisanship, he appeals powerfully to the whole country. In the west his speeches have had a profound effect.

"We rely" [he has said] "on the sailors and soldiers of Britain, on the great men who command her forces both on land and sea, and in the halls of State—efficiency at every post. We rely on that unity that has amazed our foes, on the spirit of sacrifice abroad now as never before, that proves the mettle of our people. We rely on the British fleet, the bulwark of our strength. We pin our faith to British pluck. The foe that faces us is the biggest that ever confronted a nation, or a combination of nations, and we must win or go down. There can be no compromise. A compromise would be a sin against ourselves and our

## War Measures and Politics

children, against civilization itself. The call is for men and money, but chiefly men. That call is in the ear of every heir to British liberty. Canada is doing well. Canada's Government is loaded with unwonted responsibilities. I am not here to extol or to defend it, but if we know our duty we will bend every energy to this struggle. All other functions of Government we must still perform, but this is first. The lives of our sons we hold sacred. Of their wealth we are only trustees. But in this great crisis we can spare neither to achieve success. Before any failure on our part will expose the common cause to peril, we are prepared to bankrupt this country."

Here is an extract from a speech which Mr White, Minister of Finance, delivered at Ottawa a few days ago:

"Canada has for years been building railways, canals and ports to facilitate the transport of produce. A new era has now dawned in which the policy will be greatly to increase production. This is the new national policy. It is also the policy of patriotism because at this juncture patriotism and production march hand in hand. Britain's fleet ensures the safe transport of Britain's food supply, but does not ensure the supply itself. The Dominions of the Empire ought to make that supply certain and ample. Canada will do her full share and more if possible in this as in other things. Our soldiers offer their lives. Those who remain at home may be depended upon to offer their labour."

Mr Burrell, as Minister of Agriculture, has been active in organizing the movement among farmers to increase production, Sir George Foster has revealed resource and energy in the Department of Trade and Commerce, and has made many speeches of fine temper and dignity. Indeed, the whole Cabinet has laboured with such zeal and energy as to command the good will and confidence of the country. Nor, as has been said, have Ministers been subjected to any serious criticism or embarrassed by any attempt of the

## Canada

Liberal leaders to exploit a difficult situation for partisan advantage. Since the emergency session of Parliament, Sir Wilfrid Laurier has made only two or three speeches. Indeed, the Liberal leaders have seldom appeared upon the platform. Those who have spoken have avoided controversial issues and firmly asserted the duty and the obligation of Canada to unite with the Mother Country and the other Dominions in defence of the Empire and free institutions in Europe. In a speech at Montreal Sir Wilfrid Laurier incidentally defended his naval policy by a passing reference to the achievements of the Australian navy and recalled in guarded language the mischievous appeals of Nationalists to the prejudices of Quebec. "The time will come," he said, "when we shall have our domestic problems once more. In the meantime, the only thing I have to tell you, is to continue as we have commenced. I am as strong a party man as there is in Canada, but for the present I forego my connections as a party man and simply wish to continue in my duty of helping the Motherland."

Discussing the situation when war was declared he said:

"There arose the question whether or not we were bound to take part in the war. Everybody admits that we were bound to defend our own shores, our trade, our commerce; to provide against the possibility of a raid; and to repel an invasion if that should happen. But were we bound to send troops to the front? We heard many subtle arguments in the press of this city about constitutional law, natural law, and other kinds of law, whether we were bound to take part in the war and fight for our Mother Country. There is no need to go to constitutional or natural law to settle that question. We are a free people, absolutely free. The charter under which we live has put it in our power to decide whether we should take part in such a war or not. It is for the Canadian people, the Canadian Parliament, the Canadian Government, to decide. This freedom is at once the glory and honour of England, which has granted it; and of Canada, which uses

## War Measures and Politics

it to assist England. We are absolutely free. Freedom is a concomitant of all British institutions. You find from the bottom rung of the ladder to the top, freedom in everything. There is no conscription in Great Britain. There never was; there never will be." He added, "Freedom breeds loyalty, coercion always was the mother of resistance and rebellion."

Reviewing the history and constitution of the Empire he said:

"When we see the results of the British system of Government, there are men in this country and in England who believe that this present mode of freedom should be replaced by a system of concentration of these obligations, and to make what has been voluntary obligatory. There are men who believe that the British Empire can be maintained only upon the lines on which it has been established—freedom and diversity. In war is not the proper time to discuss problems of such magnitude and far-reaching consequences. At the present time the only thing we have to do is to finish the war, and to adjourn to a future date these problems which will have to be taken up at a future date."

The Liberal Leader continued:

"I ask you, my fellow-countrymen, would it be possible to contemplate that we should remain passive and quiescent when the French and English armies were fighting against the German hosts for the freedom of France and Belgium and the civilization of the world? I do not hesitate to apply to Canada the words of Mr Asquith to England: 'If Canada had remained passive and quiescent when such efforts were called for by such countries as England and France, to which we owe so much, we would have covered ourselves with dishonour.'"

Sir Wilfrid Laurier described the Monroe Doctrine in

## Canada

language closely resembling that used by the Prime Minister at Toronto. He said: "If ever Canada is to be saved I do not want it to be saved by the Monroe Doctrine, but by the efforts of the Canadian people. Not that, if the unfortunate day came that we had to defend our country against a German invasion, I would not accept the help and assistance of the American people. But I do not want to ask it. I want the Canadian people to rely upon themselves." These were Sir Robert Borden's words at Toronto:—"The Monroe Doctrine, as you know, does not embody any principle of International law, but is a policy proclaimed nearly one hundred years ago by the Government of the United States. For the reason that it is a policy of the United States, that country alone has the right to determine its scope and its limitations. As the policy of a great friendly nation the Monroe Doctrine is entitled to every respect, but Canada does not seek shelter behind it in this war."

Mr N. W. Rowell, K.C., leader of the Liberal party in the Ontario Legislature, speaking at Toronto, urged that the Imperial Conference fixed for 1915 should be held. He was surprised and disappointed to read in newspapers favourable to the Government that there was objection at Ottawa to a Conference in 1915, although Australia and New Zealand were favourable. He argued that if ever there was a time when a Conference should be held representing all parts of the Empire, and constituting practically a Parliament of the Empire, it was in this year of crisis.

Mr Rowell said further: "Can you give to Germany, can you give to Europe, a more splendid manifestation of the unity of the Empire and of the determination of all parts to see this fight through, than to have representatives from the Empire meet and take counsel together as to what we can all do and contribute to bring this conflict to a successful conclusion? I do hope that when other portions of the Empire are asking for this conference, which by its constitution should be held this year, the Government of Canada will not drop the holding of this Imperial assembly for the



## War Measures and Politics

benefit of the whole Empire." He added, "Our conception of Empire is the freedom of the individual nations to manage their own affairs, coupled with loyalty to the Throne, as centre and head of all these nations. The Germanic conception is the reverse. The Germans cannot give local self-government. They do not give government to their own people."

Mr Rowell proceeded to argue that colonial self-government was one of the great contributions which the Anglo-Saxon race had made to the science of government. The great principle that had made possible the continued existence of the Empire was fought for and achieved by the struggles and triumphs of Liberalism in Canada. "Let us pay a tribute to the men who had the spirit of liberty and courage and the patriotism to see that the largest liberty to the individual was not inconsistent with the greatest loyalty to the State and the Sovereign." It was Sir Wilfrid Laurier who recognized that if the Empire was to be perpetuated there must be a change in status. As a result the colonial dependencies had become sister nations with the Mother Country, and the change in status was recognized by the Imperial Government when the Imperial Conference was created.

It will be seen that in war as in peace Sir Wilfrid Laurier emphasizes the principle of Colonial autonomy and makes absolutely no concession to the federationists. But at least no federationist could show greater devotion to the Empire in the crisis which is upon it, and there is no reason to doubt that when Parliament reassembles the Liberal party, under his leadership, will sanction any exertions or sacrifices that may be necessary by Canada to strengthen the forces in the field and to carry the Empire through the supreme crisis of its history. Beyond that is the future, and freedom for sober, responsible and resolute consideration of the problem of Empire.

## Increased Production in Canada

### II. INCREASED PRODUCTION IN CANADA

"PATRIOTISM" and "production" are two words which have come since the outbreak of war to be regarded in Canada as synonymous. By the end of the Canadian fiscal year, which is March 31, the total volume of this country's external trade will be found to have decreased fully two hundred million dollars below that of the last fiscal period. The larger part of the decrease will be accounted for by the falling-off in imports, which, under the present tariff, means that revenue has also been reduced in large measure, and hence that the "sinews of war" must be supplied from some other source than the Department of Customs.

The other source is the vast, partially developed territory of this country. Only by increasing the output of field and factory, mine, forest and fishery at home, and reversing the trade balance which has been against her for so many years, can Canada meet the large and growing financial obligations under which she has been placed. Early in August our liabilities to London upon all classes of securities held there were estimated at £545,546,849. For interest charges alone Canada, at the time war was declared, had to find something like £2,000,000 per month. When to these ordinary national obligations are added the war loans, the first of which amounted to fifty million dollars, little argument is required to convince the people of Canada of the absolute necessity, as well as the patriotic purpose, of economy and diligent physical effort in bringing about increased production.

Foremost amongst the effects of the war on Canada are the improved understanding and the friendlier feeling between the industrial east and the agricultural west. The common interest involved in increased production has brought the grain grower of the prairie provinces into a

## Increased Production in Canada

harmonious relation with the manufacturer of the east. Early in November, for the first time in history, the officers of the Canadian Manufacturers' Association came into personal touch with the leaders of the different provincial organizations of grain growers. The meeting was held in Winnipeg and was called for the primary purpose of discussing ways and means for increasing Canadian production, and for the secondary purpose of bringing about, if possible, a larger measure of co-operation between agricultural and manufacturing interests. The keynote of that convention in Winnipeg was the welfare of the Empire. One of the chief conclusions to be reached and adopted quickly and unanimously was contained in the following words: "The thought uppermost in the minds of us all, the issue transcending all else in importance, is the war. Upon that we have but one opinion to express, one determination to record—the Empire must win, the Empire shall win!" It was freely recognized that the present world struggle is one of resources, and that the supreme duty of Canadian citizens at this time lies in the utilization to the utmost of the bountiful resources with which they have been blessed. Incidentally, it was borne in upon the mind of the convention that apart altogether from the exigencies of the war, a substantial increase in Canadian production, on a sound economic basis, is not only a desirable but an essential step at the present stage of the country's development.

The net result of the meeting between the manufacturing and farming interest at Winnipeg was the launching of a campaign early in January under the auspices of the Dominion Department of Agriculture, to encourage and stimulate larger production from the soil in all parts of Canada. Under the slogan, "Patriotism and Production," the campaign was inaugurated at Ottawa by the Hon. W. T. White, Minister of Finance, before a large gathering of representative agriculturists. In his speech Mr White emphasized the importance of raising larger quantities of

## Canada

meat supplies in Canada. The live-stock industry, he said, has not kept pace with agriculture and manufacturing. During the past twelve years wheat production in Canada has been more than trebled. Manufactures have been doubled in volume of output. Horses have increased fifty per cent, but food animals have increased in that time less than twenty per cent. Both Australia and New Zealand (Mr White pointed out) are much farther advanced in the business of producing meat supplies than Canada.

No phase of the problem of production in Canada is so perplexing just now as that of stimulating and developing the live-stock industry. In the last fifteen months, since the passing of the Underwood Bill by the Government of the United States, which permitted all kinds of live food animals to enter the markets of that country free of charge, the capital holdings of live stock in Canada have been subject to a very severe strain. Now that the prices of all kinds of grains and fodder have advanced to record heights, the problem of making a profitable business out of cattle, sheep and swine is a difficult one to solve.

Progress, however, has been made, and will be made further, in the matter of land cultivation. Increased production from the land is the basic argument in the campaign which has arisen as the result of the war. All other increased outputs in Canada must depend upon that which comes from the soil. It has not always been so. Of late years the volume of business in Canada has not been proportional to the size and value of the yield of produce from the soil. The future was taken into account to an exaggerated degree, and in western Canada particularly, banking, railway construction, municipal and all manner of civic works advanced until they were ten years ahead of their time. The land is now sought as the best economic means of squaring the nation's foundations and fighting the Empire's battles. When it became evident last August that Europe's demand upon the food supplies of America would be unusually strong, the agricultural authorities of all the provincial

## Increased Production in Canada

governments and of the Federal Government issued bulletins and published messages throughout the country advising the farmers to make due preparation for the crops of 1915. The farmers took the advice, and, helped by a splendid season for autumn work on the land, succeeded—it is conservatively estimated—in extending their cultivated areas by at least twenty-five per cent in all Canada.

Western Canada, because of its vast tracts of unbroken prairie land, is looked to for the bulk of the increase in cereal production. But in this seeming opportunity for the plainsman of the west there is mingled with the prospective benefits to country and Empire a distinct peril. Extensive grain growing has generally been acknowledged as a dangerous and unprofitable business in this country during the past five years, and it has been the direct mission of governmental departments, for a considerable period, to preach and encourage the gospel of mixed farming in those regions where wheat was the only crop. The abnormal conditions which exist at present and the prevailing prices of wheat and other grains are a great inducement to the farmer to confine all his attention to grain-growing. Yet the country cannot afford to sell its future and undo all the good work accomplished by the agricultural departments in the last two years for a mess of pottage. More intensive, rather than extended, cultivation is the essential need of western Canada, and only with the improved methods of application will a satisfactory increase in production be assured.

The question of labour has a marked bearing upon the Canadian campaign for increased production. This year the large number of unemployed persons burdening cities and towns should be turned to useful account when the harvesting period arrives. Ordinarily the western farmer in a season of abundance experiences great difficulty in securing the services of efficient harvest labourers. This year the grain crop of Canada promises to be exceedingly large, and it will be a national undertaking to see that every farm is manned with an adequate supply of labour.

## Canada

To increase production at first thought appealed to many people in Canada as an extremely easy and simple process. When war broke out, and the agitation for an increased volume of production from the farms of the Dominion became popular, the suggestion was made that a million acres of undeveloped prairie land should be set aside, and that the unemployed men in the urban centres should be placed upon that reserved area and be set to work producing food supplies. Such a back-to-the-land movement, however, presents great difficulties. Canada has already given away to homesteaders, during her life-time, about 58,000,000 acres in the western provinces, and the total crop area in the west last year, including homestead farms and every other purchased farm, was barely 19,000,000 acres. The day has come in this country when the people who go on the land as owners must be farmers, not merely settlers. It would seem necessary that many of the unemployed industrial workers, now idle upon the streets of Canadian towns and cities, before becoming landed proprietors in the prairie west or some other part of the Dominion, must serve their apprenticeship first as farm labourers. In this way a much needed supply of labour for farm work could be created, and a practical movement of people to a life on the land might be begun. Increased production in the meantime will have to depend upon the improved methods and extended efforts of our present farmers.

### III. FINANCE AND WAR

THE real close of industrial expansion in Canada may be put in the year 1912. At this point it became clear to observant people that the time had come for giving some check to further undertakings. It was fortunate that this was the case, and that the banks from that time applied a steady pressure upon their customers to reduce obligations, or to refuse business that would involve increased borrow-

## Finance and War

ing. It is inevitable and also reasonable that a country in Canada's position should be both a large borrower and a large importer, but it is also very necessary that both these processes should be watched with the greatest care by those who are responsible for the financial arrangements of the country.

In considering the economic position in Canada we may regard our exterior debt in very much the same light as the first mortgage on an estate, or on the properties of a business undertaking. In the case of Canada, this mortgage amounts to about \$3,000,000,000, the interest of which must be provided for as a first charge on the country's productivity. During the last few years of rapid borrowing and rapid development a sufficient amount of money has been obtained from abroad in each year to meet the requirements of interest, and to pay for the large surplus of imports required by the industrial work which was being undertaken. It has been no surprise to find that, when the larger permanent construction has been temporarily completed, not only has the country rather more than provided for immediate needs, but that also the rapid diminution of activity should bring with it something in the nature of a crisis. The years 1913 and 1914 have in consequence been years of steady liquidation. When the war occurred at the beginning of August the country was in some respects in a good position to meet the situation.

During the last twelve years Canada has constructed about 17,000 miles of new railway, has provided homes for a vast number of immigrants and has created an immense mass of new industrial machinery, and it is not surprising that in the process excess and disproportion in respect of the different sorts of activities have occurred. The most striking feature, apart from the railway expansion, has been the building up of a large number of cities in the west, constituting an urban population out of all proportion to the agricultural activities of the area in which they are situated. In many of these cities a considerable proportion



## Canada

of the population has been occupied in activities that could very well have been dispensed with. The number of people who busied themselves exclusively in real estate speculation must be very considerable, and the damage that they have done is in proportion. Of the advances received from Europe and the United States, those which have been applied to the building of railways, the setting up of factories and the mortgaging of farms in actual operation, have, at least, had something permanent and useful to represent them, but a large part of the money obtained through syndicates, for the purpose of parcelling out speculative lands in the neighbourhood of cities in the west, has simply had the effect of raising the nominal value of real estate, and the profits acquired have been represented by almost absolute economic waste. A very considerable proportion of the extravagance in the ideas and expenditure of a whole class of persons in Canada for a few years has been at the expense of foreign lenders.

The present crisis has brought into relief several very important facts. First, the transcontinental railway systems necessary for a considerable margin of further agricultural development are practically completed. Secondly, the country is provided with industrial machinery for a population considerably in excess of its present numbers. Thirdly, the development of the primary industries of the country has been relatively inadequate. Fourthly, the financial situation is well in hand and presents no insoluble difficulties. In the first two cases there has been probably both waste and over-anticipation of increase of population, but, at all events, the work is done, the money has been borrowed, the responsibility is shouldered, and, as a matter of fact, the country as a whole is amply able to carry the burden.

The railway situation must be dealt with, and, no doubt, will be dealt with in a large way. Where there has been positive waste, or where more expensive railways have been built than the immediate economic requirements justify, the wise policy for the country is simply to write off any

## Finance and War

loss involved, and, as it were, start with a clean sheet. The one thing which must be avoided is the possibility of bonds held by other countries not being paid. The loss to the country of even a large sum of money, however unfortunate, can be borne. The loss of credit involved in defaults of interest and the like would involve damage infinitely greater. Fortunately it is probable that a course will be taken in accordance with this large view of the situation. In any case we find ourselves, in spite of hasty and unscientific treatment of the whole transportation problem, in possession of some 36,000 miles of railway in reasonably good condition, and more than adequate to deal with the large task involved in conveying to market the primary products of a country situated as Canada is, with a small seaboard and a long, relatively narrow tract of country.

The industrial situation is considerably more complex. This is not the first time in the economic history of Canada that a temporary excess of industrial machinery has been an embarrassment, and while the war has certainly accentuated the difficulties of the situation, it has not been the prime cause. An industrial productivity was established, based on the requirements of a period of extensive railway construction, building and the like, plus an optimistic estimate of even accelerated progress. This period of expansion has for the present come to an end. It is always, however, more or less of a surprise how readily the business of a country adapts itself to new conditions, and there are signs already that with the aid of foreign orders connected with the war, amounting to some \$30,000,000, various Canadian establishments are with some success readjusting their activities to the exigencies of the situation. Those manufacturers in Canada who depended to any considerable extent on foreign markets, particularly, of course, Germany and Austria, for their output, have suffered very seriously, and, further than that, the market in the Canadian west has been materially reduced. As against this latter difficulty the very large increase in agricultural productivity that is promised for the coming season will be a great help.

## Canada

In general it may be said that the demand for the ordinary requirements of life will at most show only a moderate decrease, and many industries will be almost unaffected by the crisis, while some, such as a portion of the leather and the woollen industries, will reap an actual benefit. The greatest strain must come upon the industrial companies that have large fixed charges.

The development during the last few years of what one may call the primary industries has not been satisfactory. The remark made a year or two ago by an observer passing through the west that the one thing that struck him about it was the absence of agriculture may be an exaggeration, but it has a considerable basis of truth. For example, the figures given for the production of field crops in 1909 were about \$533,000,000, for 1911 about \$598,000,000, and for 1913 about \$553,000,000. During that period the immigration has been very large. Some valuable figures are given in the Annual published by the *Monetary Times* of Toronto, in which are analyzed with considerable care the relative production of the five years from 1909 to 1913 inclusive. Of these, two appear of special importance.

### AREA UNDER CULTIVATION

	All field crops Acres	Yield Bushels
1909 . . . . .	30,065,000	842,272,000
1910 . . . . .	30,272,000	557,739,000
1911 . . . . .	34,536,000	851,739,000
1912 . . . . .	35,569,000	908,142,000
1913 . . . . .	35,369,000	895,563,000

### PER CAPITA PRODUCTION

	Population	Acres under cultivation	Yield bushels per capita	Value field crops per capita	Value total production per capita
1908	6,507,000	4.62	129	\$81	\$125
1910	6,872,000	4.40	81	\$57	\$102
1911	7,206,000	4.79	118	\$82	\$125
1912	7,583,000	4.66	119	\$73	\$119
1913	8,000,000	4.42	111	\$69	\$113

## Finance and War

Account should also be taken of the very slow increase, and in some districts actual decrease, of live stock.

The most hopeful element in the position is that the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan are seriously realizing the importance of mixed farming, and that the position in that respect may be materially different in the next few years. In reply to the various appeals for larger production of grain, the Canadian farmer has been inclined to think that there was a considerable risk of serious decline of prices, and that it would be unwise for him to increase his area of cultivation too greatly. Of course, it is extremely unlikely that any decrease in price of wheat could occur this year, but with regard to live stock the situation possesses none of the elements of uncertainty which are found in the case of cereals. The ranch system of cattle raising appears to be nearing its final disappearance. The great meat companies have gone so far as Rhodesia in search of areas suitable for cattle raising, and before many years have passed the spaces in the world that are suitable must become comparatively limited. In view of this phenomenon, it seems certain that the feeding of animals must before long be carried on mainly upon a more intensive principle. It would be perfectly safe for the future, as well as profitable in the present, for the Canadian farmer to develop stall-fed cattle raising. This would not only be profitable in itself, but it would do a great deal towards eliminating the danger of the exhaustion of farming lands by the continuous export of grain out of the country.

In spite of a certain reluctance on the part of a small part of the farming population to respond to the appeal for more production, there has been a greatly increased area prepared for crops next year, and much quite enlightened suggestion and consideration on the part of agricultural departments of both Dominion and Provincial Governments. A more difficult problem is presented in the suggestion that more people should be immediately put on the land, and that a large sum of money should be voted by

## Canada

Parliament for the purpose of providing them with capital. There are grave difficulties in the way of that sort of wholesale treatment. It would require the employment of a large number of highly skilled and conscientious people for the selection of lands and settlers, which, under existing circumstances may not be feasible. However, much can certainly be done in the way of directing immigrants to agricultural employment. There has been and is a great shortage of labour in the farming districts, both in Ontario and the west. Hitherto intending emigrants have been encouraged in the expectation of procuring highly paid work in industrial or railway activities, and gangs of foreigners have been exploited for railway construction. During the quiescence of the industrial world in Canada, and the cessation, or virtual cessation, of railway construction, immigrants should be informed that they must expect mainly agricultural employment.

All these considerations point to a period in Canadian development devoted to the extension of activities in the primary industries, possibly somewhat at the expense temporarily of the industrial side of things. Along with it one might, perhaps, venture to hope may come a rest from the somewhat neurotic extravagance of our national habits. Amongst other things which the war has taught is economy—a lesson, perhaps, on the whole more needed than most others. We are thus brought naturally to the examination of what, in a country situated as ours, is a most important element in our progress, and that is the financial.

The bank statements for the last few months show, curiously enough, an increase for the month of November in savings bank deposits. In July, 1914, they were about \$671,000,000, in September they had dropped to \$621,000,000, showing a loss of \$50,000,000, but by the end of November they had risen again to \$666,000,000, bringing them up to within \$5,000,000 of the highest point in the year, and \$41,000,000 more than the same period

## Finance and War

last year. The current loans for the last five months have declined about \$45,000,000. This falling off is quite proper, and shows the effect of wise conservation, possibly in some cases of timidity.

During this same period a large increase has been made in the holding of gold and legal tenders by the banks, from \$145,000,000 at the end of July to \$211,000,000 at the end of November. The call loans last year, elsewhere than in Canada, which are mostly in New York, have been reduced during the same period from \$125,000,000 to \$74,000,000. The circulation of bank notes, which, as was noted in the December number of *THE ROUND TABLE*, are now legal tender in respect of dealings between the banks and their customers, and which reached the high point of \$123,000,000 in October, had fallen in November to \$114,000,000, a very moderate figure.

Closely allied with the financial situation, especially with the question of gold reserves, is the position of exchange between Canada and the United States. During the period after the commencement of the war up to the early part of November, New York exchange in Canada was at a discount, varying from a small fraction to as high as two per cent. This period was marked by the heavy exportation of Canadian wheat, and the withdrawal as far as possible of Canadian loans in the United States. From the middle of November onward the situation in New York Exchange has become exactly reversed, and has remained at a premium varying from a quarter of one per cent to one per cent ever since. This represents a period during which the exports of wheat have practically ceased and the imports remained considerable. Both situations were embarrassing, and both probably unavoidable, and in neither case has gold been shipped to relieve the situation.

The cessation of borrowing in London has deprived Canada of one means of securing money to pay for the excess of imports from the United States, and so far the borrowings in the United States have not been adequate

## Canada

to keep the Exchange position level. In the year ending March, 1913, our surplus of imports from the United States reached the extreme level of nearly \$300,000,000 for the year. That disparity has been diminishing ever since, and for the eight months of 1914 ending with November 30 our total excess of imports was barely \$50,000,000. During that period we were able to sell securities in the United States to the amount of some \$25,000,000, and a further eight or ten million dollars of securities have been sold during the months of December and January. There are some indications that the financial people of the United States will recognize that it would be quite reasonable for them to encourage further purchases of Canadian securities, in order to retain the very large trade involved. The purchases of securities by the United States since the war have been in the main provincial and municipal, and in this connection it may be pointed out that the municipalities may have an excellent opportunity of funding their debt to the banks, which the November returns show to be about \$44,000,000, by selling their securities during a period when there will be hardly any industrial securities with which they will have to compete. Of course, it is very much to be hoped that the quite healthy demand for municipal securities, which has shown itself lately both in Canada and the United States, may not lead them into the belief that they can wisely engage in further large expenditure. They are in the position at present of having over-supplied themselves with public utilities of various descriptions, and should rest content for some time with very modest additions to their debts. At a recent meeting of municipal representatives in Quebec it seemed that they were all filled with the spirit of wise retrenchment, and, further than that, in the municipal elections which occur annually on January 1, the expenditure involved in by-laws proposed to the electors amounted to little more than one-quarter of that of 1913.

Canada. January, 1915.



## AUSTRALIA

### I. AUSTRALIA AND THE WAR

IT is safe to say that the feeling of national consciousness has never been so profoundly stirred in Australia as it has during the last four months. Nations, like men, have often to face a great crisis before the secret of their being becomes revealed to the world and to themselves, and it was not until the outbreak of the war, which has jeopardized the very existence of the British Empire, that Australia began fully to realize that Empire's meaning, and the high and responsible part she has been called to play in it. During the last few years her sense of Imperial responsibility has been deepened and quickened by two things—the creation of her national Navy, and the *imperium in imperio* established by her possessions in the Pacific. It is certain that even apart from these factors her offers of assistance in the present crisis would have been wholehearted and substantial, but it is also certain that the possession of ships and colonies of her own has kindled her imagination and enthusiasm with unprecedented vividness and has enabled her to appreciate as never before the larger issues of Empire. Moreover, she is coming to realize that the present war is totally unlike anything that has ever yet befallen England or herself, and that on its issue depends her very existence as a nation. The instinct of self-interest and self-preservation may therefore be taken as a strong factor in her present attitude: that it is the sole, or even the main, factor will be credited by no

## Australia

one who is acquainted with her national temper and has reflected on the fact that thrice already—in Egypt, in China and in Africa—her soldiers have fought on behalf of the Empire in situations where her own safety was in no sense imperilled.

From the beginning of the negotiations preceding the war there has never been a moment's doubt or hesitation in any responsible quarter in Australia as to the necessity of England's taking part in it, nor as to the essential righteousness of her cause. Indeed, during the momentous days when the decision still hung in the balance, Australia, with a brief and misleading account of the negotiations before her, showed considerable perplexity and impatience at the hesitation, as it then seemed to her, of England to fulfil her obligations to France. This keen solicitude for British honour was intensified by the indignation consequent on Germany's invasion of Belgium, and despite the extreme gravity of the issue, the declaration of war was hailed with feelings of positive relief. The British Association was at this period visiting Melbourne, and some of its members caused Australia considerable amusement by their naïve expressions of surprise at her "loyalty" and "keenness." If anyone had come here expecting the opposite of these things, he must have been considerably surprised. At first, indeed, Australia, anxious though she had been for the assertion of the Empire's honour, was dazed by what had happened and by the difficulty of focussing her social, political, and economic outlook to meet the new conditions. One in every five hundred of her own population were born in Germany, and many of these have taken an important part in her commercial, agricultural and artistic life. It was impossible for her to adjust her attitude immediately towards this element in her midst, although disclosures in England, Canada, and elsewhere, showed the great danger of espionage and treachery which might be expected in certain alien quarters. It was impossible, too, that Australia, unvisited as she has hitherto been by war, should at once realize the immensity and full

## Australia and the War

gravity of the issue. Yet her reaction from the shock was swift and practical.

The declaration of war reached her in the interval between the double dissolution of the Federal Parliament and the ensuing General Election. Nearly the whole of the Liberal Ministry were canvassing in their constituencies; yet within two days of the outbreak the Prime Minister, Mr Joseph Cook, had offered a first contingent of 20,000 men to the Imperial Government and this had been gratefully accepted. The Australian Navy was at once put at the disposal of the Admiralty. Mr Fisher, Leader of the Labour Opposition, assured Mr Cook of his party's hearty co-operation in everything relating to the war. Enemy shipping in Australian ports was promptly seized. At the suggestion of the Federal Ministry, the State Ministries took steps to fix the price of foodstuffs, and to prevent the hoarding of wheat and other commodities by persons interested in making capital out of the country's necessity. The Federal Government itself prohibited the export of meat and wheat to any country other than the United Kingdom, and conferred with the Banks concerning the best means of relieving the financial situation. The general result of these precautions has been that never since the war began has there been any symptom of financial panic throughout Australia. One or two industries, notably the mining industry, have suffered severely, and there has been a definite increase of unemployment. But apart from these facts, and as far as the vast majority of Australians are concerned, the conditions and cost of living have been practically normal since the beginning of the war.

After the Federal General Election the conduct of affairs devolved upon the victorious Labour Party. It is worth noting that until a few years ago this Party had been strongly anti-militarist throughout Australia. The earnest efforts of a few of its members, notably the present Attorney-General and the Minister of Defence, Messrs Hughes and Pearce, succeeded in awakening it to the vital importance of a strong defence policy, which, indeed, was easily perceived

## Australia

to be of the first importance if the Party intended to adhere to its cherished doctrine of a "White Australia." The result was its adoption of compulsory training and the elaborate and expensive defence scheme recommended by Lord Kitchener. The latest stage in the Party's evolution has been reached in the preparation and dispatch of what is by far the largest expeditionary force ever sent forth from Australia. This course was greatly facilitated by the War Loan of £18,000,000 requested by the Federal Authorities from the Imperial Government and promptly granted by them. The fact that Australia has undertaken the responsibility and expense of this obligation is a further token of her anxiety to play her part worthily in this supreme crisis, while she is keenly grateful to England for having supplied her with the means of doing this without delay. The Government at once appropriated the sum of £9,800,000 towards covering all expenses connected with the expeditionary force up till June 30 next. Two months ago, after several weeks' preliminary training, the first contingent of 22,373 men was dispatched, and on December 3 the Prime Minister announced that these had been disembarked in Egypt to assist in the defence of that country and to complete their training there. He added that, when this was finished they would go direct to Europe, to fight beside the other British troops. This course was adopted by the special recommendation of Lord Kitchener, who recognized the danger of housing Australian troops in tents throughout the European winter after a long voyage through the tropics and sub-tropics.

Besides the above force, 16,500 men of all ranks are now in training for service abroad; 13,000 of these will leave Australia shortly, and an additional 3,000 will be dispatched at the end of every succeeding two months. There are also 6,800 men in training for home defence. In answer to a question put to him in the House during November, Mr Fisher replied that as many additional troops would be forwarded as were needed. He had previously declared that Australia

## Australia and the War

would support the cause of the Empire in this war to the last man and the last shilling. At present every man who has offered for enlistment and been found physically fit is being trained and equipped.

The Liberal Opposition are at present attempting to ensure reinforcements being sent on a very much larger scale, and Sir William Irvine recently indicated that 100,000 men was the least number which Australia might reasonably be expected to supply considering the extreme gravity of the issue. Public feeling in the Commonwealth is quite in favour of the increase, and there is no need to think that the Government is blind to the fact that before the war is over Australia may have to make a very much larger contribution than she has made hitherto.

As far as the sea is concerned, the operations in the Pacific since the beginning of the war have triumphantly vindicated the existence of the newly created Australian Navy. Experience had shown that the people of Australia had no heart for a hired fleet, even if the lessor were England. Her own contribution of £200,000 per annum—one which she firmly declined to increase—was indeed no adequate contribution to Imperial Naval Defence; but as soon as Rear-Admiral Henderson's scheme for the formation of an Australian Navy had been adopted, it became clear that her former reluctance had been due neither to parsimony nor to any selfish or provincial regard for her own safety. The policy of Athens with regard to the Confederacy of Delos had been reversed, and with the happiest results. At a vastly increased cost, Australia set about equipping and manning the new ships. During the year 1913-14 her defence estimates amounted to £4,752,735, which represents a larger proportional expenditure than Germany's estimate of £70,785,000 in the preceding year. Of this sum over £2,000,000 was allotted to the Navy, so that it is an understatement of fact to say that Australia's naval expenditure has increased tenfold under the new regime. The result is that the Royal Australian Navy to-day possesses the most

## Australia

powerful war vessels of any belligerent in the Pacific, save Japan. The fleet consists of the battle-cruiser "Australia" (19,200 tons), and the light cruisers "Sydney," "Melbourne," "Encounter," "Pioneer," together with fifteen destroyers, gun boats and submarines.

It had, moreover, been provided that in case of war the new fleet should be immediately placed under the undivided control of the Admiralty, and, as has been above indicated, this was done almost automatically, as soon as war broke out. Directly this happened, the Navy left Sydney and has since then been co-operating in the Pacific with the British China Squadron, the French and Japanese fleets and the New Zealand forces. It covered the expedition sent by New Zealand to Samoa and thus made possible the capture of that possession. Throughout the war it has guarded the coast of Australasia from attack by the enemy's cruisers. It has harried Germany's battleships and destroyed her wireless stations. But for its presence it is practically certain that Sydney would have been shelled by the "Scharnhorst" and the "Gneisenau," and it is probable that these ships, with their comrade vessels, would have remained in the Pacific instead of having been driven to their destruction in the South Atlantic. Australia's Navy has indeed done considerably more than protect her own coasts; its work has had definite Imperial value. It has kept open all the trade routes to Colombo, Singapore, the Pacific Islands and America; and, owing to its presence, not a single British merchant vessel has hitherto been captured by the enemy in Australian waters.

Perhaps the most definite achievement of the Australian Navy and the expeditionary force accompanying it has been the capture of German New Guinea. On September 12 the Australian Naval Reserve took possession of the wireless station at Herbertshöhe after eighteen hours' bush fighting extending over six miles. Rabaul, the seat of government in German New Guinea, was subsequently occupied and a base was established at Simpsonshafen. The casualty lists

## Australia and the War

unfortunately included the deaths of Commander Elwell, Capt. Pockley, of the Army Medical Corps, and four seamen. Still more serious was the loss of Submarine AE1, with her complement of thirty-five officers and men. This vessel was last seen on September 14, and no trace of her has hitherto been found. The Australian Navy has followed up its success in New Guinea by the capture of Kaiser Wilhelmsland (September 24) and other German possessions in the Pacific.

A more sensational and hardly less important achievement was the sinking of the "Emden" by H.M.A.S. "Sydney." On November 9 the Navy Office at Melbourne received a telegram from Cocos Island to the effect that a German warship, immediately identified as the raiding cruiser, had arrived off the island, and was landing men in boats. Immediately an urgent coded wireless message was sent to the "Sydney," which was believed to be in the vicinity. A message urgently requesting help was also sent from the island immediately before the wireless station there was broken up by the German landing party. Soon afterwards the "Sydney" hove in sight. The "Emden" put out to sea, deserting her boats, and attempted to make good her escape. The "Sydney," however, engaged her, and after an hour's accurate and deadly fire set her in flames and reduced her to a sinking condition, in which state her captain ran her aground on the north of Keeling Island. The "Sydney's" casualties list numbered only three killed and fifteen wounded.

Besides equipping the armaments just mentioned, Australia has also taken prompt and drastic steps to prevent the possibility of danger within her own borders. Soon after the present session began, the Government passed legislation enabling them to deal summarily with individuals who might be found guilty of espionage or sedition, and to enter any house or office in search for incriminating documents. Such results as have hitherto been published, though they have not been particularly sensational, have been quite sufficient to show that Australia has not escaped Germany's far-flung



## Australia

net of espionage, and that she has had good cause for fearing the stranger within her gates. Her internal activities have not, however, been confined to the seductive practice of spy hunting. One of the first acts of the present Ministry was to vote £100,000 as a free gift to Belgium, while during the four months of the war over £1,000,000 has been privately contributed to various patriotic funds. This is all the more creditable when it is remembered that owing to the widespread prevalence of drought Australia is at present suffering to an unwonted extent from financial depression.

The war itself has directly and gravely affected Australia's greatest mining centre. The output of the Broken Hill Mines consists of lead, silver and zinc; and of these the last is in the main shipped for treatment to Belgium, the North of France and Germany. Operations in these countries are necessarily suspended by the war, and the commencement of operations elsewhere is a matter involving time, and requiring the provision of a very large amount of capital. This capital would only be forthcoming upon an assurance that permanent supplies of metal could be relied on, and a difficulty at once arises from the fact that mines, at the outbreak of war, were bound by agreements which in most cases have several years to run. What is the effect of war on the legal obligations of these agreements is a matter on which no lawyer speaks with confidence, and litigation instituted in England does not seem to have led, or to be likely to lead, to an authoritative decision. Meantime, the cessation of operations in some of the mines, and the restriction of output in others, is affecting many thousands of people, and may produce a serious industrial situation on the Barrier. The Government is tempted to cut the knot by legislation definitely releasing the contractors from their obligations after the war, so as to open the road for new smelting arrangements.

On the other hand, the agreement appears to be part of an international arrangement respecting output and prices, which is stated by its defenders to be vital to the prosperity

## Australia and the War

of the Australian industry. The case is one more of the many illustrations furnished by this war that the "private relations" of business in modern conditions readily assume a national importance, which makes Government indifference and inaction impossible.

As far as her national sentiment is concerned, it was not till some weeks after the declaration of war that Australia began to understand the crucial significance of the issue, and it may safely be said that she has not fully understood it even yet. Remote as she is from the main scene of action, she at first found it somewhat difficult to realize that, being a belligerent, she was liable to all the responsibilities and rigours of war. Moreover, like the rest of the Empire, she was ignorant of the full measure of Germany's unscrupulous ambition, and did not then believe, as she believes to-day, that that country deliberately manufactured the present war as a preliminary to the enslavement of Europe and the downfall of the British Empire. Her eyes were startlingly opened to this aspect of the matter by the British White Book, and the certainty therein supplied that Germany could by a word have prevented hostilities at any stage of the negotiations. During the last few months all thinking Australians have been educating themselves in the causes of the war by reference to the writings of Cramb, Bülow, Bernhardi, Ussher, Sarolea and others. They have realized that for a generation Germany has been industriously schooled by her professors and dragooned by her militarists into the belief that her national destiny demands that she should become the suzerain of a vanquished Europe and the regent of a vast colonial empire which can only be obtained by England's downfall. They have further realized that by a deliberate application, or misapplication, of the Nietzschean "ethic" she has deliberately "trans-valued all values" in pursuit of this end, and has counted no means common or unclean which would lead to her own maniacal aggrandizement. And the certainty of these facts has been kindled into passionate indignation by the wanton invasion of

## Australia

Belgium, the destruction of Louvain and Rheims Cathedral and the infliction, the inevitable result of the official policy of "frightfulness," of the most revolting atrocities upon innocent women and children.

Moreover, since the beginning of the war, Australia has realized, as never before, the material and spiritual significance of the British Empire and the part she has been called to play therein. She has understood the essential unity of thought and feeling and interest which underlies its superficial diversity. She has contrasted that service which is perfect freedom with the condition of enslavement represented by the blood-tax in Alsace-Lorraine and the Colonization Commission in Posen. Herself in constitution and legislation perhaps the most socialistic community in existence, she has further contrasted the freedom reposed in her of working out her own destiny after her own will, with the implacable hostility and contempt displayed towards organized labour in such a semi-official German publication as Bülow's *Imperial Germany*. These contrasts and the lessons they supply have forced themselves on all thinking men and women in Australia. It would be too much to say that they have yet come fully home to the great masses of the country. In certain quarters, moreover, there has been a not unamiable exultation in the help which Australia has been able to render to England, together with an imperfect recognition of the far greater help which is being at present rendered by England to Australia. Young, light-hearted and unscathed as she is by war, Australia as a whole has hardly even yet been able to grasp the tremendousness of the issue, to feel that it is one of life and death for herself no less than for England; and that in Flanders and the North Sea is being decided the fate of her tiniest back-block township as surely as that of London. She has still to learn, or still to feel acutely, that she has even more at stake in the present war than has England, since, should the unlikely happen and Germany be victorious, it is inconceivable that England should ever become

## Public Finance

a German province, while it is well-nigh certain that sooner or later Australia would undergo that unspeakable fate. It must be admitted that with very rare exceptions neither her Press nor her public men have given her much light or leading in this regard, nor have striven to create that intensity of feeling without which nations cannot be expected to make the last sacrifice. But whatever Australia's deficiencies may be in this respect they cannot for one moment be attributed to any lack of loyalty or of keenness to play her part worthily, to the best of her understanding, in the defence of the Empire. Once her imagination has been fully kindled regarding the immensity of the peril she will certainly make even greater contributions and sacrifices than she has made to-day. Her will is sound and ready: and it would take but little to make her learn and practise the great lesson preached by Meredith to France after 1870:

"The lesson writ in red since first Time ran,  
A hunter hunting down the beast in man,  
That till the chasing out of its last vice  
The flesh was fashioned but for sacrifice."

### II. PUBLIC FINANCE

THE Prime Minister, in his capacity as Commonwealth Treasurer, delivered his Budget speech on December 3, more than five months after the commencement of the financial year to which it relates, the delay being mainly due to the fact that the first three months of the financial year were absorbed by the double dissolution, the general election, and the consequent change of Government. For the current financial year the Prime Minister estimates that from existing sources of revenue the total receipts, including a surplus of £1,200,000 brought forward from the previous year, will amount to £21,600,000. On the other hand, he estimates that the total expenditure for the

## Australia

year will aggregate £37,600,000, comprising ordinary expenditure £25,850,000, and war expenditure £11,750,000. The resulting deficit of £16,000,000 he proposes to finance by means of loans to the extent of £13,100,000, and by increased taxation to the extent of £2,900,000.

In his budget speech the Prime Minister pointed out that the deficit on ordinary account could have been avoided if the money which is being spent on new works and buildings had been charged to loan instead of to revenue account. A total of £4,300,000 is being spent on such works and buildings, as compared with £3,300,000 for the preceding year. Of the £13,100,000 to be financed by loans, £10,500,000 is to be obtained through the British Treasury. The total amount allocated to Australia of the British Government's loan of £350,000,000 is £18,000,000, payable in twelve monthly instalments of £1,500,000 each, commencing on December 15, 1914, and thus providing a total of £10,500,000 during the current financial year. The remaining £2,600,000 to be raised by loans is to be obtained by the investment to that extent of the Australian Notes Fund in the purchase of Commonwealth Treasury Bills in aid of revenue.

To provide the additional sum of £2,900,000 required from taxation the land tax has been increased, the tariff has been amended, and a probate duty on estates above £1,000 net value has been added to the duty already charged by the States.

In the case of the progressive land tax which, within certain limits, proceeded formerly by increments of 1-15,000th of a penny for each additional pound of unimproved value, the increment of 1-9,375th of a penny has been substituted for that previously in force. It is estimated that this will furnish an additional sum of £1,100,000. The tariff amendment is designed in part to raise additional revenue, and in part to remedy anomalies in the existing tariff. The principal revenue duties are those imposed on stimulants and narcotics, and the additional revenue which

## Public Finance

it is estimated that the amendment will bring in for the balance of the financial year is £800,000. Against this it is estimated that the combination of war and drought will bring about a shortage of £1,500,000 under the old tariff as compared with the previous year. The probate duty is progressive, ranging from 1 per cent to 15 per cent on the excess net value of any estate above £1,000. This is estimated to produce £1,000,000 for the unexpired portion of the current financial year.

It is clear that the incidence of the additional taxation has been so designed that the major portion of the taxes will fall on the wealthy classes, and the omission of revenue duties on tea and kerosene, which would reach the masses as well, has been the subject of unfavourable comment.

A matter of considerable importance in the domain of public finance is the expenditure of the States on public works from loan moneys. This expenditure has in recent years mounted rapidly, and for 1913-14 exceeded £20,000,000. To discontinue it abruptly would lead to widespread distress, while its continuance on the high level reached involves some very difficult financial problems. To consider these, a conference of Federal and State Ministers was held, at which leading members of the Federal Opposition were present. The outcome of their deliberations was an agreement, under which the Commonwealth undertakes to lend and the States undertake to borrow the following sums: New South Wales, £7,400,000; Victoria, £3,900,000; South Australia, £2,600,000; Western Australia, £3,100,000; and Tasmania, £1,000,000—a total of £18,000,000.

Exactly how this advance to the States is to be financed by the Commonwealth Treasurer has not yet been made clear, but from the fragmentary explanations which have so far been furnished it appears that it is to be based largely on an extensive increase in the issue of Australian notes. In this connection an arrangement has been made between the Commonwealth Government and the associated banks of Victoria under which gold to the amount of £10,000,000

## Australia

is to be made available from time to time as required, in exchange for Australian notes. The banks are to use such notes for ordinary banking purposes, but are not to present them at the Treasury for gold until the close of the war, when they will be redeemed. Under the present law the Treasury is required to hold in gold 25 per cent of the face value of the notes issued and unredeemed at any date. This requirement has, throughout, been amply met, the latest return giving a proportion well over 40 per cent. According to the returns for the quarter ended September 30, 1914, about 53½ per cent of the notes issued by the Treasury were held by the banks, leaving 46½ per cent in the hands of the public. It may be mentioned that the notes are legal tender and are redeemable in gold at the Commonwealth Treasury, and that the issue of notes is a Commonwealth Government monopoly.

The dangers of an over-issue of such paper have been cited in the House of Representatives by Sir William Irvine, Attorney-General in the late ministry, but in the absence of a clear statement of the scheme involved no useful criticism is possible. In any event, the endeavour, under the present changed conditions, to maintain a programme of public works aggregating some £20,000,000 per annum appears to be a doubtful policy, which can only result in deferring, not in avoiding, the evil day. Total cessation of public works would be unwise, but an attempt to maintain under adverse conditions the high level of recent years would seem to be equally unwise.

### III. PRIVATE FINANCE

OWING to a succession of prosperous years and to a conservative attitude generally adopted by the banks in making advances, the war has found Australia in a relatively strong position to face her economic problems.



## Private Finance

During the past three years, ending September 30, 1914, there has been:

In deposits a net increase of	£10,161,443
In advances a net increase of	5,517,957
The total current accounts were	
at 30/9/14	£65,740,690
The total fixed deposits were at	
30/9/14	86,474,329
	Together £152,215,019
While the total advances were	123,071,651
Holdings of coin and bullion were	34,998,194

In the first stages of the crisis there was but little sign of panic. During the first few days withdrawals of deposits were made chiefly from Savings Banks, but these were not heavy in the aggregate, and there has only been a limited hoarding of gold.

Among the immediate financial effects was the closing of markets connected with the mining industry. At a later stage the pastoral industry was seriously affected by the absence of continental wool buyers from the local wool sales and by the prohibition of exports to countries other than the United Kingdom. Subsequently a shortage of refrigerated cargo space has led to an accumulation of frozen meat in the stores and consequent cessation of purchases of fat stock. Recently the markets for metals have recovered, but it has only been possible to realize merino wool in restricted quantities. The Stock Exchanges have been reopened and business has been resumed with reduced dealings, but at a fair level of prices. So far the strain upon the financial resources of the community has not been unduly severe; but apart from the war pastoral interests are being seriously affected by the widespread drought, which is also responsible for the entire failure of the wheat harvest for export purposes.

The most disquieting feature in the financial situation is that while the returns from exports have largely decreased, the demand for money is likely to increase during the next

## Australia

few months, and may possibly be largely in excess of the supply during the following six months. Already rates for mortgages have been increased and loans have been difficult to negotiate even on large margins of security. On the other hand, there are many sources from which money may be saved, notably by a diminution in personal and extravagant expenditure.

Restrictions in realization of produce, such as metals and wool, coupled with greatly reduced exports of wool and wheat, have resulted in a general dislocation of the Exchanges on London; the banks have had their burden lightened in this respect by an agreement with the Bank of England to give credit in London for gold lodged with the Commonwealth Treasurer, which will obviate the risk and expense of shipping gold during the war, but it may be expected that the problem of exchanges will continue to be a difficult one for bankers and the mercantile community generally. It may be specially noted that much relief was experienced by the Bank of England, under the British Government Guarantee, taking over from the Australian banks a very large number of foreign bills of exchange, and in this way freeing Australian capital that otherwise would have been locked up for an indefinite period.

Australia. December, 1914.

## SOUTH AFRICA

### I. THE REBELLION

IN the December issue of *THE ROUND TABLE* the political developments consequent on the outbreak of war in Europe were discussed up to the date where Colonel Maritz, an officer of the Defence Force, who was at the head of a commando supposed to be operating on the eastern border of German South-West Africa, went into open rebellion. Previously there had been ominous signs that opinion among the Dutch-speaking community was by no means unanimous. At the special session of the Union Parliament early in September a resolution had indeed been passed, by a majority of 92 to 12, affirming the "whole-hearted determination" of the House to "take all measures necessary for defending the interests of the Union and for co-operating with His Majesty's Imperial Government to maintain the security and integrity of the Empire." It was well known, however, that a large proportion, probably a majority, even of the loyal Dutch in the constituencies, were opposed to an expedition to German South-West Africa. They would have preferred to do nothing, until the Union was invaded, partly because the South African Dutch are temperamentally unwarlike, and partly because they were convinced, or affected to be convinced, that German South-West Africa would inevitably fall to the Union in any case at the conclusion of the war in Europe. They were also apprehensive, as the event proved justly so, that the strain upon an allegiance scarcely more than a decade old might prove too

## South Africa

much for the more ignorant or reactionary or irreconcilable elements among their kinsmen in the Free State and the Transvaal. Such an atmosphere was obviously congenial to all the influences of political unrest: from the unreconciled republicans of the old regime to mercenary soldiers of fortune like Maritz. The signs of the working of these various poisons soon began to appear.

How Beyers, the Commandant-General of the Union Defence Force, resigned the very day after the close of the special session of Parliament, was noted in the December **ROUND TABLE**. His letter of resignation was essentially a political manifesto, which sneered at Britain's professed anxiety for the protection of small nations, declared that the South African War was a series of Louvains in miniature, and openly sympathized with Germany. By Beyers' most intimate friends among the Dutch loyalists this letter, and the action which it was intended to vindicate, excited the liveliest feelings of disappointment and chagrin. Had he resigned as soon as the war broke out, their vexation would not have been so acute. To wait until the British troops had been withdrawn, and until he knew all about the plans of campaign in German South-West Africa, was bad faith in its meanest and most contemptible form. A blot had appeared on the Afrikaner scutcheon, and more than one Dutchman who was against Great Britain in the South African war, told me within a few days of the announcement of Beyers' resignation that they felt so bitterly ashamed as almost to wish to change their names. Nevertheless they still refused to believe that the resignation was due to anything more than an honest difference of opinion on a matter of policy. When a letter appeared in the public press, in which the epithet "traitor" was applied to Beyers, a chorus of indignant protests was evoked. The ex-Commandant-General, it was said, was a man of the strictest probity: and whatever he did, must have been done from the purest and most conscientious motives. For a time this theory seemed feasible. At the graveside of the ill-fated Delarey, Beyers

## The Rebellion

explicitly disassociated himself from any intention of either causing or advising rebellion. On the following day Beyers and Christian de Wet addressed a great gathering of burghers, in order to denounce the policy of the Government and to advise them to have nothing to do with an expedition to German South-West Africa, whether they were called out or not; but here again even the loyal Dutchmen drew a sharp distinction. The advice given by Beyers and de Wet, they were ready to admit, was unwise, unconstitutional and in its potency utterly mischievous. That it necessarily implied an intention to go into rebellion, or a desire to restore the old Republics under German protection, they stoutly denied.

Whatever may have been in the mind of Beyers and de Wet at Delarey's funeral, or for some weeks later, they were committed to the full programme of rebellion by October 21, when de Wet made his notorious speech at Vrede, a town in the northern Free State which he had invaded with a rebel commando. At the close of his volume on the "Three Years' War," de Wet advised his countrymen, now that the struggle was over, to remain loyal, since only loyalty was "worthy of a people who had shed their blood for freedom." At Vrede, however, he declared that though he had "signed the Vereeniging Treaty and sworn to be faithful to the British flag, they had been so down-trodden by the miserable and pestilential English, that they could endure it no longer. His Majesty King Edward VII had promised to protect them and had failed to do so." But the only evidence of the oppression of a people rightly struggling to be free, that de Wet vouchsafed, was the fact that he himself, after pleading guilty to an assault on a native, was fined in the sum of five shillings by the Vrede Magistrate, described by de Wet as "one of the pestilential English" and "an absolute tyrant." The Magistrate, as it happens, is a brother-in-law of Mr Steyn, the ex-President of the Free State, who fought against England in the South African War, and was appointed, largely through the

## South Africa

influence of Mr Steyn, to the Vrede Bench by General Hertzog, at that time Attorney-General of the Free State in the First Ministry under the system of responsible government. This sounds so farcical as a vindication of rebellion, that doubts have been cast on the genuineness of the Vrede defiance. De Wet himself, however, has never called the report in question. The Vrede speech, in truth, was genuinely illuminative by its very frankness. Cunning as a guerilla fighter among the kopies and the krantzies, de Wet's sobriquet among his countrymen in his own district is "Babiaan" (baboon). Christian de Wet is a political ignoramus. He used the sort of argument to justify an act of gross bad faith which he thought most likely to appeal to an ignorant backveld audience. The dominant motive in his mind, as it probably was in Beyers' mind also, was not so much hostility to Great Britain as to General Botha; an hostility that flames out in his Vrede speech in references to the "ungodly policy of Botha," and to "this ungodly scandal," which "the South African Dutch were going to stand as one man to crush."

For two years General Hertzog had continued to play upon a dislike of General Botha and still more of General Smuts in the minds of Beyers and de Wet, until dislike had passed into sleepless malevolence. That General Hertzog was to a large extent morally responsible for the rebellion both of Beyers and de Wet there can be no doubt whatever. Since de Wet was captured a story, which is well authenticated, is going round the Clubs. The rebel leader is said to have candidly and unrepentantly acknowledged his treason, and to have admitted the justice of any punishment the Government may inflict. There was only one qualification to this grim acquiescence in the decree of fate: he would like to have a quarter of an hour and a rifle in the presence of Hertzog. And just as Hertzog played upon de Wet's prejudices, so he appealed to Beyers' vanity and ambition. When Botha formed the first administration

## The Rebellion

under responsible government in the Transvaal, Beyers was left out, and, although he was given the Speakership in the Transvaal Parliament, and after Union the Commandant-Generalship of the Union Defence Force, his relations with Botha and Smuts were never afterwards cordial. When Hertzog was ejected from the Botha Cabinet, he made it his business to fan a secret resentment which Beyers probably scarcely acknowledged to himself. Even before the outbreak of the war the bait of the Premiership in a Hertzog Cabinet had been dangled before Beyers' eyes: and the attitude of Botha on the outbreak of war seemed to furnish a unique opportunity for the realization of his hopes. It was known that Botha's policy in regard to the invasion of German South-West Africa was unpopular with the majority of the Dutch, not excepting the Prime Minister's own followers. Hertzog probably calculated that, if only a lead were given by the resignation of Beyers from the Commandant-Generalship, the Defence Force would virtually be broken up; the Government would be unable to carry out its pledge to the Imperial authorities; and the Ministry would be forced to resign. Even if a stop-gap Unionist Cabinet took its place, while the war in Europe lasted, Botha and Smuts would have been permanently discredited, and the way cleared for the eventual formation of a Hertzog Government, though with Beyers at its head. But if Beyers and de Wet were the catspaws of Hertzog in working for his own political ends, the chief of which was not so much to lower the British flag as to overthrow Botha, they also became the willing instruments not only of a political faction but of a consciously anti-British and treasonable conspiracy.

It is interesting here to quote at some length from two documents which have not yet been published, but which were widely circulated among the Dutch. On October 20, ten days after the news of Maritz's treachery was proclaimed, and a few days before it was known that de Wet and Beyers



## South Africa

were in active rebellion, a meeting was held at Stellenbosch, at which the Rev. A. Moorees, of the Theological Seminary, delivered an eloquent speech in which he said:

“They had not only to disapprove, but strongly to condemn treachery. Maritz had not only proved treacherous himself, but what was worse, he had dragged several young men with him to whose care they had been trusted. Not only that, but Maritz had gone further, and had treacherously made prisoners of those who had remained loyal, and that not in fair war, but in a treacherous manner. He could not find words sufficiently strong to condemn such deeds. Even before the expedition to German South West Africa had been decided upon, there were certain centres where there was disaffection, and now they had the treachery of one in whom they had reposed every confidence and who had been honoured by the Government, who had proved unfaithful to the trust reposed in him, and who had not been faithful to his oath and to his uniform.”

This utterance was the more notable, because the speaker is an enthusiastic Afrikaner who has always taken up a strong, sometimes indeed a distinctly partisan, attitude, on all questions affecting the relations of the two white races. A few days later an anonymous reply, written in Pretoria, was circulated among all the Dutch clergy throughout the Union. A few passages are well worth quoting:

“What,” says the writer, “does Maritz want to do? He wants to come to give us, or to help us to regain, something for which we allowed 23,000 women and children to be murdered by the noble English, for which we allowed 4,000 cowardly low common Boers to be killed, for which we fought for three years, and for which thousands of ‘Dutch bastards,’ ‘Dutch traitors,’ ‘contemptible Dutch curs,’ as the noble English call them, ‘Dick, Tom and Harry’ according to our General Botha, ‘Doppers’ according to our

## The Rebellion

General's Lieutenant, Ewald Esselen, 'little yelpers' according to the Hon. Minister Malan, all descendants of those vulgar Voortrekkers and fellow countrymen, subjects and burghers of that low Paul Kruger, pray every evening and every morning. That is what Maritz wants to come and give us back. Next year (1915) it will be twenty years since Jameson made his raid on the Transvaal to steal our country, to kill our Government, to destroy our existence as a people, and in addition, our nationality for ever; and in all that time I have never had the good fortune to meet a single Englishman or Englishwoman who condemned that, not to speak of detestation and making him out to be what you now make Maritz out to be. . . . Can you blame Maritz for not being so thoroughly convinced of the English victory in Europe as you and 'our General' are? Can you not see that if one thinks that Germany is going to win, and he loves his Fatherland, he thinks nothing is too good, not even his life, to sacrifice in order to save his country? It is certainly an indisputable fact that the future of German South-West Africa is going to be decided on the battlefields of Europe, and it is as clear and bright as sunshine what our fate is to be if we attack German South West Africa and Germany is victorious in Europe. Can a man who loves his country allow, much less help, the digging of our grave by the invasion of German South-West Africa? . . . The Dutch in the Transvaal in 1880, under a thousand times more difficult circumstances than those we are under to-day, and with much less prospect of success than we have to-day, but fired with the same patriotic feeling of independence with which de Wet, Beyers and Maritz are inspired to-day, simply grasped the gun, and trusted in God to throw off the British yoke and domination. This they succeeded in doing, because they were unanimous and faithful to one another. There was not in those days a pro-English 'our General' who stood up against his people, and so broke the power of our people with the help of English and the National Scouts. If those rebels had not been successful, then probably their leaders would either have been shot or hanged (because a second Slachter's

## South Africa

Nek would have been very easy for the noble British Empire) or banished, and the history which you now teach the youth at Stellenbosch would tell of the base-hearted rebels, Piet Joubert and Paul Kruger; but because they were victorious, Paul Kruger was called 'Africa's greatest Statesman.' . . . Never again in our lifetime shall we get such a beautiful opportunity of getting rid of the British yoke, and then building up a nation of our own, founded on the Voortrekkers' religion, manners, customs and traditions. If we had a sympathetic Boer Government at the head of affairs, then there would be nothing easier under the sun. Surely, honourable professors, you do not labour under the mistake that de Wet, Beyers and Maritz want to bring us under the German Empire? No, I assure you that for that not one of them would give a brass farthing. They want to have back, or regain, that independence for which we struggled so hard twelve years ago; because if that independence for which we gave up our lives and allowed the land to be ruined, is to-day not worth possessing, then it was, to say the least of it, a waste of time and foolish to make all these sacrifices. My conviction, however, is that it has appeared as clearly as possible during those twelve years, that that independence more than ever before is necessary for our people, if we do not want to be totally absorbed by English manners and customs, and see our existence as descendants of the Huguenots and Voortrekkers disappear. If this rebellion of de Wet and Beyers succeeds, then you will get an opportunity of teaching the youth the history of the war of freedom in South Africa, just as Americans teach their children how the United States became independent of England."

At a later date a manifesto (which also has not appeared in the Press), was circulated over the signatures of Beyers, de Wet, Maritz, Kemp, Wessel Wessels, J. J. Pienaar and J. Fourie, in which the separatist aim, though not so candidly avowed as in the letter to the professors, is no less certainly a controlling motive:

"When we subscribed to the Treaty of Vereeniging

## The Rebellion

and laid down our arms, we were a crushed and beaten people, driven to the verge of starvation and despair by the dishonourable tactics of a vigorous and powerful enemy—our resources exhausted and our homes destroyed—but we accepted the inevitable, and were content to forego our nationhood and our liberties for the sake of the future of our people. We were prepared to keep our allegiance to Great Britain, as long as we could do so with honour to ourselves and without ingratitude to our friends. Now, however, we are called upon to choose between this doubtful claim upon our loyalty to a relentless conqueror, and our gratitude to a friendly nation, which extended its sympathy and help in the time of danger. We are being betrayed into this act of base ingratitude either by the folly or the treachery of our own Government. Was it not enough to ask to forget the terrible scenes we witnessed a few years ago, either as men in the field of battle, fighting for our hard-won freedom, or as youths flying with our despairing women-folk from our burning homesteads, or in the concentration camps seeing them dying in thousands around us, but must we now be compelled to take up arms against a nation that gave us a helping hand in our troubles, and plunge our people into the horrors of an extremely doubtful European War? For our part we are prepared to shed the last drop of blood rather than be guilty of such cowardly baseness, and we call on all those who love honour and friendship and gratitude to assist us in resisting it. We have no wish to shed the blood of the people of South Africa, English or Dutch—far from it—but we must emphatically declare that the members of the present Government have betrayed their trust, and no longer represent the real feelings of the people of South Africa. We most emphatically declare it to have been a gross libel on the honour of his countrymen, for General Botha to lead the Imperial Government to believe that the Afrikaner people were willing to enter into active and unprovoked hostilities against the German nation, with which they had no possible quarrel, and to which, indeed, they are closely united

## South Africa

by ties of blood, friendship, and of gratitude. It was clearly his duty to inform the Imperial Government that, while it could rely upon their passive loyalty and obedience, it was too much to expect that they would willingly and openly invade German territory. The consequence, therefore, of the present civil strife must rest, morally, at any rate, on his shoulders and those of his Government. For ourselves, we shall not lay down our arms until the Government is removed from office, and all idea of invading German territory is frankly abandoned. We are fully aware of the gravity of our position, but no other course consistent with honour was open to us, and we leave our motives to be finally judged by the honourable instinct of all men. Expediency may demand that we be regarded and treated as rebels, but justice and truth will always proclaim our conduct as inspired by the truest patriotism. We do not desire to set up a Republic or any other form of Government, against the wishes of the majority of our fellow citizens. All we ask is that the people as a whole be allowed to say whether or not they wish to declare war against Germany, or any other nation. We wish to govern ourselves in our own way without fraud or coercion from anyone, and we call upon the people to assist us in attaining that ideal."

The Fourie whose name appears as a signatory to the above manifesto, was tried by court martial, condemned to death and shot at Pretoria on December 20. In his address to the Court, Fourie showed quite plainly that racial enmity and republican aspirations were the mainspring of his action.

"The days of Slachter's Nek, the murders at Blood River, the murder of the Dutch at Piet Retief by Kaffirs under English officers, and the death of 30,000 Dutch women and children in the concentration camps all forbid that he should uphold the honour of England, and he challenged any man to point a finger at him and say he had erred. He knew the Government now over him looked on him as a rebel, but he was as dis-

## The Rebellion

appointed with the Government as it was with him. It was a greater honour for him to stand there as a prisoner than as an officer in the English army. What he had done, he had done with open eyes, and of his free conviction. He was still convinced that God would not support the unjust, and that there were enough people in the veld to rescue South Africa."

Beyers and de Wet were thus not only swayed by motives rooted in hostility to Botha, and in the case of Beyers by political ambition; they were also, though at first possibly unconscious of the fact, the instruments of a treasonable coterie nourished on the enmities and animosities of the past, and prevented by racial prejudice from realizing that the South African Dutch are freer now than they were in the days of Kruger. If the oversea observer finds it difficult to understand how any considerable body of men could be misled by such arguments, or swayed by such motives, let him recall the attitude of the large numbers of educated Scotsmen towards the Union of England and Scotland for many years after that great political achievement.

Two other contributory influences were at work. No evidence has yet been forthcoming that Beyers had sold himself to the Germans. All that is known is that Mrs Beyers is of German extraction, and had visited Germany, not only with her husband when he went as Commandant-General of the Union Forces, but subsequently; that on the last occasion she stayed in Berlin for a considerable time; and that when the war broke out she used her influence with her husband, which was great, in a way entirely sympathetic to Germany. About the existence of an active and widespread German propaganda in South Africa, aided by German gold and supported by an elaborate system of espionage, there can be no doubt whatever. There is no other way of accounting either for the amount of money which some of the rebel leaders, not previously in affluent circumstances, had at their command, or for the prevalent belief among the rebels in the certainty of Germany's triumph,

## South Africa

and in the prospect of all sorts of collateral benefits likely to follow in its train. The other contributory influence is less easy for an outsider to credit; but it is a fact of no small importance. The country Boer, and sometimes even Dutchmen who pretend to some education, are often as credulous as they are pious. At the time of the South African war, not only was the Bible read and explained in such a way that it seemed impossible for the Boer to lose, but old men saw visions and young men dreamed dreams, the circulation of the reports of which had a more powerful effect on the backveld than the speeches of a Cabinet Minister would have in England. An atmosphere of this kind is extremely favourable to the charlatan; and a "prophet" named Van Rensburg had gained some repute during the South African war by having predicted that, if Delarey went out on a certain day, he would capture Methuen. This prediction came true; other predictions, which were less happy, were forgotten. As soon as the war broke out, Van Rensburg began to see visions, or at all events to report them. In January last, he saw across the water five great bulls mixed up in a fight. One bull was blue and another was red; and the blue bull had gored a great hole in the red bull. Of course, the red bull was Britain, and the blue bull Germany. Another vision showed the burghers who had been commandeered for German South-West Africa, trekking to the border and returning, after meeting the Germans, without firing a shot; which, being interpreted, obviously meant that Germany intended not only to restore the old Republic but to give them Natal and the Cape. Delarey was in constant consultation with the "prophet" before he came down to attend the special session of Parliament, and his friends found this fine old Dutchman in a frame of mind bordering on religious mania. The strange misadventure by which he met his death on his way back, was mentioned in the December ROUND TABLE. It is now practically certain that he had arranged with Beyers to go to Potchefstroom, in order to dissuade the Defence Force troops from re-



## The Rebellion

sponding to the Government's summons. After Delarey's tragic end, Van Rensburg's influence with Beyers became even greater than it was before; and one of the Ministry stated the other day, that the evidences of the "prophet's" influence, traceable among the rebels now in prison, are astonishing.

The character and magnitude of the services the Botha Government has rendered to the Empire can only be adequately gauged if all the aspects of the situation, which have now been presented at perhaps inordinate length, are carefully pondered. It would have been a political miracle had the Dutch South Africa, which was linked with the Empire only a dozen years ago, been entirely unanimous in co-operating with Great Britain in the present crisis. On the other hand, the position being what it actually was, the success with which difficulties have been confronted and surmounted, is an extraordinary tribute to the statescraft and political capacity of General Botha and General Smuts. From the date when Beyers resigned the Commandant-Generalship, the situation demanded not only courage, resolution, vigilance and energy, but exceptional quickness and a sureness of political intuition. Doubt, hesitation or uncertainty would have brought instant confusion and possibly irretrievable disaster alike in a political and military sense. But from the moment when General Smuts penned his mercilessly clear and incisive reply to Beyers, there was neither doubt, nor hesitation, nor uncertainty. Many Dutchmen winced sympathetically as the lash of the Minister of Defence descended on the ex-Commandant's shoulders; but none, who saw straight, could deny that the path of duty, honour and good faith had been clearly pointed out, and must be followed, unless the country was prepared to discard the compass of conscience and political judgment altogether. When it became evident that this was not enough and that the movement for passive resistance to the invasion of German South-West Africa was spreading, General Botha promptly put aside the compulsion of the Defence

## South Africa

Act, called for a volunteer army, and announced that he himself would take the supreme command. This was a stroke which at once compelled the rebels to declare themselves openly, and by the mere force of example prevented disaffection from spreading and assured General Botha of the force he required.

Attempts to obscure the issue either by the well-intentioned timidity which wished at all costs to prevent bloodshed among kinsmen, or by mischief-makers who wished to trap the Government, were promptly exposed. Between the date of Maritz's rebellion and de Wet's outburst at Vrede, a mutual friend both of the Government and of General Hertzog wired to the Prime Minister asking that the Cabinet should do what it could to end the revolt of Maritz without bloodshed. To this General Botha replied, that, while he deplored Maritz's treachery, particularly because he had succeeded in scandalously misleading a number of thoughtless young men, negotiations with the rebel leader were out of the question. General Hertzog, on the other hand, who was also approached, was content to forward to General Botha a copy of the wire, with the remark that if he could assist in bringing about the desired result (i.e. the end of the revolt without bloodshed), he placed his services at the disposal of the Government. The Prime Minister replied with a copy of the answer already sent to the mutual friend, with the added remark that obviously an "immediate and public repudiation of Maritz's action by General Hertzog and the others mentioned in Maritz's ultimatum might do much towards achieving the object in view." Similarly, after de Wet and Beyers took the field, repeated efforts were privately made from the side of Mr Steyn (who was known to have been all the time in close consultation with General Hertzog) to open up negotiations between the Government and the ex-Commandant-General. The invariable reply was that there could be no negotiations with a rebel; though General Smuts was so little desirous of closing the door to repentance that

## The Rebellion

Beyers was allowed to pass through the lines of the Government forces and to spend a night at Steyn's house outside Bloemfontein, so that the ex-President might have an opportunity of exercising what influence he had in the direction of political grace. As matters stand, the net result of Steyn and Hertzog's failure to denounce the rebellion publicly and unconditionally, as well as of their abortive underground efforts, has been seriously to impair their political prestige with all, who are not rebels either in heart or fact.

The Government prosecuted the operations against the rebels in the field with great energy. Maritz's impudent ultimatum was dated October 8; but de Wet and Beyers did not take the field until about a fortnight later. Two-thirds of the population in the Free State were believed to be either lukewarm, or eager to go into rebellion as soon as their leaders gave the word. In the Transvaal the Western districts, involving one-third of the population, were affected. Three members of the Union Parliament took up arms against the Government; several predikants belonging to the Doppe section of the Dutch Church, men of great influence among their people, were among the most active recruiters for the rebels; and in the Free State a member of the Defence Council of the Union, Mr Wessel Wessels, threw all the weight of his position and his personal support in the field against the Government. Yet by December 20, General Botha was able to announce in Pretoria that apart from the rounding up of two or three stray bands, the insurrection had been crushed. The original plan of the rebel leaders was probably to effect a junction between Beyers, de Wet and Kemp, who probably had at one time something like 10,000 men at their disposal in detached groups in the Western Transvaal and the Northern Free State; then to march westwards and join up with a force from German South-West Africa under Maritz, who was to bring artillery, rifles and ammunition, in which the rebels were fortunately very deficient; and finally to advance against Pretoria. The position was serious; just how serious nobody,

## South Africa

not even Ministers, could say. Only a day or two before he actually joined the rebels, Beyers had seen Botha in Pretoria, and in response to an earnest appeal from the Prime Minister had promised that he would go back to his farm and stay there. In presence of such faithlessness in an old comrade in arms Botha could scarcely be easy in his mind as to who could be trusted and who could not. Only his extraordinary personal influence, backed by the tireless energy and resource of General Smuts, can explain how in these circumstances he was able in a few weeks to get between 30,000 and 40,000 men into the field. A few thousand of these were troops of the Permanent Defence Force, part of the little army which had been sent to occupy the coast towns of German South-West Africa, and which was recalled when the rebellion broke out. But the vast majority were burgher commandoes called out to fight their own kith and kin, in the cause of co-operation, with an Empire against which, side by side with these same kith and kin, they had been fighting only twelve years ago.

The appalling difficulties of such a situation are obvious; and things have happened which the English-speaking South African, whose political imagination is not always in proportion to his loyalty, has been apt to criticize. Naturally the Government and the Dutch commandants were anxious to avoid bloodshed as much as possible. In some cases South Africans of British extraction complain that, while they were fired on until the last moment by the rebels, their own fire was forbidden in the hope that the rebels would be surrounded and forced to surrender. How much truth there is in reports of this kind it is difficult to ascertain; but the Dutch loyalists, no less than their English-speaking fellow citizens, took the risks involved in such a natural concession to the sentiments of kinship. The casualty lists prove this beyond all possibility of doubt.

From first to last General Botha's commandos never gave the rebel leaders a moment's rest, so that they were never able to link up their forces. With the exception of

## The Rebellion

Kemp, who, with the "prophet" van Rensburg, managed to break through and reach German South-West territory with a few hundred men, they have all either surrendered or been captured or killed. General Botha's personal conduct of the operations against the rebels in the Free State was characterized by amazing vigour, energy and endurance and has revived in an extraordinary way an ascendancy which a lack of touch in some quarters, due to absorption in administrative affairs, had in recent years somewhat impaired. The fate of Beyers, who perhaps more than any other individual was directly responsible for the rebellion, was tragically miserable. Harried from pillar to post by General Botha's commandos he was cornered on Dec. 9 on the north of the Vaal River, which was running strong and high at the time with flood waters. Escape was impossible, and Beyers, who was a man of incomparable physical courage, plunged into the swollen river on horseback in the hope of gaining the Free State bank. The animal was unable to make headway against the stream, and Beyers slipped out of the saddle intending to swim for his life. Presently he was heard to exclaim that his coat was keeping him from swimming freely, and his last words as he threw up his arms and disappeared beneath the waters were, "Ik kan nie meer nie" (I can do no more).

At this moment (January 14) General Botha is in Cape Town recuperating for a brief space before proceeding in person to German South-West Africa. Alluding at Pretoria on December 20 to his operations in German South-West Africa, the Prime Minister said:

"In suppressing the rebellion the Government have had the most hearty co-operation of both races. Let us have the same co-operation in German South-West Africa. The undertaking before us is a difficult undertaking, but, if we all do our duty, it will be carried to a successful conclusion. Now that German territory has become a refuge for Maritz and other rebels, it is more than ever necessary that we should persist in our

## South Africa

operations there. We cannot tolerate the existence of a nest of outlaws on our frontier, a menace to the peace of the Union."

As a matter of fact, from the point of view of German South-West Africa, the rebellion has probably been a blessing in disguise. The expedition, as originally planned, was perilously inadequate in numbers, for the most part imperfectly trained, very deficient in artillery, and entirely without aircraft. These defects have now all been made good; while, so far as the composition of the expedition is concerned, instead of consisting almost exclusively of South Africans of British extraction, thousands of the Transvaal burghers, of whom General Botha has made such effective use in the recent operations against the rebels, are now encamped on Green Point Common *en route* to German South-West Africa. How wholly improbable such a co-operation was a few months ago, may be judged by the fact that at the present moment there are extremists of both races here in Cape Town who refuse to believe that Botha has any intention of sending the burghers to German South-West Africa. This incredulity is a guide to the measure of the Prime Minister's achievement.

### II. SOME CONSEQUENCES

WITH the suppression of the rebellion the difficulties of the Government in connection therewith are by no means over. Perhaps the most difficult question of all concerns the punishment of the rebels. It is a mere truism to say that the law which punishes treason is a necessary consequence of the idea of the State, and is essential to the existence of the State. The principle is universal in the history of civilization. On the other hand the application has been extremely varied at different times and in different circumstances. In the circumstances of South Africa as in Scotland

## Some Consequences

in the first half of the eighteenth century, in Canada a century later and in India after her mutiny, it is as important to avoid a procedure which would leave a sense of rankling and predominantly racial resentment, as it is to discourage a confidence which might confound clemency with condonation. This is a maxim easy to write: it is also a rule of statesmanship extremely hard to follow. Even if we are sure of the statesmanship, much depends on the temper of the people in a democratic country, particularly where the population is not racially homogeneous.

On November 11 the Prime Minister published a circular intimating that all who surrendered voluntarily before November 21—excepting persons “who had taken a prominent or leading part in the rebellion,” or who, while in rebellion, had “committed acts in violation of the rules of civilized warfare”—would not “be criminally prosecuted at the instance of the Government.” The obvious and sufficient justification for such a proclamation was that many of the rebels were extremely ignorant and had been greatly misled. Yet the circular was received with some headshaking among the stern and unbending loyalists, as a symptom that sympathy was beginning to interfere with necessary rigour. The heads shook more emphatically than ever when, the rebellion being practically over, General Botha issued a statement on December 10 in which the following passage occurred:

Our sacrifices of blood and treasure, and the losses of the population, have been considerable, but I believe they are not out of proportion to the great results already achieved, or which will accrue to South Africa in the coming years. For this, and much more, let us be reverently thankful to Providence, which has once more guided our country through the gravest perils, and let that spirit of gratitude drive away from our minds all bitterness caused by the wrongs which have been suffered, and the loss and anguish which have been caused by this senseless rebellion.

I have noticed latterly a growing sense of anger and bitterness in the public mind. But let us remember that this has been a quarrel in our own South African household, that all of us will have to



## South Africa

continue to live together in that household in the future, and while we do our duty in seeing that never again shall there be a recurrence of this criminal folly, let us be on our guard against all vengeful policies and language, and cultivate a spirit of tolerance, forbearance and merciful oblivion of the errors and misdeeds of those misguided people, many of whom took up arms against the State without any criminal intention, or without any clear perception of the consequences of their action.

While just and fair punishment should be meted out, let us also remember that now, more than ever, it is for the people of South Africa to practise the wise policy of forgive and forget.

How this was received by a section of the English-speaking population can best be indicated by a quotation from a letter of protest addressed to the *Cape Times*, which had been urging on South Africans of British origin that the object of the law of treason was to maintain the security of the State, that security could not be maintained without harmony, and that they would defeat the very ends they had in view by calling for more than was needed for deterrent purposes.

“When General Botha talks to us [so wrote this Protestant loyalist], about a ‘merciful oblivion of errors,’ and a policy of ‘forgive and forget,’ it is clear that the wind has set in from a political quarter. . . . Blood is thicker than water; the blood given by loyalists for this their country will, it seems, prove much thinner than that of the rebels and the Government. It is time that someone talked straight on this matter, for the papers seem to be conspiring to treat this rebellion as a purely spasmodic aberration on the part of the Maritzites and others, instead of a deep-seated plot of Imperial significance.”

This is no doubt as natural from the point of view of the extremist of British extraction as the bitter taunts from the Hertzogite extremist that Botha has sold himself to the English and betrayed his country. It is also no less stupid. Nothing in the Prime Minister's record is finer than the clear-eyed patience with which he met insult from one

## Some Consequences

section and incorrigible mistrust from another. In an interview on Dec. 20, at Pretoria, he said:

I am sure my English friends will understand what is expedient when I tell them that continued denunciation of the rebels may wound just those whom I know Englishmen have no desire to wound. I mean the Dutch who have been responsible for quelling this rebellion. Not many years ago they and the rebels were fighting side by side against England. For the loyalist Boers in these later days it has been an unhappy, indeed a tragic, ordeal to have to hunt down and fire upon men—some of them their relatives, many of them their friends—who were once their comrades in arms. These men in many cases have already met with their just punishment. Their wrongdoing and their fate are matters of the most acute grief to their kinsmen, and bitterness may unwittingly be provoked if our English fellow-countrymen continually emphasize the infamy of acts which they are not alone in detesting. The Dutch loyalists have discharged a painful duty out of a stern sense of honour, and, having relatives and friends often among the rebels, they regard the whole rebellion as a lamentable business, upon which the curtain should be rung down with as little declamation, as little controversy, as little recrimination as possible. To those who call for the infliction of severe penalties upon the ringleaders, I wish to say: Be sure justice will be done. In due time Courts will be constituted to deal with these men. . . . For myself personally, the last three months have provided the most sad experiences of all my life. I can say the same for General Smuts, and indeed for every member of the Government. The war—our South African war—is but a thing of yesterday. You will understand my feelings and the feelings of loyal commandos when, amongst rebel dead and wounded, we found, from time to time, men who had fought in our ranks during the dark days of that campaign. The loyal commandos have had a hard task to perform. They have performed it. The cause of law and order has been, and will be, vindicated. Let that be enough. This is no time for exultation or for recrimination. Let us spare one another's feelings! Remember, we have to live together in this land long after the war is ended!

A day or two later Mr de Wet, the Minister of Justice, who has been a powerful addition to the Cabinet which he joined at the beginning of last year, addressed the Civic Guard at Johannesburg, a volunteer body mainly composed of South Africans of British extraction. On the previous day Fourie, the rebel commandant from whose statement before

## South Africa

the Court Martial extracts have already been quoted, had been shot. After thanking English friends who had tried to do their best to imagine the Dutch feelings "of deep humility" at the turn circumstances had taken, Mr de Wet went on to say:

"And may I ask if any of you have tried to consider what your feelings would be if you had to confirm the death sentence on a man whom you knew personally and who a few short years ago fought side by side with you for the same principles, and the same ideals for which you were fighting. There are a large number of your Dutch-speaking fellow-citizens who do not feel perhaps the same way about the Imperial connection as you do. It is not unnatural that the great majority quite recognize the rights which the British flag gives them, and are quite prepared to recognize that, under the British flag, they are free to cherish their own language and their own traditions, and are prepared loyally to stand by that flag. They recognize that the two races have to live side by side in South Africa, and are prepared to do so on a basis of mutual goodwill, mutual respect, and mutual co-operation. Is it unreasonable under these circumstances to ask the English-speaking section to try and be careful and to avoid intolerant language and conduct, to avoid language which, though ostensibly aimed at the disloyal section, is very often of such a nature as deeply to hurt the section which is loyal and which has been deeply humiliated by recent circumstances?"

But Mr de Wet, while putting in this plea—a plea as statesmanlike as it is pathetic—for due "allowances" from the British side, made it perfectly clear that the Government had no intention of allowing their feelings to dominate their policy. The Prime Minister had uttered a warning against conduct or language of a vindictive character, and had exhorted his countrymen to cultivate the temper which let's the dead past bury its dead. But he had also said that punishment must be fair and just.

The translation of such an obligation into practice in

## Some Consequences

the present instance is extremely difficult. As regards the leaders of the rebellion who belonged to the Defence Force, they will be tried under the Defence Act by Court Martial. There are comparatively few in this category. One (Fourie) has already been shot, and his brother has been sentenced to five years' imprisonment with hard labour. Following the precedent in the Cape Colony after the South African war, other Government rebels, not amenable to a Military Court, will be tried by a special Tribunal of three judges. The number has not been even approximately stated, but there is good reason to believe that 300 or 400 will probably be tried in this way. Finally there is the question of the rank and file. There are some 4,000 in prison; and some 1,200 who surrendered have been allowed to go to their homes on parole. General Botha's own followers among the Dutch, no less than the "straight-talking" section of the South Africans of British extraction, insist on some punishment. In the case of the rebels in the Cape Colony there was disfranchisement for a number of years; and the loss of civil right is, of course, a common-law penalty of treason. Yet, if this penalty were exacted in the present instance, the same charge would be made against General Botha as was made against Dr Jameson; that he was using the unfortunate past for the purposes of the electoral future. The one charge might be as untrue as the other; but the result would none the less militate against the policy of letting the dead past bury its dead. In the end this question of the rank and file will probably be left to Parliament, which meets about the end of next month.

There are other questions of capital importance which Parliament will be called upon to discuss. One is the compensation for damage done by the rebels; a thorny business, particularly as in certain districts in the Free State there is good reason to believe that not a few, who are now lamenting their losses, were not averse from helping the rebels.

The other is the question of Finance. When the special session of Parliament rose, General Smuts had taken a vote of £2,000,000 to carry him on till March. But that was on

## South Africa

the presumption that from 12,000 to 15,000 troops would be employed in German South-West Africa. The rebellion brought between 40,000 and 50,000 men into the field; the £2,000,000 had vanished by the end of November; and we shall now probably send between 20,000 and 30,000 men to German South-West Africa, the cost of which must be taken at not much less than £1 a day per man. The extraordinary war expenditure will thus be very large—immensely larger in proportion than any other part of the Empire will have to face. Still more serious is the deficit between ordinary revenue and ordinary expenditure which, due mainly to a shortage in Customs revenue, and the closing down of the diamond mines, will be anywhere between £2,500,000 and £3,000,000. How this will be met Parliament must decide. There will almost certainly be a lowering of the income tax limit, which at present is £1,000, a revision of the tariff for revenue purposes, and an all-round, though not heavy, increase in railway rates. The whole matter will be discussed in consultation with the leaders of the Opposition and Mr Merriman before Parliament meets.

In the interview at Johannesburg which has already been quoted, the Prime Minister paid a tribute to his colleague, General Smuts: "Nobody can ever appreciate sufficiently the great work General Smuts has done—greater than any other man throughout this unhappy period. At his post day and night his brilliant intellect, his calm judgment, his amazing energy, his undaunted courage, have been assets of inestimable value to the Union in her hour of need." That is all true and an imperfect sketch of an extraordinary crisis and an almost unprecedented political situation will not have failed if it brings home to readers overseas how much the Empire, preoccupied in events in Europe, owes to General Botha and General Smuts, for the staunch upholding of its unity and its honour in its struggle for freedom.

South Africa. January, 1915.

## NEW ZEALAND

### I. NEW ZEALAND IN WAR

THE interest of New Zealand in the great war is undiminished, and the patriotic spirit of the people, so far from abating seems to grow in ardour. There is literally no sacrifice which New Zealand is not prepared to make for the maintenance of the Empire. Of the 10,000 men comprising the first expeditionary force, some 1,800 are garrisoning Samoa, and the rest are reported to be in Egypt, together with the Australian contingent. There are 3,000 reinforcements now in camp near Wellington waiting to sail as soon as transports are available and, according to the Minister of Defence, they are an even finer lot of men than the original body. These will be followed by another 3,000 and further reinforcements will be sent every two months. It seems probable that New Zealand will have a contingent at the front numbering about 20,000 men. The men in Samoa have expressed a strong desire to be sent to the fighting line in Europe, and the Government are now raising a special contingent of 500 men to relieve a corresponding number of the garrison in Samoa for service in Europe. For this special force the age limit has been raised to 47.

Not the least remarkable feature of the outburst of patriotic feeling in New Zealand is the keen desire of the older men to be of service in this national emergency. If the age limit were raised to 50, there would be thousands of additional volunteers for active service. As it is the elder men in the various centres have formed themselves into Citizen's Defence Corps, the idea being that they should be drilled and armed for purely local defence, to take the place of the younger men who have volunteered for the front. In the city of Christchurch alone, over 1,200 citizens, representing all classes of the community, enrolled themselves within two or three weeks after the movement was started.

## New Zealand

Nor are the Maoris less keen than the Europeans in their loyalty and patriotism at this juncture. When the natives first offered their services, the Home Government offered to take 250 for Egypt, but 500 were speedily enrolled. The Minister of Defence, Colonel Allen, who recently inspected them, said there was the raw material of a fine body of soldiers in the contingent, and even in the short time that the men have been in camp very good results have been obtained. Colonel Allen found that many of the men are old scholars of St Stephen's, Te Aute, Clareville, the Otaki Mission School and other Maori Schools for boys. Some of them were non-commissioned officers in the school cadets companies, and are finding that training of value. One of the Maoris has already been appointed to a lieutenancy, and Colonel Allen said that probably all the subalterns would be Maoris. He added that the contingent is thoroughly representative of the younger generation of Maoris, and referred with pleasure to the fact that New Zealand was the first of the overseas possessions, India excepted, to offer a native contingent for Empire service.

It has to be admitted that the efforts of the Government to keep down the price of wheat and flour have not been attended with much success. When the war broke out Mr Massey, foreseeing a shortage of wheat, urged the farmers in their own interest, as well as in that of the Empire, to increase the area of land under this crop. Unfortunately the weather did not prove favourable for spring sowing, and owing to this fact and the labour difficulty, the advice was only acted upon to a very limited extent. The Government endeavoured to import wheat from Australia, but a shortage being threatened in the Commonwealth, they were able to secure only a very small amount. A Royal Commission was appointed to consider the question, and after taking evidence recommended that the price of wheat should be fixed at 5s. 3d. a bushel and that of flour at £13 per ton, less the usual trade discount of 5 per cent. A Government proclamation was issued fixing these prices, but proved inoperative,



## New Zealand in War

seeing that there was no power to compel holders of wheat to sell their stock. These, in view of the threatened scarcity, continued to hold their stocks and there was an outcry from the millers that they were unable to obtain wheat with which to make flour. Sales are reported to have taken place at 6s. 3d. per bushel, the sellers endeavouring to evade the law by professing to sell at 5s. 3d. and adding 1s. for "charges." Meanwhile, the Government are endeavouring to import a considerable quantity of wheat from Canada, which they propose to sell at cost price or even at a slight loss, and this probably will have a steadying effect upon the market.

Not only have the farmers a good market for their wheat, but in other respects their prospects are exceedingly rosy. Cross-bred wools, being required for military purposes, fetched at the recent sales the highest price on record. There is also a keen demand for frozen meat, and every prospect of high prices being realized. Speaking generally, it may be said that far from the war having injured New Zealand financially, the immediate outlook for our great producing industries was never so promising as at the present time. It says much for the local shipping companies that in addition to furnishing transports for the troops they are able to provide sufficient ships for the ordinary trade of the country.

Much gratification has been caused in the Dominion by the very appreciative manner in which English newspapers and public men have acknowledged the eagerness of young New Zealanders to help in the defence of the Empire, and the patriotism and loyalty of New Zealanders as a whole. The prevailing feeling here is one of pride in the Empire, of profound admiration of the gallant conduct of the British Army, and of devout thankfulness to the British Navy for its protection, which has not only secured our personal safety, but has enabled our trade and industry to pursue a normal course. Nor are these the only respects in which the benefits of the Imperial connection have been vividly brought home to us. The masterly manner in which the financial crisis

## New Zealand

was handled by the British Government, in conjunction with the Bank of England, was striking evidence to all the world of England's supremacy in finance, as well as on the ocean.

In addition to sharing in the general benefit arising from the restoration of credit, New Zealand has special reason to be grateful to the British Government for assistance in dealing with her own finances. It so happens that some £3,200,000 of a short-dated loan falls due in December next. The holders of the stock had refused to convert it into a longer term, and in the present state of the money market it would have been extremely difficult to raise a loan to pay off the debt. The British Government came to our assistance by agreeing to include in its own issues, not only the New Zealand War Loan of £2,000,000 which we might have expected, but also a sufficient sum to pay off the indebtedness referred to, and to provide for public works urgently required. Similar assistance has, it is understood, been extended to other self-governing Dominions. Not only have they been enabled to raise the money needed at a more favourable rate than they could have secured for themselves with the money market in a normal condition, but English credit has enabled them to obtain with ease, at a time of crisis, money which they individually might have found it almost impossible to secure on any terms. This experience will naturally cause them to consider very earnestly whether it is not possible by a closer Imperial connection in the future, to secure at all times as part of the regular procedure the advantages which they have found so valuable when generously extended to them in a time of emergency.

A few words may be added respecting the feeling in New Zealand in regard to other countries besides those already mentioned in connection with the war. For our gallant allies, the French, there is nothing but admiration. The advent of Japan into the war was at first regarded with some uneasiness, but the action of the Mikado's Government in handing over the administration of the Marshall Islands to Australia, the inflexible loyalty and high-minded contempt

## New Zealand in War

with which the insidious overtures of Germany were rejected, and the absolute "correctness" of their conduct generally, have created a very favourable impression. Needless to say, the splendid loyalty of India, and the magnificent prowess of the Indian troops at the front have also deeply impressed the people of New Zealand, and the feeling is growing that our attitude both to India and Japan must be materially modified by the events of the war. The instinct of racial self-preservation is too strong for New Zealand ever to agree to the unrestricted immigration of Asiatics for the purpose of settling permanently within our borders, but short of this it is felt that both India and Japan in future must be regarded as nations in every regard our equals, entitled to the highest degree of international courtesy and respect. It is gallant little Belgium, however, whose sufferings have stirred the national heart with the deepest feelings of sympathy, whose wrongs have excited our fiercest indignation, and whose gallantry in the field has earned our undying gratitude and admiration. Many thousands of pounds have been subscribed for the relief of the Belgian victims of the war, and in addition to the sums cabled for urgent use, shipments of New Zealand frozen meat, and clothing and blankets made of New Zealand wool are being dispatched to our sorely stricken allies. Perhaps no better illustration of the way in which all hearts were moved on their account can be given than the fact that even the children's pennies collected on "Guy Fawkes's Day," as in England, and usually spent in fireworks, were handed over this year to the Belgian Fund, some hundreds of pounds being actually contributed from this source.

The feeling of New Zealand towards the United States is, one regrets to state, a sentiment of profound disappointment. The fact that most of the educated Americans are strongly in sympathy with the Allies is gratefully acknowledged, and it is admitted that there are probably practical difficulties in the way of entirely suppressing such unneutral acts as the supply of coal and other stores to German

## New Zealand

predatory cruisers, and the conveyance of information by wireless to German belligerents. The disappointment which is felt is based on the fact that a great nation like the United States, an adherent of the Hague Conference, and a professed upholder of international law, made no sign of protest when the Treaty of Belgium was contemptuously torn to shreds, and witnessed, apparently unmoved, the burning of Louvain, the butchery of Belgian civilians, and the violation of Belgian women and children.

And what shall be said of the attitude of New Zealand towards Germany? For some time before the war one or two of the newspapers, notably the *Christchurch Press*, strove to arouse the public to the reality of the German menace. But for the most part their warnings fell upon deaf ears. There are many Germans in New Zealand and, speaking generally, they have proved most industrious and worthy settlers, earning the respect and goodwill of their neighbours. The German men of business in the towns were, as a rule, genial, able, and successful, and so far from their prosperity exciting any envy, they were everywhere received in the most friendly intercourse and, most of them being naturalized, they were looked upon as fellow-subjects of the King. Had the Prussians fought fairly it is possible that the feeling of resentment caused by the war would have died down very shortly after the restoration of peace. It is impossible, however, to describe the feeling of horror excited in this Dominion by the reports of German atrocities. For many years to come no German trader will find it easy to carry on business in New Zealand, and no New Zealander will knowingly buy German goods, even when sold in a British shop. And throughout the nation there is the most intense feeling that it would be an act of national insanity were peace to be concluded until Prussian militarism has been completely crushed. It should be made impossible, not only in our lifetime but in the lifetime of our children's children, for that devilish spirit again to lift its horrid head and cast a nightmare over a shuddering world.

## Naval Defence

### II. NAVAL DEFENCE

SINCE the outbreak of the war the consideration of the problem of naval defence has entered upon a new phase. Curiously enough each school of thought finds in the events of the war confirmation of its own particular views. The advocates of a local fleet unit for New Zealand point with pride, not unmixed with envy, to the achievements of the Australian Fleet. It was the possession of the local fleet, they say, which enabled an Australian Expeditionary Force to capture German New Guinea. We were indebted to the same fleet for assistance in capturing Samoa with our advance Expeditionary Force, and we were glad of its help in convoying our main Expeditionary Force, with that of the Commonwealth, on their voyage to the other side of the world. They point to the fact that the German cruisers, "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau," were a serious menace, not only to our commerce, but to the security of these islands and to the garrison in Samoa after our occupation of the group. It is known that these powerful ships of the enemy were at one period within striking distance of New Zealand, and that they visited Samoa after its occupation with the object of ascertaining the prospects of an attempt to recapture the islands. At the commencement of the war, and for some time afterwards, His Majesty's Australian battle cruiser "Australia" was the only ship in these waters capable of engaging either the "Scharnhorst" or "Gneisenau" with any probability of success.

These facts are admitted on all sides and even the opponents of a local navy express unstinted admiration of the exploits of the Australian Fleet, and are grateful for the sense of protection which it gave, enabling us, in Lord Fisher's words, "To sleep peacefully in our beds." It is not too much to say that the destruction of the "Emden" by the Australian cruiser "Sydney" was hailed with as much pride and delight in New Zealand as in the Commonwealth itself.

## New Zealand

On the other hand it is argued that the naval aspect of this war has shown more emphatically than ever the paramount importance of maintaining the British Navy in overwhelming strength, and concentrating it in the vital spot, which, as every one knows, in this instance was the North Sea. But for the fact that the British Navy was strong enough to keep the main German Fleet bottled up in its own ports, it is argued that no amount of expenditure on local fleet units would have sufficed to preserve Britain's oversea possessions from aggression or their commerce from destruction. To the action of the British Navy in the North Sea we owe the fact that trade between New Zealand and the Mother Country has been carried on without interruption, while the German mercantile marine has been practically swept from the sea. It is admitted, of course, that damage has been done to British shipping, which was especially brought home to us by the fact that one valuable New Zealand cargo steamer was sunk. It is argued, however, that our losses are trifling compared to those of the Germans, and that it is expecting too much to imagine that, whatever provision had been made, we would escape scatheless. We should have felt happier and been more secure had there been more powerful local naval protection in these waters when war broke out, but it is contended in answer that in concentrating the public mind on local fleets, instead of pulling all together to maintain the supremacy of the British Navy, there lies the seed of future danger to the Empire. If the war had not come for another ten or twenty years could the Mother Country have continued without the aid of the self-governing Dominions, to build sufficient ships to maintain an adequate margin of safety in view of the determined efforts which Germany was making to overtake her? And is it possible for the Dominions to provide local naval protection and at the same time assist in building up the great fleet required by the policy of concentration? To the suggestion that these fleets would all be put under control of the Admiralty in time of war and could be used in any

## Naval Defence

way deemed best for the defence of the Empire, it is pointed out that it would then be too late to effect the necessary concentration. For example, had the German Fleet been in sufficient strength to attack the British on the declaration of war it would have been too late to summon help from Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, or even Canada. In regard to the ravages caused by German cruisers and the difficulty of capturing them, it was stated by the Admiralty that between 70 and 80 vessels, English, French and Japanese, were engaged at one time in hunting for the enemy's ships known to be at large. It is contended, therefore, that it was not due to any want of pursuing ships that the enemy's cruisers were enabled to remain so long uncaptured.

The tone of the latest speeches of the leaders on both sides indicates that there is now very little difference of opinion between the two. Both Colonel Allen and Mr Massey have publicly expressed their willingness to accept the principle that the Admiralty should have full control in peace, as well as in war, of any local fleet that might be provided. The main point for which Colonel Allen has contended has been that there ought to be a larger naval force in the Pacific for the protection of Imperial interests, and that New Zealand should have the opportunity of training her own sons for the naval service; and these objects were practically provided for in the agreement made by Sir Joseph Ward with the Admiralty in 1909. The understanding then arrived at was that the Dreadnought presented by New Zealand to the British Navy was to be the Flagship of the China Pacific Unit: that two of the new Bristol cruisers, together with three destroyers and two submarines, should be detached from the China station in time of peace and stationed in New Zealand waters, and that the ships should be manned as far as possible by New Zealand officers and men. Up to the time of Colonel Allen's visit to England in 1913 little or nothing had been done by the Admiralty to give effect to their part of the 1909 agreement, and Colonel Allen himself intimated to the Imperial authorities



## New Zealand

that the position had changed so materially that he did not consider it advisable to carry out the agreement, or to send to New Zealand the ships specified.

The outbreak of the war has of course made plain to every one what was previously only suspected, that it was urgent strategical reasons which prevented the Admiralty from carrying out their part of the agreement. After the war is over no doubt the whole question of naval defence and the future relations of the Mother Country with the daughter States will come once more under review. New Zealand will unquestionably be prepared to pay a larger share towards the cost of Imperial defence, and will desire to see a larger naval force in these waters. She is also keen to see her sons represented in the Naval Service, as they now are in the land forces of the Empire. With the principle conceded by all, of "one flag, one navy, and one control," there should be little difficulty in arriving at a solution satisfactory to all.

### III. THE GENERAL ELECTION

NEVER before in the history of New Zealand has so little public interest been taken in a General Election as in the one now taking place. Naturally the mind of the public is so occupied with the world-shaking events on the Continent of Europe that it is difficult to focus attention on the issues of local party politics. The candidates have been addressing meetings as usual and these have been fairly well attended. The newspapers devote a certain amount of their space to politics, but the war continues to monopolize the bulk of their space. The general mass of the public read the war news and skip the politics. It remains to be seen what effect all this will have upon the voting.

The general impression is that the extreme Labour Party, who naturally resent the attitude of the Government over the great strike, will strain every nerve to get their candidates returned; but the Government and the official

## The General Election

Opposition, led by Sir Joseph Ward, seem to have difficulty in stirring up the rank and file to anything approaching enthusiasm. It was suggested that the Election should be postponed. Sir Joseph Ward strongly favoured this course, and urged that it should be held in February or March next. He argued that by that time a decisive result might have been achieved by the arms of Great Britain and her allies against the enemy. The Government, after carefully considering the question, came to the conclusion that as the people were being urged to continue business as usual the Government and Parliament should set the example by holding the elections at the usual time. They pointed out that it was quite possible the war might drag on for a year or more, and that they would be laying themselves open to the charge that they were using the European crisis as an excuse for holding on to office. They further contended that it would be unconstitutional for any Parliament to prolong its own existence, and it was doubtful if there was any precedent for such a course, except that of the "Long Parliament." There was, however, as readers of *THE ROUND TABLE* will remember, also the case of the Parliament which passed the Septennial Act in 1716. The question was then raised and yet remains one of the controversies of constitutional law, whether a Parliament summoned for three years was competent to extend its existence without a reference to the electorate from which it derived its powers.

At the conclusion of the Session of Parliament the Prime Minister issued a manifesto setting forth the platform of the Reform Party, while Sir Joseph Ward outlined the leading features of his policy in a public speech at Wellington. It will be convenient, perhaps, to set forth the main features of these two statements.

First and foremost in the Reform manifesto were set down the following articles:

"(1) That New Zealand shall worthily sustain its share in the responsibility and obligations of the Empire.

## New Zealand

"(2) (a) A vigorous perseverance with a system of national training for defence, by which New Zealand's young manhood may become citizens fitted for the safeguarding of the people's hearths and homes, and for helping the Empire in time of need.

"(b) A naval policy by which New Zealand will train personnel and gradually develop this Dominion's interests in an Imperial Navy which will adequately protect the Empire as a whole, maintain the supremacy of the British flag in the Pacific, and render safe the trade routes so essential to the continuance and prosperity of the Empire."

Next was a promise to continue the policy "which has already placed the finances of New Zealand, especially as regards the State Advances Department and the Public Works, on a much more satisfactory basis than was the case when the present Government took office." As regards the land, the Government promised the maintenance of the freehold principle and the development of a sturdy self-reliant yeomanry by special attention to the bona-fide settlement of small areas of good land. It promised to prosecute the subdivision of large estates, suitable for close settlement, by an automatic increase of the Graduated Land Tax, but stated that this policy would be exercised with a just and sane discrimination between land which is improved, and improvable land which is kept in an unimproved condition. "It is also necessary," continued the manifesto, "to have fair discrimination between land which is fit for agricultural and dairying purposes, and comparatively poor pastoral lands which cannot be profitably occupied in small areas. The basis of this policy is the taxation of any large landowner's inertia or indifference to New Zealand's needs." Other features of the land for settlement policy are a well planned programme of roads and bridges, establishment of agricultural and land banks, encouragement and improvement of agricultural education, and expansion of the system by which the aid of the State's expert

## The General Election

officers is available for various industries, and "a proper use of native lands for the advantage of both races." As to immigration, the new policy initiated by the Government of bringing boys to New Zealand experienced in country work and apprenticing them under complete protection as to their wages and comfort to farmers is to be prosecuted. The immigration of domestic servants is also to be further encouraged.

As an aid to securing the best possible return from exports the Government has decided to establish a Board of Trade and Commerce, which will keep in close touch with the world's markets. One important function of the Board, it is stated, will be to watch shipping freights, both inward and outward. Additional preference will be granted, where necessary, to British manufacturers, and reciprocal arrangements will be made with the other States of the Empire. At the same time those manufacturing industries for which the natural conditions are favourable in this country will be encouraged. The policy of promoting the welfare of mining by direct and indirect assistance is in future to include the encouragement of the iron and oil fields, both of which exist in the Dominion, but which have not been yet developed on a commercial scale. Special attention is to be given to the development of food fisheries for local and oversea markets in accordance with the recommendations of Professor Prince, the well-known Canadian expert. The irrigation of dry country, particularly in Central Otago, is to be promoted by State advances, and additional encouragement is to be given to the fruit industry by a bonus on exports. Afforestation will be encouraged, to ensure adequate supplies of timber for the future, and the prevention of indiscriminate destruction of forest. Special attention is to be given to improving and protecting the public health by strengthening the campaign against tuberculosis, courageous administration of the Pure Foods Act, medical inspection and physical training of school children, extension of the maternity home system, and special training of nurses in the treatment of

## New Zealand

infants. Reference is made to the increased benefits under the various pension schemes already given by the present Government, and it is stated that as soon as circumstances permit, it is proposed to remove the property disqualification of old age pensioners, and to provide pensions for the physically infirm.

Reference is also made to the educational reforms already carried out by the Government, and it is stated that the system of technical education will be further developed, and that university research work in matters helpful to local industries will be encouraged. The Government's appeal for the support of the workers points out that the reform policy of encouraging land settlement, and fostering various industries will increase the National Wages Fund, and therefore directly benefit all workers. The cost of living is to be reduced by the erection of workers' dwellings by the Government, State advances to workers for building purposes, advances to councils and boroughs to enable them to erect workers' homes, reduction of Customs Duties on certain articles in common use, extension of the scope of the Commercial Trusts Act to facilitate proceedings against monopolies, insurance against sickness and unemployment, and a subvention for Friendly Societies so soon as the Finances permit. Reform in the system of local government is promised, together with the abolition of the present system of Parliamentary grants for roads, bridges, etc. It is proposed to overhaul the existing railway fares and rates, with a view to reducing the cost of travelling, especially to young children, and to readjust the anomalies in goods freights. In regard to the natives the Reform Government's policy, it is added, is to treat the Maori as far as possible as a European. The Maori is being encouraged to strengthen himself by intelligent enterprises, thus improving his usefulness as a New Zealander.

Sir Joseph Ward's political programme for the General Election was outlined in a speech which he delivered to the Women's Social and Political League in Wellington. After

## The General Election

referring to the Liberal Party's record since 1891, as one of which any party in the world might be justly proud, he went on to say that, so far as the Empire is concerned, no one could question the sincerity and loyalty of the Liberals, and indeed of all classes in New Zealand. Our common duty was to assist in the maintenance of the Empire, and the country had shown in unmistakable manner its desire to do this to the utmost of its ability. There was a confident buoyant feeling among us that final success in the war would come to Britain and her allies. This led him to say that when the nation that had shown itself to be the most warlike in history had been conquered, it was reasonable to expect that there would be lasting peace, or at all events a peace that would continue for at least a century. There could be little doubt, in his opinion, that once the war was over the magnificent British Navy would not be required in such numbers around the British coast as in the past, and in the ordinary course of events it was probable that the Admiralty would place their surplus vessels at different points of the Empire. This was impossible in the past owing to the hostile attitude of Germany, and for prudent and well-recognized reasons it had been necessary to have the main fleet concentrated in the North Sea. The Liberal policy, so far as naval defence for New Zealand was concerned, might be summed up in these words: "We stand by the Imperial Navy." The conditions that had arisen in the present war confirmed him in this belief. One was proud of the fact that New Zealand was responsible, with the assistance of Australian and French warships, for securing Samoa, but it was idle to shut our eyes to the fact that, unless the Imperial Navy in the North Sea was so strong and powerful as to lock up the German Navy, none of the German possessions in the Pacific could have been taken, or if they had been taken, could have been held for any length of time. These facts show that the great British Navy should remain intact, and that to stand by it instead of establishing a separate local navy was the safest and

## New Zealand

wisest course for New Zealand to pursue, both in our own interests and in the interests of the Empire. Sir Joseph Ward, however, went on to say that he had always believed we should have British warships patrolling the New Zealand coasts and adjacent waters, with a base in the Dominion, and with a view to having this carried into effect arrangements were made by him with the British Admiralty in 1909, by which two cruisers, three destroyers, and two submarines were to be permanently quartered in these waters, with Auckland as base. Had this arrangement been carried out we should have had a portion of the British fleet in New Zealand waters when hostilities broke out, which would have made us all feel more certain as to the safety of the men who left our shores to fight for the Empire. He was strongly of opinion that it was necessary that this class of ship should be on our coast, but that they should be under the control and direction of the British Admiralty. The alternative to an arrangement of this kind was to undertake the burden and responsibility of a local navy. To be of real service the local navy must be an effective one, and the financial responsibility of such an undertaking was so huge that New Zealand could not bear it.

Sir Joseph Ward said that he did not wish to take away any credit due to the Government for the good work they had done in connection with the sending away of the Expeditionary Force, but it must be understood that the Liberal Party in Parliament dropped all party criticism in connection with these matters, and assisted in every way the carrying out of this great work. He thought it was premature to talk of imposing a war tax until the country knew the actual amount which would be required, and suggested that possibly the enemy would be called upon to pay an indemnity, in which New Zealand might participate. If the war tax proved to be necessary he would be quite prepared to have it placed upon the shoulders of those best able to bear it.

Referring to local politics Sir Joseph Ward pledged the



## The General Election

Liberal Party, should they be returned to power, to establish a system of proportional representation for the House of Representatives, with reasonable groups of electorates and preservation of the country quota. In regard to the Graduated Land Tax as a means of inducing the subdivision of large estates, he proposed that the Land Purchase Board should be strengthened, so as to ascertain as early as possible all the areas of land and the holdings of £20,000 and upwards which were most suitable for close settlement. The Board should report upon these lands and at the same time steps should be taken to pass into law a special Graduated Land Tax imposing upon them higher rates of taxation than those imposed by the ordinary Graduated Land Tax. This special Graduated Land Tax admittedly would aim at forcing the subdivision of the estates on which it was placed. At the end of fourteen days from the commencement of the Session the lands referred to in the Land Purchase Board's report would become subject to this special Graduated Tax, but the owner of the land in question would be permitted to escape the special tax in one of two ways—either by notifying the Minister of Land that he would subdivide his land in accordance with the Land Act within six months from the date of notification, or would hand over his land to the Land Purchase Board to be subdivided on the deferred payment system, the owner in the meantime being given State Debentures for the Government valuation of the land, bearing interest which would enable him to convert his debentures at par. The Land Purchase Board should then proceed to dispose of the land on the deferred payment system, and if at the end of the period fixed under that system, the total purchase money paid by settlers exceeded the Government valuation, then the surplus should be paid to the owner, along with the amount of his debentures, together with interest at the rate paid by the settlers. Should, however, the proceeds of the sale of the land amount to less than the Government valuation, then the deficiency would be deducted from the amount of the

## New Zealand

debentures, less interest at the rate fixed by the debentures. He regarded the extension of land settlement in reasonably small areas as of the utmost importance, and all existing legislation should be overhauled with the intention of providing for genuine settlement by occupying owners. He would utilize some of the proceeds of this special taxation in purchasing land near towns to be cut up into areas of from an acre to five acres, upon which workers' homes could be erected. He would establish farmers' banks, to be known as the Bank of Agriculture, through which the whole of the advances to settlers, workers, and local bodies would be made. Where necessary a further extension of the State functions should be put in operation to combat monopolies. He thought that £2,300,000 per year should be borrowed for expenditure on railways, and £700,000 on other public works. He was in favour of extending further trade preference to the British Isles, Canada, Australia, South Africa, and America, which in recent years had removed the duties on some of the principal articles produced in New Zealand. The internal defence of the country must be maintained, but he thought the amount expended should be limited to £450,000 annually. Sir Joseph Ward also expressed himself in favour of an extension of agricultural education and afforestation. He also held that the Public Service Act had not worked satisfactorily, and stated that it was his intention, in the event of being returned, to introduce an amendment to the Public Service Act providing for the creation of a portfolio of Public Service, and restoring direct Parliamentary, but not political, control.

So far it will be seen that, with the exception of this last point, and naval defence, to which further reference is made in this article, and the electoral law, the policy of the Leader of the Opposition does not differ very materially from that of the Prime Minister. Sir Joseph Ward, however, brought forward two somewhat novel proposals in addition to those outlined. The decline in the birth-rate in New Zealand, he said, was a question that required serious

## The General Election

consideration. It was naturally a difficult problem to solve, and to a large extent was in the hands of the people themselves, but from the point of view of statesmanship it was necessary that something should be attempted. He proposed that on the registration of the birth of every child in New Zealand £5 should be placed to the credit of the child in the Post Office Savings Bank, and that the amount should remain there for a period of fourteen years, and carrying compound interest at the rate of 3 per cent assessed annually. Discussing the advantages of the scheme he said that first of all every child born in the Dominion would automatically become a depositor in the Post Office Savings Bank, and that naturally more deposits should follow where the first was in keeping. The State would have the use of the money for the full period of fourteen years and thus the scheme would not only have an effect on the birth-rate of the Dominion, but would also be a direct incentive to thrift. The other proposal was a proposal, the details of which have not been disclosed, for cheapening the cost of living. Sir Joseph said he had been for the best part of twelve months examining a method by which the main articles of food could be cheapened. He proposed to commence with milk, without interfering with those engaged in the business. This scheme would, by the co-operation and assistance of the State, remove waste, and provide this all-important article of food in a manner satisfactory to the consumers, the producers, and the vendors. A similar scheme could be applied to both bread and meat, but in order to prove that it was practical he would first apply it to milk, and if it succeeded the country could then with advantage apply it to the other two articles mentioned.

The third party in the field, the Social Democratic Party, have not issued any special manifesto for the Election, but its "Statement of Principles" and "fighting platform" are kept standing in the *Maoriland Worker*, which is the organ of the party. In this it is stated that the Social Democratic Party stands for "the common ownership of all the

## New Zealand

collectively-used agencies of wealth production for use." It divides society in all countries into "two distinct and opposing classes—the workers who by brain and hand produce all wealth, and the exploiters who by the power of monopoly, based on the private ownership of things collectively used, are able to appropriate without service the products of the toil of others." It holds that "because of these conflicting class interests between the workers and the exploiters, class antagonisms are generated and the world-wide class war is made inevitable." It urges the wage-earners to combine for industrial action into one industrial organization, and all wage-earners, working farmers, and other useful workers to combine for political purposes into one political party. So organized, it is further stated, "the workers may not only wrest immediate and temporary concessions, but they will be able to abolish industrial exploitation, and to substitute the industrial and social administration of collective interests by the people and for the people."

It will be seen, therefore, that the Social-Democratic Party are really Socialists who aim at gaining their object by syndicalist methods, as well as by political action. As a matter of fact the leaders of the general Strike of last year are leading members of this party. In the "fighting platform," the following are, perhaps, the most striking features. Proportional representation, the initiative, the referendum, and the recall: a "Right to Work" Bill with a minimum wage clause, a maximum working day of six hours, a weekly day of rest and a Saturday half holiday: the right of Unions to register or not to register without the loss of legal standing. Dominion awards regulating a minimum wage on a sliding scale bearing relation to the rise in price of commodities, and protection against the creation of bogus competing organizations of labour; the direct representation of the workers on any governing boards in all departments of the Public Service and of Local Government authorities; old age pensions after fifteen years' residence for all men at 60 and for all women at 50; the endowment of motherhood, in-

## Postscript

cluding maternity care and infant life protection; free hospital care for married and unmarried, and medical aid in the direction of maintaining the national health rather than simply in the treatment of disease; and pensions for widows, orphans, the blind, and the incurably helpless; the repeal of the present inadequate Defence Act, and the creation of a citizen army on a volunteer basis, democratically organized with standard wages while on duty, which shall not be used under any circumstances in time of industrial disputes, together with practical measures for the promotion of peace.

Between the policy of this party and the policy outlined by Sir Joseph Ward there is as much difference as between the policy of the Social Democrats and that of the Government. Nevertheless both the Social Democrats and Sir Joseph Ward's Party are animated by a common desire to oust the present Government from office, and it is evident that for the purpose of this election they came to a working agreement to avoid splitting votes. Only in one or two instances are there both Social-Democratic and Liberal candidates in the field, these being cases in which the parties were apparently unable to control their respective candidates.

There are Social Democrats standing in eleven seats and in addition there are six Labour candidates not belonging to the Social Democratic Party.

New Zealand. December, 1914.

### POSTSCRIPT.

December 17, 1914.

THE General Election which took place on the 10th instant resulted unfortunately in what at present looks very much like a deadlock between the Parties. It should at first be explained that the elections this year took place under singular and, indeed, unprecedented conditions.

## New Zealand

Under an Act passed last Session, the members of the Expeditionary Forces before leaving New Zealand were allowed to record their votes, so that they might not be disfranchised owing to their absence on the service of the Empire. As the candidates had not then been nominated it was arranged that the men should simply vote "Government," "Opposition," or "Labour," as the case might be. After the nominations the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, and two selected members of the Labour Party, were empowered to decide to which candidates in each electorate these party votes should be respectively allotted. It followed, therefore, that the results given out on the night of the Election were not decisive, inasmuch as the Expeditionary votes, and those of the seamen, who also have the privilege of voting *in absentia*, could not be added until the official count. On the night of the Election the result of the polling was given as follows: Government, 38; Opposition, 30; Labour, 8. As it was known that the Labour members would vote with the Opposition to turn out the Government, this left the parties equal and if a government supporter was elected as Speaker, there would be a majority of one against the Ministry. Subsequently it was found that on a recount of the votes for Wellington East, with the Expeditionary votes added, the Reform candidate, Dr Newman, headed the Poll instead of the Labour candidate, Mr McLaren. This made the position, Government, 39; Opposition, 30; Labour, 7; thus giving the Government a majority of 1 on a no-confidence division with a government supporter in the Chair.

This refers only to European members. There are four Maori members of the House of Representatives, and these were elected on the day following the polling for the European members. Needless to say, the Maori elections this year were followed with unusual interest. The Maoris give their votes personally to the Returning Officer, before a Maori Assessor, instead of voting by ballot as in the case of the Europeans. In the last Parliament, only one of the Maoris

## Postscript

supported the Government, the other three being members of the Opposition. On this occasion two of the candidates elected had announced their intention of supporting Mr Massey. This still left the Government with a majority of 1, and as the Reform Party are absolutely solid it was thought Mr Massey could carry on.

Yesterday, however, a fresh surprise was sprung on the country when it was announced that a mistake had been made in counting the votes for the Hawke's Bay electorate, and that the corrected return showed that Dr McNab, the Opposition candidate, had been elected instead of Mr Campbell, Ministerialist, as was at first supposed. This, of course, made the parties once more even, counting the Labourites with the official Opposition.

It is generally admitted that such a result in the midst of an Imperial crisis is nothing short of a public calamity. It is to be hoped that no one outside the Dominion will fall into the error of supposing that the result is in any way due to dissatisfaction with the Government for dispatching the Expeditionary Force or with their action in regard to Defence matters generally. It is true that the Social Democrats include the abolition of the compulsory system of training among the planks of their platform, but during the Election they kept this point very much in the background. The official Opposition, on the other hand, gave the Government unswerving support in Parliament in all the measures they took in connection with the war, and during the campaign expressed their entire approval of the dispatch of the Expeditionary Force. Some of the keenest Imperialists in the House are included in their ranks.

The chief cause of the set-back which the Government has sustained is their association with the movement having for its object the introduction of Bible Reading into the State Schools. A Bill having this object in view was introduced by Colonel Allen, the Minister for Education, and, although it was not made a Government measure, the fact that it was favoured by many members of the party raised



## New Zealand

a very powerful opposition against the Government, including practically a block vote of the Roman Catholics. What proved particularly disastrous to the party was an attempt of the Bible in Schools League to make this a supreme test in voting for candidates irrespective of other considerations.

Among the personal changes brought about by the Election the defeat of the Hon. F. M. B. Fisher for Wellington Central is the most noticeable. Mr Fisher was Minister of Customs and Marine in the Massey Government, and was, perhaps, the most brilliant platform speaker and debater in the party. The Government Party sustained another loss in the defeat of Sir Walter Buchanan, who has sat in the House for about forty years, and is one of the most respected members of the Party. On the Opposition side the most notable defeat is that of the Hon. R. McKenzie, another veteran member of the House, who was Minister for Mines under Sir Joseph Ward.

It is not yet known what solution will be found for the apparent deadlock which has arisen. It is hardly likely that the Governor will agree to another dissolution till he has exhausted every means of providing himself with responsible advisers from the present House. Possibly some of the Opposition may decide to refrain from voting against the Government until after the conclusion of the war, or if a trial of strength takes place and it is found that neither side can hold office the most natural course would seem to be to arrange a coalition between the Government and the more moderate Members of the Opposition, thus paving the way for the natural division of parties between the Liberal or Reform on the one hand and Labour on the other, as in Australia.

